Opinion
2d Crim. No. B293399
02-19-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NICOLAS HOLZER, Defendant and Appellant.
J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Michael Katz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 1470650)
(Santa Barbara County)
Nicolas Holzer appeals his conviction for four counts of first degree premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (a)) with multiple-murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2)) and weapon use enhancements (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found that appellant was legally sane when he stabbed his father, mother, two sons, and the family dog more than 100 times. Appellant was sentenced to eight years state prison plus four consecutive terms of life without possibility of parole. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Facts
On the evening of August 11, 2014, appellant stabbed to death his father (William Holzer, age 73), his mother (Sheila Holzer, age 74), his son (Sebastian Hozler, age 13), his son (Vincent Holzer, age 10), and the family dog (Dixie). During the surprise attack on his father, appellant broke the knife handle, got another knife from the kitchen, and then stabbed the remaining family members. Appellant placed the knives neatly on the kitchen countertop, washed his hands, and called 911. He told the operator that he had killed his family, answered questions about who he was and where he lived, and waited for the Santa Barbara County Sheriff.
Two detectives conducted a videotaped Miranda interview. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.) Appellant said "I was supposed to be doing something like this a long time ago" and finally worked up the nerve to do it. Appellant knew it was wrong to kill his family but felt he had to do it. He claimed to have killed other people. He said that he accidentally hit a jogger in Isla Vista in the 1980s, may have killed a friend's sister in high school, hit someone on a mountain road in South Africa, was responsible for the Columbine High School killings in Colorado, and started the AIDS epidemic in the 1970s. "I'm just really a bad person" and "I've done lots of horrible things." Appellant said he was the most evil person in all of humanity and was "going to go to Hell for all eternity. Everyone else gets basically to go to Heaven, but not me."
Doctor James Tahmisian interviewed appellant a few hours later. Appellant said he was "gonna be condemned for all eternity" and that he had an "[o]kay" ability to tell right from wrong. Appellant denied that he suffered from hallucinations or that anyone threatened him, but thought he may have had "delusional thinking." Dr. Tahmisian gave examples of delusional beliefs but appellant said none applied.
Doctor David Glaser, a psychiatrist, interviewed appellant the same day. Appellant said "I had to save my family. And I had to take the best opportunity I could to not let them . . . go to hell with me." Appellant repeatedly stabbed the victims to make sure they died quickly. Appellant knew he would probably spend the rest of his life in prison or receive the death penalty and asked Dr. Glaser to help "mitigate my circumstances or improve what is happening to me." "I assume that your assessment is essentially going to be going to the DA in determining how to prosecute me" and "[your] insight has a huge impact on how they perceive it."
Two years later, appellant claimed that God told him to kill his family.
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) and waived jury trial. The trial court conducted a 16-day bifurcated trial and found that appellant was guilty and legally sane.
Dr. Glaser testified that appellant was legally sane, "appreciate[d] the moral wrongfulness" of his acts, and "demonstrated a nuanced appreciation of right and wrong." Appellant considered using a handgun so that father did not suffer.
Doctor David Fenell, the supervising psychiatrist and medical director at Atascadero State Hospital, stated that it was unlikely that appellant heard a command from God to stab the victims. If that was the case, appellant would have told the 911 operator and detectives. Dr. Fenell opined that appellant was sane when he committed the murders and appreciated the moral wrongfulness of his acts.
Doctor Brandon Yakush, a psychologist, testified that appellant knew the difference between right and wrong and "there's just nothing contemporaneous to the offenses that I can correlate to God belief . . . ." Appellant's thought process was within normal limits "in that he was linear, coherent, co-directive," and his responses were appropriate to the questions posed. That was consistent with the testimony of appellant's sister (Suzanne Gunn). Appellant told her, four to six months before the stabbings, that he was going to kill his parents and sons, and made no mention of God. Appellant told his brother (Scott Holzer) that appellant's oldest son (Sebastain) was going to die.
