Opinion
No. 2014NY019942.
07-22-2014
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Larry J. HOLMES, Defendant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by ADA Jaime Perrone, for People. The Legal Aid Society, by Vaneskha Hyacinthe, Esq., for Defendant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by ADA Jaime Perrone, for People.
The Legal Aid Society, by Vaneskha Hyacinthe, Esq., for Defendant.
Opinion
Steven M. Statsinger, J.
Defendant, charged with Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.05 ) and Obstructing Government Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 195.05 ), moves to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient. For the reasons set out below, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Sealing is stayed for 30 days.
In deciding this motion, the Court has considered defendant's motion papers, the People's opposition and the relevant statutes and cases.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Allegations
On the night of March 13, 2014, Police Officer Thomas Sullivan arrived at a Manhattan apartment pursuant to a radio run. From outside the door he could hear the complainant, Evilla Roebuck, crying and the defendant yelling. Sullivan knocked loudly and announced, “Police Department.” When Ms. Roebuck said, “What do you want,” Sullivan replied that he needed to speak to her and ordered her to open the door.
Ms. Roebuck replied that she was “fine,” but was still crying. Sullivan again demanded that she open the door so that he could “make sure that everyone in the apartment is okay.” Defendant refused to open the door, confirming that everyone in the apartment was “okay.” Sullivan persisted in demanding entry, without success.
He then overheard Ms. Roebuck say, “This isn't my fault. You have to take resopnsibility. Look at what you did to my face.” Defendant told her to open the door after he went out on the fire escape, while Sullivan continued to demand entry. Defendant told Sullivan that they did not need the police and that everyone in the apartment was going to sleep. Ms. Roebuck was still crying.
Eventually, Ms. Roebuck opened the door. She had lacerations and abrasions on her face. Defendant was in a back room of the apartment; he and Ms. Roebuck were the only civilians present.
B. Legal Proceedings
Defendant was arraigned on March 14, 2014, on a Misdemeanor Complaint charging him with two counts of Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law §§ 120.00(1) and (2) ), Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 135.05 ), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law §§ 110/120.00(1)) and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1). The Court set bail and a motion schedule and Adjourned the case to March 19 for conversion.
On March 19, 2014, the People filed a Superseding Information charging the defendant with the same five counts, along with one count of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 195.05 ). The Court, however, concluded that the Information converted only Count 3, Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, and Count 4, Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree.
Defendant posted bail and filed the instant motion to dismiss in court on April 10, 2014. On May 20, the People filed a written response, and the Court Adjourned the case to July 22 for decision. The matter has been sub judice since May 20.
II. THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT
The Information, sworn to by Officer Sullivan provides that:
On March 13, 2014 at approximately 11:05PM, I received a radio run, and at approximately 11:15PM, I responded to [the] location. When I arrived, I heard the sound of a female crying and sobbing through the door. I could also hear a male voice yelling through the door. I then banged on the door and stated in substance, “Police Department.” I then heard the same female voice state in substance through the door, “What do you want?” In response, I stated in substance, “we need to speak with you. You have to open the door.” I then heard the female state in substance through the door, “I'm fine,” and I could hear that the female was still crying. I then stated in substance, “You still have to open the door. We have to make sure everyone in the apartment is okay.”
I then heard the same male voice state in substance, “We're not opening the door. Everyone in the apartment is okay.” I then continued to bang on the door and state in substance, “You need to open the door. We're not going away.” I then heard the same male voice state in substance, “If you want me locked up, you open the door.”
I then heard the same female voice state in substance, “This isn't my fault. You have to take responsibility. Look what you did to my face.” I then heard the same male voice state in substance, “After I go out the fire escape, you open the door.” I continued to bang on the door. The male voice then stated in substance, “We don't need you. Everyone here is going to sleep. Goodnight.” During this time, I could still hear through the door that the female was crying.
At 12:00AM, Evilla Roebuck ... opened the door. I observed that Ms. Roebuck was in an excited state in that she was crying, had tears in her eyes, and her eyes were red and puffy. I also observed that Ms. Roebuck had lacerations and red abrasions on her face. I further observed the defendant standing in the back room of the apartment. I further observed that Ms. Roebuck and the defendant were the only two people in the apartment at the time, besides myself and the other responding police officers.
III. DISCUSSION
The Information alleges that both the defendant and the complainant to admit the police into an apartment, defying an officer's request that he be admitted so that he could ascertain that everyone in the apartment was “okay.” The Court concludes these facts do not sufficiently make out a prima facie case of the “restraint” element of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, under Penal Law § 135.05. Nor do they make out a prima facie case of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree; there is no basis for concluding that defendant obstructed an “authorized” governmental action.
