His testimony on this aspect of the case is undisputed and therefore must stand. ( People v. Dollen, 53 Ill.2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879 (1972); People v. Housby, 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461 (1975).) In this case the criminal design did not originate in the mind of the defendant but was conceived by his government who recruited a former girl friend to induce him to procure a drug.

E.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (3rd Cir. 1975); United States v. Wells, 506 F.2d 924, 925 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941, 94 S.Ct. 1945, 40 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974); United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742, 752-53 (6th Cir. 1973); Kadis v. United States, supra, at 373-74; United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1958). Similarly, several state courts which have decided the issue recently require the state to negate the issue of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.E.g., State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 135-37, 249 A.2d 238, 239-40 (1968); People v. Housby, 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 764, 338 N.E.2d 461, 462-63 (1975); Simmons v. State, 8 Md. App. 355, 364-65, 259 A.2d 814, 816-17 (1969); State v. Grilli, Minn., 230 N.W.2d 445, 446 (1975); State v. Murphy, Or. App., 535 P.2d 779 (1975); State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975); State v. Amundson, 69 Wis.2d 554, 564-65, 230 N.W.2d 775, 781 (1975). Contra, Brown v. State, Del., 310 A.2d 870, 871 (1973); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 222, 291 A.2d 425, 434 (1972).

In other words, the court rejected defendant's entrapment defense because it was not supported by the evidence. It follows, therefore, that defendant's reliance on People v. Estrada (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 228, 414 N.E.2d 512, People v. Housby (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461, and People v. Carpentier (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 1024, 314 N.E.2d 647, is misplaced. In Estrada and Carpentier, the appellate court found error in the circuit court's implicit finding that no entrapment existed as a matter of law as a result of its refusal to give an entrapment instruction where the evidence supported such instruction.

Entrapment is an affirmative defense if established by the evidence. ( People v. Dollen (1972), 53 Ill.2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879; People v. Lewis (1963), 26 Ill.2d 542, 187 N.E.2d 700; People v. Outten (1958), 13 Ill.2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 284.) Once the defendant presents some evidence in support of the contention that there was an entrapment, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not entrapped. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3-2(b); People v. Dollen (1972), 53 Ill.2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879; People v. Cross (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 628, 379 N.E.2d 1319; People v. Housby (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461. In Sherman v. United States (1958), 356 U.S. 369, 2 L.Ed.2d 848, 78 S.Ct. 819, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Sorrells v. United States (1932), 287 U.S. 435, 77 L.Ed. 413, 53 S.Ct. 210, in which it recognized the defense of entrapment in Federal courts, and stated:

Thus the informer was the only witness who could either corroborate or deny the contradictory testimony relating to the essential elements of the illegal sale. See also People v. Gibson (4th Dist. 1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 898, 370 N.E.2d 262; People v. Housby (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461. Unlike Lewis and the other cases cited, the unidentified informer in the case at bar did not arrange the buy and was not present at the time defendant delivered the 100 pills of speed to Salmon.

( People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765.) Furthermore, it has been held that the defense of entrapment is established where there is unrebutted testimony by defendant that the State's informant supplied the drugs that are the subject of the offense. (See, e.g., People v. Dollen, 53 Ill.2d 280, 290 N.E.2d 879; People v. Housby, 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461; People v. Rogers, 6 Ill. App.3d 1092, 286 N.E.2d 365.) Where evidence is presented by defendant on the issue of entrapment, the burden is on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issue of entrapment and all other elements of the offense. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3-2(b).)

Defendant recognizes in his brief that he could not raise the defense of entrapment since it is not available to an accused who, like defendant, denied having committed or participated in an unlawful act, under the precedent of People v. Morgan (1st Dist. 1968), 98 Ill. App.2d 435, 240 N.E.2d 286. In that case the evidence was deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense of soliciting a prostitute where the law officer merely provided an opportunity for the commission of the crime by a person who was already so disposed. While defendant did not raise the defense of entrapment, in his reply brief he seeks to raise a related defense and cites as his authority People v. Housby (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461. The Housby case was one involving a controlled substance where the defense of entrapment had been raised and where the State failed to rebut the defense of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.

We find no error in the refusal to direct a verdict in defendant's favor. In his reply brief, defendant asserts that his testimony of consent stands uncontradicted because the State failed to call complainant in rebuttal to refute the voluntary and seductive conduct he attributed to her. He relies upon People v. Housby (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461, which involved a prosecution for the delivery of a controlled substance. There, the State's evidence related solely to the actual sale of the substance between defendant and an I.B.I. agent.

Upon such records the court held that entrapment was established as a matter of law. Comparable records resulted in reversals of convictions in People v. Rogers, 6 Ill. App.3d 1092, 286 N.E.2d 365, and People v. Housby, 33 Ill. App.3d 762, 338 N.E.2d 461. In this case an IBI agent testified that defendant sold him the substance while seated in the agent's automobile.