Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCR 523226
Jenkins, J.
This is an appeal from the judgment entered after a jury found appellant Eric Campbell Holm guilty of: (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Penal Code section 12021, subdivision (a), and (2) being a felon in possession of ammunition and reloaded ammunition, in violation of Penal Code section 12316, subdivision (b). We affirm.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of October 26, 2007, Joshua Roth was working outside his home at 1830-A Gravenstein Highway South in Sebastopol. During that time, Roth heard at least three outbursts from a man and woman arguing in a neighboring yard: the first outburst occurring close to noon, the second occurring around 4 p.m., and the last occurring at 6 p.m. During the last outburst, Roth heard the woman say “kids, get inside.” Approximately 15 to 20 minutes later, Roth heard a popping sound, followed by the man yelling “There is one.” After that, “it became very quiet in the direction of the voices.” Although Roth could not see the people arguing, he believed the voices came from a house to the right of his. He also believed the loud popping sound came from the discharge of a handgun, a sound he was familiar with from previously living near Hunter’s Point, a high-crime neighborhood in San Francisco.
Within 20 to 30 minutes of hearing the final outburst, Roth called 911. Roth told the dispatcher that he heard someone about two houses away from him fire a gun in the course of an argument between a man and a woman. Roth said that although he had not seen the man and woman or their home, he had heard the two people screaming “mostly profanities” at each other for about an hour. Roth then recounted to the dispatcher the events of the most recent argument, including his belief that the popping sound came from a handgun.
At 10:26 p.m. that night, Deputy Sheriff Mark Aldridge received a dispatch call describing “shots fired” and proceeded in his squad car to Roth’s home. Deputies Fletcher Skerrett and John Peterson arrived shortly after Deputy Aldridge. Roth recounted to the officers that he heard a single gunshot from a home about two doors down from him, and pointed them towards 1902 Gravenstein Highway.
Two buildings, a trailer, and a driveway were on the property of 1902 Gravenstein Highway. Facing the lot from the road, the driveway ran along the left side of the property. Almost directly behind the driveway was a barn with an apartment on the second story. The main house was about 40 to 50 feet from Gravenstein Highway on the right side of the lot, adjacent to the driveway. The main house and barn were approximately 100 feet from each other in a diagonal direction. A trailer was about 50 yards to a few hundred yards behind the barn.
The officers approached the property and noticed a young man and woman on the front porch of the main house. Two of the officers believed the woman appeared upset. The woman identified herself as Amanda Holm (Amanda), and said the man with her was her boyfriend. The officers asked Amanda about the gunshot, and she told Deputy Aldridge that she had heard a loud bang, but believed the noise came from her neighbors on the lot behind 1902 Gravenstein Highway. Amanda further stated that her parents had been arguing earlier in the day, and that she had never before heard them have such a bad argument. Amanda stated that her parents were probably in the barn apartment, where they lived.
As the officers made their way from the house to the barn, they noticed appellant leaving the barn through a doorway 10 to 15 feet from them. Deputy Aldridge said, “Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department.” Appellant looked towards the officers, tossed a dark object to the ground, and put his hands in his pockets. Deputy Aldridge told appellant to remove his hands from his pockets, which he did. Deputy Aldridge then patted him down, but did not feel any weapons.
Deputy Peterson retrieved the object that appellant had tossed to the ground, and told Deputy Aldridge it was a magazine from a gun, loaded with live ammunition. The ammunition was.30-caliber. Deputy Aldridge then handcuffed and detained appellant.
Deputy Aldridge asked appellant what had been going on that night, and appellant responded that he and his wife, Sarah, had an argument, and that she was in a house trailer at the back of the property. Deputy Aldridge then asked appellant if he had the gun that went with the ammunition. After initially denying there was a gun, appellant eventually admitted that it was located in the trailer with his wife. Appellant explained that he took the magazine from a.30-caliber rifle to make sure his wife did not hurt herself. Appellant denied firing the gun, but admitted storing six or seven guns in the trailer, some of which he claimed belonged to his late father, and some to his wife’s father.
While Deputy Aldridge continued to question appellant, Deputies Skerrett and Peterson searched the barn, including the apartment. Inside the apartment, they discovered two live.30 caliber rounds.