A. Facial Insufficiency in General
A Misdemeanor Information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution that an Indictment serves in a felony prosecution: It ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant. People v. Dumay, –––N.Y.3d ––––, 2014 WL 2515692 (June 5, 2014) ; People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 138–39, 517 N.Y.S2d 927, 930–31, 511 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1987). Accordingly, a Misdemeanor Information must set forth “nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof.” People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228–29, 906 N.E.2d 381, 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655 (2009) (citing People v. Henderson, 92 N.Y.2d 677, 679, 685 N.Y.S.2d 409, 708 N.E.2d 165(1999) and CPL 100.40(1)(c) ). This is known as “the prima facie case requirement.” Kalin, 12N.Y.3d at 229, 906 N.E.2d at 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the Information allege facts that would prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jennings, 69 N.Y.2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1986). Rather, the Information need only contain allegations of fact that “give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.” People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S2d 88, 91, 740 N.E.2d 233, 236 (2000). A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must subject the allegations in the Information to a “fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading,” id., assume that those allegations are true, and consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. CPL §§ 100.40, 100.15 ; People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 747, 944 N.Y.S2d 715, 721–22, 967 N.E.2d 1160, 1166–67 (2012). See also Casey, 95 N.Y.2d at 360, 717 N.Y.S2d at 91, 740 N.E.2d at 236. Under these standards, the Information here is facially insufficient as to both counts.
B. The Information Does Not Sufficiently Plead the “Restraint” Element of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree
A person is guilty of Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree, Penal Law § 135.05, when he “restrains another person.” “Restrain” means:
[T]o restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined “without consent” when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
Penal Law § 135.00. The facts alleged in the Information do not make out a prima facie case of restraint. Here, there are two possible victims of an unlawful imprisonment: the police officer or the complainant. The Information alleges no facts that would support a finding of “restraint” as to either.
1. Defendant Did Not “Restrain” the Police Officer
With respect to the officer, while it is true that the defendant—and the complainant too, although she apparently was not charged—refused to admit the officer, that is not an unlawful “restraint.” This refusal did not “restrict” the officer's “movements” by either “moving him from one place to another” or by “confining him.” While the officer would clearly have preferred to be inside the apartment, as opposed to outside of it, his movement was not restricted. He was free to go any place he wished, and was not in any way “confined” to the hallway outside the apartment door.
Nor is there any allegation that the officer was kept outside the apartment by “physical force, intimidation or deception.” The Information merely indicates that defendant refused to open the door. This type of passive resistence does not constitute physical force. See, e.g., People v. Alston, 9 Misc.3d 1046, 805 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Crim Ct N.Y. County 2005) (refusal to hand over license, registration and proof of insurance during a traffic stop was not “physical force”); People v. Simon, 145 Misc.2d 518, 547 N.Y.S .2d 19 (Crim Ct N.Y. County 1989) (destruction of evidence is not “physical force”).
Accordingly, the Information does not make out a prima facie case of restraint with respect to the officer.
2. Defendant Did Not “Restraint” the Complainant
The Information also fails to make out a prima facie case of restraint with respect to the complainant.
The facts alleged show merely that defendant refused to let the police into the apartment; there is no allegation that defendant kept the complainant there against her will. This is, of course, the gravamen of the offense. For example, in People v. Jordan, 43 Misc.3d 1210(A) at *4 (Crim Ct 2014), there was sufficient evidence of restraint where the defendant “locked and barricaded the door to the room containing her, [her] five children and two adults, command [ed]' some of the children to block the door, and pushed away the two adults when they tried to open it.”
But here, absent any allegation from which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant used physical force, intimidation or deception to hold the complainant in the apartment against her will the Information is facially insufficient as to “restraint.”
C. The Information is Facially Insufficient as to Obstructing Governmental Administration In the Second Degree
On the facts alleged, the Information does not make out a prima facie case of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree. Defendant's refusal to admit the police into the apartment was not unlawful, since the Information does not allege either that the police had a warrant or that exigent circumstances justified a forcible entry.
As pertinent here, a person violates Penal Law § 195.05 when he “attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference.” The “official function” element requires that the public servant's action be “authorized,” which in turn requires that the action be lawful. For example, in People v. Graham, 54 AD3d 1056, 865 N.Y.S2d 259 (2d Dept 2008), the court upheld a conviction under § 195.05 where defendant's disruptive behavior interfered with an otherwise lawful traffic stop. However, interference with unauthorized police conduct, such as an illegal stop or detention, does not violate § 195.05. People v. Small, 109 AD3d 842, 971 N.Y.S2d 212 (2d Dept 2013) ; People v. Lupinacci, 191 A.2d 589, 595 N.Y.S2d 76, 77 (2d Dept 1993).
