People v. Ortiz (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 466, 471, 414 N.E.2d 1072, appeal denied (1981), 83 Ill.2d 573. Defendant Williams relies on People v. Pugh (1967), 36 Ill.2d 435, 223 N.E.2d 115, People v. Calhoun (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 691, 361 N.E.2d 55, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 632, and People v. Howard (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 330 N.E.2d 262, in which the court reversed convictions based on the lack of evidence of constructive possession. We find these cases to be distinguishable.

[Citation.] The act of dominion may be that defendant had the [contraband] on his body, that he tried to conceal it, [or] that he was seen throwing it away." People v. Howard , 29 Ill. App. 3d 387, 389, 330 N.E.2d 262 (1975). However, mere proximity is not sufficient evidence to prove actual possession.

Moreover, unlike Macias, no compelling alternative explanation for the keys to the apartment or his presence in the vicinity of the building in question was posited or arose from the evidence presented, and the reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence were sufficient to establish his control.¶ 26 We have also considered People v. Howard, 29 Ill. App. 3d 387 (1975), People v. Strong, 316 Ill. App. 3d 807 (2000), and People v. Wolski, 27 Ill. App. 3d 526 (1975), cited by defendant for the proposition that control of a residence is insufficient to prove possession because that control may not be exclusive, but find them unpersuasive. In Howard, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 389, the State was required to prove actual possession, and therefore the case is factually inapposite to the case at bar.

( People v. Jackson (1961), 23 Ill.2d 360, 178 N.E.2d 320.) The act of dominion may be that defendant had the contraband on his person, that he tried to conceal it, or that he was seen throwing it away. ( People v. Howard (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 330 N.E.2d 262.) Here, the evidence reveals that defendants were in the room, that cocaine was on a table in the same room, and that defendants were 18 inches away from it.

Accordingly, the State's failure to process either knife for fingerprints, when extensive processing for fingerprints was conducted on less critical items in the apartment, could have appeared to the jury as such a conspicuous omission unfavorable to the prosecution. ( People v. Howard (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 389, 330 N.E.2d 262, 264; People v. Smith (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 64, 67, 278 N.E.2d 551, 553; People v. Jackson (1961), 23 Ill.2d 360, 364, 178 N.E.2d 320, 322.) Under the beforementioned factual circumstances, the presence of a knife within the deceased's grasp could have been considered by the jury as evidence of her possession of the knife. ( People v. Howard (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 389, 330 N.E.2d 262, 264.)

Knowledge alone is not the equivalent of possession. ( People v. Jackson (1961), 23 Ill.2d 360, 363-64, 178 N.E.2d 320; People v. Howard (4th Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 388, 330 N.E.2d 262.) While the law raises an inference of control when narcotics are found on the premises occupied by a defendant, absent facts and circumstances which indicate otherwise ( People v. Nettles (1961), 23 Ill.2d 306, 308-09), it is only a permissible inference, not an automatic and absolute result. Defendant's presence on the premises does not significantly add to the State's case.

Dominion may be shown where the defendant has the contraband on his body, or when he tries to conceal it or is seen throwing it away. People v. Anderson, 2018 IL App (4th) 160037 (citing People v. Howard, 29 Ill.App.3d 387, 389 (1975)). Proximity, alone, is insufficient to prove actual possession.

There was not only the flight and the proximity of the weapon to where defendant was apprehended, but Sergeant Rellinger specifically testified that moments before defendant fell, he discarded a "dark object" that made a "metallic sound" as it hit the ground. See People v. Howard, 29 Ill.App.3d 387, 389 (1975) (explaining that dominion can be established where a defendant is "seen throwing [the contraband] away"); contra Wright, 2013 IL App (1st) 111803, ¶ 26 (explaining that no witness saw the defendant "make any actions that would indicate that [he] was discarding a gun"). Defendant fled from police, discarded a "dark object" that made a "metallic sound" when hitting the ground, and was apprehended inches away from a handgun.

¶ 50 Defendant argues actual possession fails to apply here because defendant did not actually possess the firearm. Specifically, defendant relies on People v. Howard, 29 Ill. App. 3d 387, 389, 330 N.E.2d 262, 264 (1975), to argue that actual possession applies only where a defendant is seen throwing an item away and here no one witnessed defendant discard the firearm. Therefore, defendant argues constructive possession applies.

) Possession may be established by evidence of actual physical possession or constructive possession. ( E.g., People v. Jones (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 1143, 1148, 435 N.E.2d 823, 826.) Actual possession is proved by testimony which shows defendant exercised some form of dominion over the unlawful substance, such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away. ( People v. Howard (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 387, 389, 330 N.E.2d 262, 264.) Constructive possession exists without actual personal present dominion over the controlled substance but with an intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over it. ( People v. Valentin (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 22, 31, 480 N.E.2d 1351, 1358.