Deputies Skerrett and Peterson also searched the trailer. They noticed that no lights were on inside and that the door was partially open. After they knocked on the door several times, a woman who identified herself as Sarah Holm (Sarah) came to the door. Sarah appeared groggy, upset, and agitated. When they questioned her, she did not immediately appear to understand them, so they had to repeat their questions. Deputy Skerrett thought she either had just awoken, or was drunk. In response to Deputy Peterson’s questions, Sarah told the officers that she and her husband had a fight earlier in the night. She denied knowing whether any guns were inside the trailer.
Deputies Skerrett and Peterson searched the trailer and found seven rifles stacked inside a closet, including a.30 caliber. None of the rifles was loaded and Deputy Skerrett found no ammunition in the trailer. During trial, Deputies Skerrett and Aldridge testified that they could not find any indicia suggesting the trailer belonged to appellant.
Deputy Aldridge questioned Sarah outside the trailer. On the stand, he testified that Sarah told him “they” had been storing the weapons in the trailer. While Sarah did not specify who “they” were, Deputy Aldridge testified that she “corroborated” appellant’s statements regarding who was storing the weapons. In particular, Deputy Aldridge testified:
Q: And when you spoke with Mr. Holm, he told you that he was storing the weapons; correct?
A: Correct.
Q: When you spoke with Sarah Holm, she also said that they were storing the weapons; correct?
A: Correct.
Q: Both of their stories corroborated each other.
A: Correct.
When Deputy Aldridge determined that appellant had previously been convicted of a felony in Yolo County, he arrested appellant.
Deputy Skerrett testified that he drove his patrol car to the trailer, where he and the other officers collected the magazine, the two live rounds, and the rifles, and placed them in the trunk of Deputy Skerrett’s patrol car. Before leaving the property, Deputy Peterson told Amanda they had arrested her father and had taken the rifles as evidence. Amanda responded that the rifles belonged to her grandparents, and asked how she could get them back. A subsequent crime lab analysis revealed no fingerprints on the weapons.
Sarah testified at trial that appellant had owned rifles throughout their marriage — at least two of which he received as gifts from his father and Sarah’s mother — but that he had given his collection to Amanda after being convicted of a felony. Although Sarah testified that Amanda kept the rifles in her room in the main house, she later claimed not to know where the weapons were kept on the property.
On the night of October 26, 2007, Sarah arrived home from work around 7:00 p.m. and found her husband in the barn apartment. Appellant asked her if she received a paycheck, and when she said no, they argued for about an hour and a half. At one point, appellant went outside the barn to work on his motorcycle while Sarah stayed inside the apartment. Appellant started up his motorcycle and it made a popping sound. He yelled “that’s one,” and Sarah, who by this point was crying, yelled back at her husband and walked off towards the trailer. Although upset, Sarah testified that she did not threaten to kill herself or hurt anyone else.
Sarah found the trailer locked, so she broke into it. Angry, distressed, and still crying, she fell asleep. Normally a heavy sleeper, Sarah did not wake up until the police knocked on the trailer door with their flashlights. She did not hear appellant enter the trailer while she was sleeping, nor did she see him handle any weapons that night. She denied telling Deputy Aldridge “we” stored the rifles in the trailer.
After the parties finished presenting evidence, appellant’s counsel moved under section 1118.1 for a judgment of acquittal on count one based on lack of sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court denied the motion, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to send the matter to the jury, namely that appellant had access to the trailer, and had a magazine in his hand when the police found him.
On February 11, 2008, the jury found appellant guilty of both counts. On June 9, 2008, before sentencing, appellant’s counsel filed a motion for new trial under section 1181, arguing again that the corpus delicti of the crime failed to support a guilty verdict. The trial court denied the motion.
On July 29, 2008, the trial court suspended imposition of a sentence and placed appellant on probation for three years, conditioned on serving four months in county jail, with 43 days of credit for time served. Appellant timely appealed the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment on the sole ground that the prosecution failed to establish the “corpus delicti” of count one, being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a). The California Supreme Court has explained the corpus delicti doctrine as follows: “In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself ─ i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California, it has traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant. [Citations.] Though mandated by no statute, and never deemed a constitutional guaranty, the rule requiring some independent proof of the corpus delicti has roots in the common law.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169.) Furthermore, “[T]his rule is intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened.” (Id. at p. 1169.)
