Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC069174
Jenkins, J.
This is an appeal from the final judgment following the conviction by a jury of appellant Ervin G. Horton for public intoxication, riding a bicycle while under the influence of alcohol, possession of a controlled substance, and bringing a controlled substance into jail. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 7, 2009, an information was filed charging appellant with bringing a controlled substance into jail (Pen. Code, § 4573) (count one), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) (count two), public intoxication (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f)) (count three), and riding a bicycle while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 21200.5) (count four).
Unless otherwise stated herein, all statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
The information was based on events occurring on May 28, 2009 in Menlo Park. Officer Tony Mendoza was dispatched to a residence on Hollyburne Avenue following a domestic dispute or noise complaint. When Officer Mendoza arrived, he found appellant in the backyard and told him to be quiet. Appellant agreed to this command but, nonetheless, Officer Mendoza and his colleagues were dispatched to the residence again a short time later based on another noise complaint. The officers left again after appellant agreed to be quiet.
Later the same evening and in the same neighborhood, Officer Mendoza stopped appellant for riding a bicycle without an illuminated headlight. When stopped, appellant smelled of alcohol and appeared intoxicated with red eyes, an unsteady gait and a belligerent demeanor. Officer Mendoza’s colleague, Officer James Luevano, administered a preliminary alcohol screening test that identified appellant’s blood-alcohol content as 0.156 percent, nearly twice the legal limit. The officers determined appellant was too intoxicated to safely ride the bicycle, and arrested him for public intoxication and riding a bicycle while under the influence of alcohol. Officer Joshua Venzon then searched appellant’s person and found no contraband.
Appellant advised the officers that he had ridden to a nearby gas station to buy cigarettes, but realized once he got there he had forgotten his wallet. Consistent with this story, the officer found no wallet on appellant’s person.
While transporting appellant to jail, Officer Venzon warned appellant in a voice he believed was loud enough for appellant to hear that “bringing stuff into jail is illegal. It’s another felony. Tell me now if you have anything.” Appellant was yelling and arguing that he was being harassed at the time, and offered no response to the warning. Subsequently, when appellant was searched after arriving at jail, three rocks of suspected cocaine base were found in his right front pants pocket. When questioned about the drugs, appellant responded, “yeah, that’s crack. I smoke crack.” Appellant was thus arrested for bringing a controlled substance into jail and possession of a controlled substance.
Testing by police later confirmed the substance found in appellant’s pocket was cocaine base weighing 0.18 grams with a street value of about $50 to $60.
Trial began on January 11, 2010. Appellant, testifying in his defense, stated that he began consuming alcohol (E & J Brandy and Diet Coke) about 7:00 p.m. on the day in question, and had consumed about a half gallon by 10:30 p.m., when police first contacted him in response to the noise complaint at his residence. Appellant, due to his intoxication, did not recall being tested for alcohol, transported to jail, or told that it is illegal to bring contraband to jail. He did recall being searched and found in possession of the rocks of cocaine base. According to appellant, he told the officers at that time that the drugs did not belong to him. Appellant had checked his pockets earlier in the day and found no drugs in them. Appellant also noted that he was deaf in one ear.
On January 13, 2010, the jury found appellant guilty as charged. The trial court thereafter suspended imposition of a sentence, ordered appellant to serve 180 days in county jail, and placed him on probation for three years. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, appellant challenges the judgment on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly brought cocaine base into jail in violation of section 4573 following his arrest for being under the influence of alcohol in public and while riding a bicycle. According to appellant, his level of intoxication and the absence of any indicia of awareness prove he was in fact unaware of the existence of the drugs found in his possession. The following legal principles are relevant to his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Section 4573 provides in relevant part: “[A]ny person, who knowingly brings or sends into... any state prison... any controlled substance, the possession of which is prohibited by Division 10 (commencing with Section 11000) of the Health and Safety Code, ... is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years.” (§ 4573.)
“In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court’s role is a limited one. ‘ “ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.)
“Explaining this standard the court said that ‘this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation omitted.] Instead the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)
“ ‘ “Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 738-739.)
“ ‘The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] “Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.)
As noted above, in this case, appellant points to evidence of his intoxication and the lack of evidence of his awareness of the drugs in his pocket in arguing there was insufficient evidence to prove he had the requisite state of mind – knowledge – to commit a violation of section 4573. Turning first to the evidence of appellant’s intoxication, the law is clear that, under section 22, “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to negate the existence of general criminal intent.” (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 81.) Thus, as the California Supreme Court has explained, intoxication is not relevant for the purpose of negating the existence of a general criminal intent. (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 81-82.)
Section 22 provides in relevant part: “(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his or her having been in that condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. [¶] (b) Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought.” (§ 22, subds. (a), (b).)
Interestingly, the distinction between crimes of general and specific intent arose specifically to address the issue of whether a defendant’s voluntary intoxication could suffice to absolve him or her from liability for a particular crime: “ ‘The distinction between specific and general intent crimes evolved as a judicial response to the problem of the intoxicated offender. That problem is to reconcile two competing theories of what is just in the treatment of those who commit crimes while intoxicated. On the one hand, the moral culpability of a drunken criminal is frequently less than that of a sober person effecting a like injury. On the other hand, it is commonly felt that a person who voluntarily gets drunk and while in that state commits a crime should not escape the consequences. (See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) p. 537.)” (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 81-82.)