Family members described appellant as manipulative and controlling, at times exhibiting a seething anger and rage. Appellant graduated from UCSB Phi Beta Kappa, briefly worked for the British parliament, had a psychotic break after returning from Japan, married and divorced, and after three years of litigation was awarded custody of his sons. Despite his mental issues, appellant was gainfully employed at Raytheon for five years and left his job to live with his father and mother. Between 1996 and the date of the killings, appellant was treated for a thyroid condition, depression, psychotic and paranoid anxiety, major depression with psychotic features, chronic delusional disorder, schizophrenia, and two suicide attempts. While in jail, appellant was diagnosed as suffering from unspecified schizophrenia.
Five mental health experts opined that appellant was legally insane. Doctor Lakshman Rasiah believed that appellant suffered a delusional disorder and "his delusions overcame his understanding . . . of right and wrong." Clinical and forensic psychologist Susan Ferrant opined that appellant suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and was "functioning in the framework of a delusion" when he killed the victims. Doctor Howard Babus opined that appellant was schizophrenic and acutely psychotic. Carolyn Murphy, a forensic psychologist, opined that appellant suffered from schizoaffective disorder and was unable to distinguish right from wrong. Neuropsychologist Juan Gutierrez opined that appellant suffered from a delusional disorder and an infant brain injury, and did not understand the difference between right and wrong.
The trial court found that appellant was legally sane and understood that the nature and quality of his actions when he committed the killings. That was the testimony of Dr. Tahmisian, Dr. Glaser, Dr. Yakush, Dr. Fenell, and Dr. Mark Alfano.
Substantial Evidence
We review for substantial evidence, a daunting standard in which the reviewing court "'presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier [of fact] could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' [Citation.]" (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.) It is settled that a defendant may suffer from a diagnosable mental illness without being legally insane. (People v. Mills (2012) 55 Cal.4th 663, 672; see, e.g., People v. Chavez (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 882, 891 (Chavez) [jury determined defendant was legally sane even though expert opinions were conflicting].) "'"To warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends."' [Citation.]" (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 519.)
Mentally Unable to Distinguish Right from Wrong
Section 25, subdivision (b) provides that the defense of insanity "shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense." "[I]f a person is incapable, because of a mental disease or defect, of understanding that his actions are morally wrong - that is, in violation of generally accepted standards of moral obligation - then that person is legally insane, regardless of whether he knows his actions are illegal. [Citation.]" (People v. Severance (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 305, 323.)
The question of whether a defendant is criminally responsible for killing a human during a delusional episode depends on the nature of the delusion. (People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 781, fn. 13 (Skinner).) Appellant's statements to the 911 operator, the detectives, and Drs. Tahmisian and Glaser clearly show that appellant was aware of his actions and could distinguish right from wrong. Appellant put the knives on the counter, washed his hands, called 911, and answered questions about who he was and what happened. Appellant waited for the responding officers, waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed. In those interviews, appellant expressed remorse and said he knew it was wrong to kill his family. Appellant said he had to work up the nerve to commit the killings and stabbed the victims as quickly as possible so they would not suffer.
The trial court found that appellant had "a mental disease or illness that qualifies under the M['Naghten] test" but understood the nature and quality of his actions. Appellant was "methodical and precise in the killing but made absolutely no effort to hide his crimes or avoid detection. He then calls 911, he confesses completely to the crime, and he does so . . . in affect and bearing and language reflective of someone who is not obviously insane." "[T]he fact that he suffered from a delusion no one quarrels with. I think that's clear. And the question is are the delusions, the mental disorder[,] so pervasive and of such a nature as to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong[?]" The trial court found that appellant was legally sane and that appellant's statement, two years later, "that he's compelled by God to kill his family" is "arguably suspicious at a minimum, and . . . convenient." "The weight of the evidence suggests [appellant] was not commanded by God but acted from depression, compulsion, certainly a mental disorder, but not one so severe and entrenched and obvious that it can be said that he was insane."
The burden was on appellant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 25, subd. (b); People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921, 955 (Powell).) "'[T]he fact that a defendant claims and believes that his acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a finding of legal insanity.' [Citation.]" (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 609 (Coddington), overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn 13.) The question is "'whether a defendant can distinguish, not the legal rightness or wrongness of his act, but its moral rightness or wrongness.' [Citation.]" (People v. Torres (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1401.) In Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, our Supreme Court explained: Morality, in the context of an insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards, not defendant's "'own distorted standards.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 608.)
Despite appellant's delusional beliefs, appellant knew it was wrong to kill his mom and dad and kids but "did it anyways." Dr. Glaser testified that appellant's claim that he acted on God's command was "self-serving and just not consistent with the phenomenology of hallucinations." Dr. Yakush agreed that appellant was delusional but not legally insane.
Appellant claims that he was rambling and incoherent, but the 911 call and jail house interviews show that appellant was rational and answered all questions. More than two years later, appellant claimed that God told him to kill the victims. The trial court reasonably concluded that it was a fabrication, designed to avoid punishment. We do not reweigh the evidence or act as a second trier of fact. (Chavez, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 891.) "Merely because a person finds it difficult or impossible to control his or her behavior, however, does not necessarily mean that the person lacks the ability to understand the nature and quality of that behavior or to distinguish right from wrong." "The issue of legal sanity is, of course, a complex and uncertain one about which fully competent experts can reasonably disagree." (Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 958.)
Moral Right From Wrong - a Societal Standard
Citing a Connecticut case, State v. Wilson (1997) 700 A.2d 633, appellant claims that he honestly but mistakenly believed that society morally approved his actions to save his family from eternal hell. The argument is based on the theory that he was legally insane if he harbored a delusional belief that society did not morally condemn his actions. That may be the law in Connecticut with respect to "deific commands" to kill (i.e., defendant's belief that a divine power authorized the killing), but that is not the law of California or the majority of other jurisdictions. "[T]he large majority of other jurisdictions that have considered the cognitive prong of the insanity defense has chosen a societal, rather than a personal, standard. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 618.)
As discussed in Coddington, the trier of fact considers the defendant's delusions about the facts, not defendant's delusional beliefs about the societal standard of morality. (Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 608.) "'[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards particular to the accused.'" (Ibid.) "The fact that a defendant claims and believes that his acts are justifiable according to his own distorted standards does not compel a finding of legal insanity. [Citation.]" (People v. Rittger (1960) 54 Cal.2d 720, 734.)
A delusion about the facts would be where defendant believes his victim is about to kill him, and he kills the victim in self defense. (See, e.g., People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822, 829-831 [jury erroneously instructed that defendant, a paranoid schizophrenic, was sane if he unreasonably believed he acted in self-defense].) If, on the other hand, defendant's "'delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and [defendant] killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.' [Citation.] [¶] . . . The [factual] delusion [that the victim is about to kill defendant] . . . results in an inability to appreciate that the act is wrong. The defendant believes he is defending himself. The second delusion, without more, does not suggest that the defendant believes his act is lawful or morally justified. [Citation.]" (Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 781, fn. 13, citing M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 211 [8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723].) --------
This was discussed in People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259: "Although seldom addressed the courts, which have generally left the word 'wrong' undefined in jury instructions, the question is whether moral wrong is to be judged by societ[al's] generally accepted standards of moral obligation or whether the subjective moral precepts of the accused are to be employed. While the inherent 'slipperiness' of the terminology in this area may leave some doubt, it appears most courts mean that the defendant is sane if he knows his act violates generally accepted standards of moral obligation whatever his own moral evaluation may be. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1274.) Defendant's inability to appreciate moral wrong is a component of the California test of insanity (Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 780) but "'wrong,' in the sanity context, means the violation of generally accepted standards of moral obligation." (Stress, supra, at p. 1275.) Stated another way, legal insanity requires a sincerely held belief grounded on generally accepted ethical or moral principles derived from an external source, not those standards particular to the accused. (Price v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1069, fn. 13.)
Appellant admitted he knew the killings were wrong. Appellant's mental expert, Dr. Babus, agreed that appellant would not be saying "I'm going to spend the rest of my life in prison" unless appellant understood that what he did was clearly wrong. Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant was sane when he committed the killings.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J. We concur:
PERREN, J.
TANGEMAN, J.
Brian E. Hill, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
J. Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Michael Katz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.