1. Refusals to Admit the Police Generally
Ordinarily, a citizen's refusal to admit the police does not violate § 195.05. In People v. Offen, 96 Misc.2d 147, 148, 408 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (Crim Ct N.Y. County 1978), defendant, a shopkeeper, cursed at a police officer who announced that he was going to issue the defendant a summons for littering. Defendant returned to his store, closed and locked the door and rebuffed police officers' numerous requests to open it. 96 Misc.2d at 149, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 915. The court concluded that this refusal did not violate § 195.05. “[I]t is no crime to refuse to open a door to police officers,” although the defendant of course assumes the risk that such a refusal might result in additional rights, duties or actions by the officers. 96 Misc.2d at 150, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
Subsequent cases have confirmed that, except in cases where there is a “legal obligation to open the door,” a refusal to do so, without more, does not obstruct, impair or prevent the administration of any law or governmental function, nor does it prevent the police from performing an official function. People v.. Martin, 35 Misc.3d 133(A), 951 N.Y.S.2d 88 (App Term 9th and 10th Dists 2012). Such a legal obligation will arise, however, where the police seek entry pursuant to a valid warrant. See People v. Paige, 77 AD3d 1193, 911 N.Y.S.2d 176 (3d Dept 2010) (evidence legally sufficient where officers reasonably believed that subject of an arrest warrant was present in residence, but defendant refused to admit them so that they could execute the warrant). Cf. People v. Rodriguez, 19 Misc.3d 302, 851 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Crim Ct N.Y. County 2008) (where information alleged that defendant refused to admit police officer, it was insufficient absent facts showing that the warrant was being lawfully executed).
2. Refusals to Admit the Police Where Exigent Circumstances Are Present
Absent a warrant, however, a legal obligation to admit the police only arises where there exists an exception to the warrant requirement, such the presence of exigent circumstances. Rodriguez, 19 Misc.3d at 306, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (without a valid warrant or exigent circumstances, officer “officer had no authority to demand entry”). See also Martin, 35 Misc.3d at 133(A), 951 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (information was insufficient; it pled neither a warrant nor exigent circumstances permitting a forcible entry); People v. Briggs, 24 Misc.3d 1217(A), 890 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Crim Ct N.Y. County 2009) (same); People v. Williams, 16 Misc.3d 1109(A), 847 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Crim Ct Bronx County 2007) (bare allegation that police were investigating “gang activity” did not create an exigent circumstance; defendant's refusal to admit police if they lacked a warrant did not violate § 195.05 ). The instant case turns on this very question.
3. Exigent Circumstances Are Not Sufficiently Alleged
Here, the Information does not allege that defendant refused to admit officers who were attempting to execute a warrant. Rather, defendant is charged with violating § 195.05 for refusing a warrantless entry. However, since the facts set out in the Information do not permit a reasonable inference that exigent circumstances were present, the Information is facially insufficient.
The Court of Appeals has analyzed situations analogous to that at issue here under the general rubric of an “emergency exception” to the warrant requirement. People v. Molnar, 98 N.Y.2d 328, 774 N.E .2d 738, 746 N.Y.S.2d 673 (2002). This exception arises where the police have “reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and [that there is] an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.” Id. 98 N.Y.2d at 332, 774 N.E.2d at 740, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 675 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For this exception to apply, the “protection of human life or property in imminent danger must be the motivation for the search.” Id. Molnar identifies a spectrum of potential exigencies:
Under the federal constitution, the officer's motivation is irrelevant to the inquiry. Brigham City v. Stuart, 537 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1948 (2006).
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At one extreme, [the police] are authorized-if not expected-to break into a premises when, for example, there is a shooting in progress or a hostage held. At the other extreme, we neither want nor authorize police to seize people or premises to remedy what might be characterized as minor irritants. People sometimes create coking odors or make noise to the point where neighbors complain. But, as we live in a free society, we do not expect the police to react to such relatively minor complaints by breaking down the door.
98 N.Y.2d at 333, 774 N.E.2d at 741, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 676.See also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 130 S.Ct. 546 (2009) (describing the “emergency aid exception” to the warrant requirement); Brigham City, 537 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. at 1947 (“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”)
The Court concludes that the facts pled here are not sufficiently extreme to trigger an emergency exception. The Information alleges only that the police responded to the apartment due to a radio run, without describing the content of the run. On arrival, the officer heard the complainant crying and the defendant shouting, but there is no indication that the shouting suggested that anyone was in imminent danger. Nor, as discussed above, is there any allegation that the complainant was being held against her will. When the officer inquired, the complainant told him that she was “fine” and did not need police assistance. Although the officer continued to hear crying, defendant also confirmed that “everyone in the apartment is okay” and that “we don't need [the police.]” These facts are much closer to the “noise to the point where neighbors complain” end of the Molnar spectrum than they are to the “shooting in progress or a hostage held” end. And the police seem to have believed this as well, since they never attempted a forcible entry. This case is accordingly very much like Briggs. 24 Misc.3d at 1217(A), 890 N.Y.S.2d at 370. There, allegations of “fighting and shouting” inside an apartment did not give rise to exigent circumstances, and defendant's refusal to admit the police did not violate § 195.05. Id.
For these reasons, then, the Court concludes that the Information is facially insufficient; it does not make out a prima facie case of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree.
D. Conclusion
The Information is facially insufficient as to both counts. The motion to dismiss is accordingly granted; sealing is stayed for 30 days.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. Sealing is stayed for 30 days.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.