“[I]nsofar as the corpus delicti rule restricts the admissibility of incriminatory extrajudicial statements by the accused, section 28(d) [of Article I of the California Constitution] abrogates it.” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1174.)
The corpus delicti of a crime thus consists of two elements – the fact of injury, loss, or harm; and the existence of criminal agency as its cause. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301.) However, the quantum of evidence required to prove the corpus delicti of a crime is far below that required to convict a defendant of a crime. Specifically, the evidence “is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible.” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.) Further, the inference of criminal conduct need not be “the only, or even the most compelling, one,” so long as it is “a reasonable one....” (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 367. See also People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 301 [describing the requisite amount of evidence as “quite small,” “slight” and “minimal”].) In addition, the evidentiary showing may include circumstantial evidence. (People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 301 .)
Here, appellant concedes he was previously convicted of a felony. However, appellant claims the judgment must be set aside with respect to count one, being a felon in possession of firearms (§ 12021, subd. (a)), because there is insufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In particular, appellant argues that, independent of his own admissions to investigating officers that “he” was and “they” were storing firearms in the trailer on the property, the evidence was insufficient to permit an inference that he had possession of any of the firearms that the officers thereafter found on the property. We disagree.
“A violation of section 12021, subdivision (a) is a relatively simple crime to commit: an ex-felon who owns, possesses, or has custody or control of a firearm” has committed the crime. (People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1410.) In fact, “(t)he crime is committed the instant the felon in any way has a firearm within his control.” (Id. at p. 1410.) Further, for purposes of section 12021, “[p]ossession may be either actual or constructive as long it is intentional.” (People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 119, 130 (Spirlin).)
Thus, in Spirlin, the court held that the defendant had constructive possession over a firearm that remained in the bedroom closet of his apartment for several months based on statements by his wife to police that “the gun belonged to defendant and that he had possessed it for ‘a couple months or so.’ ” (People v. Spirlin, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.) Similarly, in People v. Nieto (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 364, 368, the court held that, “[a]t the very least, [there was] circumstantial evidence supportive of a finding of joint or constructive possession, custody or control” where guns were found under the front seat of the defendant’s car while he was operating the vehicle.
In both of these prior cases, the appellate court was concerned with the evidence supporting a conviction or sentence imposed following a conviction under section 12021, subdivision (a), rather than, as here, the evidence supporting the corpus delicti of the crime. Regardless, applying the lessons these cases offer with respect to the principle of constructive possession, we conclude the evidence in this case was indeed sufficient to support the more lenient evidentiary standard of a reasonable inference that appellant committed the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 301; People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 367.)
Specifically, there was evidence that, when the investigating officers first approached appellant on the night in question, they observed him toss to the ground a magazine clip loaded with live ammunition, apparently in an attempt to conceal it. This ammunition was a match for one of the seven firearms – a.30 caliber rifle – that the officers found a short time later in a closet in an unlocked trailer on the property where appellant lived with his wife, Sarah. The officers also found Sarah in the trailer, who was upset from a lengthy argument with appellant and had gone there to sleep. According to testimony from Deputy Aldridge, Sarah told him “they” were storing the rifles in the trailer. This testimony corroborated appellant’s admissions to Deputy Aldridge that “he” and “they” were storing the guns in the trailer for his father and Sarah’s father. While Sarah denied making this statement at trial, the trial court was nonetheless entitled to credit Deputy Aldridge’s contrary testimony when determining whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
Thus, independent of appellant’s own admissions, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the reasonable inference that he, at a minimum, had constructive possession, custody or control over the rifles stored in the trailer on the property where he lived, as well as over the ammunition designed for those weapons. As such, the prosecution met the “minimal” burden required under California law to prove the corpus delicti of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)). (People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 301. See also People v. Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1171; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 367.) Accordingly, we decline to set aside the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, Acting P. J., Siggins, J.