First, Brisbon contends that the prosecutor's remarks on the quality of mercy that the jury should accord the defendant were an expression of the prosecutor's own personal opinion and were designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. Second, Brisbon contends that these remarks asked the jury to execute the defendant for the "I-57" murders, and not for the murder of "Hippie" Morgan. Brisbon, relying upon this court's decision in People v. Hope (1986), 116 Ill.2d 265, maintains that the implied references to the I-57 murders constituted reversible error because they were irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and were based upon a nonstatutory aggravating factor. We do not find Brisbon's arguments persuasive.
For the same reasons that gang membership may be necessary to understand an otherwise inexplicable act (Colon, 2018 IL App (1st) 160120, ¶ 35), the complete lack of gang membership may be necessary for a jury to fully grasp the events that led to a victim's murder. ¶ 31 Defendant argues that the State's introduction of and comments on the victim's mother's testimony are similar to the testimony and remarks that led the Illinois Supreme Court to reverse in People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359 (1964), and People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986). ¶ 32 In Bernette, the supreme court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and found: "We do not see how the jury here could have reached any other conclusion."
Generally, arguments urging a fearless administration of justice or commenting unfavorably on the evils of crime do not constitute error. People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 277-78 (1986). However, even a cursory examination of the State's argument in this case suggests more than a general exhortation to the jury to protect society.
This court has condemned the introduction of otherwise irrelevant information about a crime victim's personal traits or familial relationships at the guilt phase of trial. (See People v. Hope (1986), 116 Ill.2d 265, 274-77 (prosecutor referenced fact that murder victim was survived by wife and three children); People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, 370-73 (evidence that the decedent had a wife and children); People v. Dukes (1957), 12 Ill.2d 334, 340 (son of the decedent testified concerning decedent's wife and family).) We recognize, however, that not every mention of a victim's personal traits will automatically vest in a defendant the right to a new trial.
" Defense counsel based his argument on two cases, People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265 (1986), and People v. Davis, 97 Ill. 2d 1 (1983), in which this court held that the jury should not have any knowledge of what a prior jury had done in a particular case because such knowledge could influence the jury. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, stating that a double homicide in such a small county, such as Henry County, would be remembered and that it would be more intellectually honest to tell the jurors the case history.
" ' "People v. Harris, 225 Ill. 2d 1, 31 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 275 (1986) (quoting Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371)). Our initial declaration unmistakably holds true: defendant was required to object to the testimony at issue and include a claim of error regarding it in his posttrial motion in order to preserve this issue for our full review.
" The defendant cites People v. Hope (1986), 116 Ill.2d 265, and People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, to support his argument that the trial judge committed reversible error. In Hope we emphasized that "the holding reached in each case dealing with reference to a murder victim's family will depend upon how such reference comes about."
¶ 23 Our supreme court has addressed the admission of evidence about surviving family members and cautioned against its use in criminal trials. Evidence that the deceased has a surviving spouse or family generally has no relationship to the guilt or innocence of the accused and normally serves only to prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 275 (1986). When such evidence is not elicited incidentally but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is prejudicial and can constitute reversible error. Id.
Additionally, a review of Stevens' comment regarding Dods' faith in context reveals an attempt to explain why he elected to return to his apartment the morning of Dods' murder in lieu of attending church services with her. Thus, the testimony defendant complains of here does not approach the clearly inflammatory testimony elicited in the cases he relies upon to support his argument. See People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 276-78 (1986) (finding repeated references to victim's wife and small children improper); People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 131 (2000) (testimony concerning age of victim's child, fact that family had lived in same building together, and length of time victim's father had been married served no other purpose than to inflame jury). Instead, we believe that the details provided in both testimonies were relevant to the presentation of the State's case. ¶ 48 Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutorial misconduct continued in the State's closing argument and rebuttal.
Last, defendant argues that challenged comments (11) and (12) improperly contained highly emotional imagery about Walker and defendant's mother that had nothing to do with defendant's guilt or innocence. In support, he cites Clarke, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 106, and People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 275 (1986). Clarke offers no guidance other than the general abjuration against making arguments calculated solely to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury.