Opinion
7362 Ind. 1542N/14
10-18-2018
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Freilyn HOLQUIN, Defendant–Appellant.
Gotlin & Jaffe, New York (Lawrence Fleischer of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Michael J. Yetter of counsel), for respondent.
Gotlin & Jaffe, New York (Lawrence Fleischer of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Michael J. Yetter of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Gische, Mazzarelli, Webber, Kahn, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Mark Dwyer, J.), rendered January 10, 2017, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of eight years, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence. Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly established defendant's guilt. There was no rational explanation for the presence of a large quantity of drugs and packaging materials in defendant's own apartment other than his constructive possession of the contraband (see e.g. People v. Diaz, 220 A.D.2d 260, 260, 632 N.Y.S.2d 82 [1st Dept. 1995] ). The evidence also established defendant's guilt under the correctly applied drug factory presumption of Penal Law § 220.25(2), based on defendant's close proximity to contraband in open view at the time a search warrant was executed.
Since defendant objected at trial on different grounds from those raised on appeal (see People v. Graves, 85 N.Y.2d 1024, 1026–1027, 630 N.Y.S.2d 972, 654 N.E.2d 1220 [1995] ), he has not preserved his present challenges to expert testimony, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal. The expert testimony on drug trafficking involved matters beyond the knowledge of the average juror, and the witness did not intrude on the jury's fact-finding function.
The court providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on allegedly prejudicial testimony. The court sustained defendant's objection and curtailed the testimony, before the witness had a chance to say anything that could have caused any prejudice. Thus, the drastic remedy of a mistrial was not warranted (see People v. Santiago, 52 N.Y.2d 865, 437 N.Y.S.2d 75, 418 N.E.2d 668 [1981] ; see also People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995, 425 N.Y.S.2d 546, 401 N.E.2d 904 [1980] ).