Opinion
May 7, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Sherman, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
It is well settled that a defendant has a right to counsel at a postindictment, prearraignment lineup, or at a lineup conducted after the filing of a felony complaint (People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154; People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218). In addition, if the right to counsel attaches in one case, it also attaches in any related case arising out of the same criminal transaction (People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689). Nevertheless, the law is clear that the indelible and nonwaivable right to counsel arises only after an accusatory instrument has been filed, as this is the means by which a criminal action is formally commenced (see, CPL 1.20, [8], [17]; People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, supra; People v. Simpson, 125 A.D.2d 347). At bar, there is no evidence suggesting that the felony complaint had been filed at the time the lineup was held (see, People v. Lane, 64 N.Y.2d 1047 [the filing and not the filling out of the felony complaint commences the prosecution for purposes of the attachment of the defendant's right to counsel]).
Moreover, there is no indication that the People caused a delay in the filing of the felony complaint, or in having the defendant arraigned, for the purpose of depriving the defendant of his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings (People v. Mosley, 135 A.D.2d 662, 664; see also, People v. Williams, 112 A.D.2d 259, 260; People v. Wilson, 56 N.Y.2d 692, 694). Rather, it appears that the police attempted, in good faith, to expedite the necessary investigatory lineup (see, People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474, cert denied 459 U.S. 846; People v. Wilson, 133 A.D.2d 790, 791). We find that the prosecution met its burden of establishing that the delay was not calculated to deprive the defendant of his right to have counsel present at the viewing (People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 340). In addition, we reject the defendant's contention that a court order was required to remove him from Brooklyn to Queens for the purpose of conducting a lineup.
In any event, the independent evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming such that any error with regard to the admission of the lineup identifications was harmless (People v. Gonzalez, 27 N.Y.2d 53, 57, cert denied 400 U.S. 996; People v Smallwood, 99 A.D.2d 819; People v. Dorch, 152 A.D.2d 703; People v. Owens, 74 N.Y.2d 677; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237). Both of the robbery victims had a strong independent basis to support their in-court identification of the defendant. In addition, three days after the crime the defendant was stopped while driving the victim's stolen car and arrested. A gun recovered from one of the passengers was identified by the victim as the gun used during the robbery.
Finally, we decline to reduce the defendant's sentence in the interest of justice (CPL 470.15; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Mangano, P.J., Bracken, Lawrence and Kooper, JJ., concur.