Here, appellant acknowledges both that evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to negate the existence of general criminal intent, and that section 4573 is a general intent crime. (People v. Gastello (2010) 49 Cal.4th 395, 402-403.) Nonetheless, appellant cites People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1118 (Mendoza) for the proposition that a defendant’s mental state, including his intoxication, is relevant “even to a general intent crime when the statute specifically includes the requirement that the defendant act ‘knowingly.’ ”
Appellant correctly notes that, in Mendoza, the California Supreme Court stated that, under some circumstances, delineating between specific and general intent crimes is an inadequate basis for deciding the admissibility of voluntary intoxication evidence, and that the applicable scope of section 22 sometimes rests in part on “policy considerations.” (Id. at pp. 1127-1128. E.g., People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975, 985 [holding that, while receiving stolen property is a general intent crime, “with regard to the element of knowledge, [it] is a ‘specific intent crime, ’ as that term is used in section 22, subdivision (b)....”].) However, the California Supreme Court has also made clear the holding of Mendoza is “ ‘is very narrow, ’ limited to admission of evidence of intoxication solely on the question of aider and abettor liability.” (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 93.)
The California Supreme Court explained this narrow holding as follows: “An aider and abettor must intend not only the act of encouraging and facilitating, but also the additional criminal act the perpetrator commits. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Because the knowledge requirement was intimately entwined with intent, we concluded that it ‘ “is closely akin to [People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444]’s definition of specific intent.” ’ (Id. at p. 1131.)” (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 93.)
In any event, we need not delve into the question of the scope of Mendoza’s holding because the case is largely irrelevant for our purposes. Here, appellant is challenging the sufficiency of evidence that he knowingly brought drugs into jail, not the admissibility of evidence that he was intoxicated when doing so. As such, even assuming the jury could consider the intoxication evidence for purposes of deciding whether appellant had the requisite knowledge under section 4573, we conclude that all the evidence in this record, considered as a whole and in a light most favorable to the judgment, was sufficient to support his conviction.
For example, there is evidence in the record that Officer Venzon warned appellant while transporting him to jail that taking contraband into jail was a felony. Officer Venzon insisted he gave this warning in a voice loud enough for appellant to hear in the back seat of the police car, even with the presence of a barrier between the front and back seats consisting of one half screen and one half Plexiglas. In addition, the record reflects that when three separate rocks of cocaine base were later found in appellant’s front pants pocket, he responded to the officer without any apparent shock or confusion: “Yeah, that’s crack. I smoke crack.” Appellant also acknowledged wearing his own pants at the time of his arrest and having checked the contents of his pockets earlier in the day.
Presuming the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from this evidence, as the law requires (People v. Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 738-739), we conclude there is no basis for overriding the jury’s decision to convict him of knowingly bringing drugs into jail in violation of section 4573. True, there is contrary evidence. As mentioned above, appellant testified that he did not in fact hear Officer Venzon’s warning that he would be committing a felony by bringing contraband to jail. In support of his testimony, appellant points out that he was belligerent and intoxicated while being transported to jail and is deaf in one ear. However, appellant’s argument ignores the “black letter law” that conflicts in evidence and inconsistencies in testimony are matters to be resolved, not by this court, but by the trier of fact, who is the “sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses.” (People v. Watts (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258, 1259.)
Moreover, “one witness, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a verdict.” (People v. Watts, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) Here, the jury could have rejected appellant’s self-serving denials in favor of Officer Venzon’s professional opinion that, under the relevant circumstances, appellant would have heard his warning. And in any event, even if appellant did not hear the officer’s warning, it could hardly have been a surprise to him that bringing illegal narcotics to jail is a criminal offense. Indeed, appellant did not act surprised when the drugs were ultimately found on his person and seized by police; rather, he acknowledged in a straight-forward fashion that the drugs were crack cocaine and that “[he] smoked crack.”
Finally, we add that, while it is undisputed appellant was highly intoxicated on the night in question, this fact alone did not require the jury to find he lacked the capability to form the requisite intent to commit a violation of section 4573. (Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1134 [“a jury need not accept an intoxication defense”].) Rather, based on the record before it, the jury could reasonably have believed appellant knowingly brought the rocks of cocaine base into jail despite his drunkenness. For example, appellant was coordinated enough to ride a bicycle in the dark just before his arrest. Appellant was also able to respond to several routine questions by the police officers during pre-booking procedures, and repeatedly expressed concern that he was late for work and needed to call his boss. In addition, appellant later recalled arguing with the officers and being handcuffed, even though he claimed not to have recalled other events on the night in question. Under these circumstances, the jury could therefore have concluded that appellant simply decided to take a risk by bringing the contraband into jail, perhaps emboldened by his intoxication, as well as Officer Venzon’s failure to initially find the drugs when he searched appellant before transporting him to jail. As the California Supreme Court has explained, so long as there is any reasonable hypothesis that demonstrates substantial evidence supporting the conviction, we are required on appeal to affirm. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) Here, we conclude this standard has been met.
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for violating section 4573. On this record, the jury could have reasonably inferred appellant knew when taken to jail that he was carrying cocaine base in his pocket. Nothing more was required.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.