Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura No. 2006026270 Allan Steele, Judge
Miriam R. Arichea, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Joey Randy Holloway appeals a judgment after conviction by jury of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, with admissions that he suffered a prior strike conviction and served a prior prison. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subds. (a) & (b), 23550; Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).) We appointed counsel to represent him in this appeal. After counsel's examination of the record, she filed an opening brief raising no issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
On July 14, 2008, we advised Holloway that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished to raise on appeal. We have received a response from him contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not seek a bail reduction or release; did not file a written motion requesting the trial court to strike the prior strike allegation; did not convey a plea offer from the prosecutor; and did not allow him to testify. Pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123-124, we present a factual and procedural summary of the case, and a brief discussion of Holloway's contentions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 10, 2006, California Highway Patrol Officer James Cook saw Holloway drive his vehicle in the wrong direction on a freeway ramp on West Main Street in Ventura. Holloway parked his vehicle and Cook stopped behind him. When Cook approached Holloway, he sensed an alcohol odor, saw that Holloway's eyes were red, and noticed that his speech was slurred. Holloway admitted consuming alcohol earlier. Cook administered field sobriety tests to Holloway and then concluded that he was under the influence of alcohol.
After Holloway's arrest, Cook administered alcohol breath tests to him at county jail. Three tests revealed alcohol levels of 0.19, 0.17, and 0.19 percent respectively.
The prosecutor charged Holloway with driving under the influence with prior driving under the influence convictions (count 1), and driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, with prior driving under the influence convictions (count 2). (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subds. (a) & (b), 23550.) The prosecutor also alleged that Holloway suffered a prior strike conviction, and that he served three prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667.5, subd. (b).)
Holloway waived his constitutional rights and admitted the prior strike conviction, service of three prior prison terms, and prior driving under the influence convictions.
At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence from Officer Cook and an expert witness from the Ventura County Crime Lab. The jury convicted Holloway of the charged counts. The trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 32 months, representing the low term doubled due to the prior serious felony conviction. The court imposed an additional term of 12 months for the prior prison term, and struck the remaining two prior prison term allegations. It ordered Holloway to pay a restitution fine, parole revocation restitution fine, and security fee, and awarded him 402 days presentence custody and conduct credits.
DISCUSSION
To establish a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel did not act in the manner expected of a reasonably competent advocate, and that it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's failings. (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 288.) Defendant bears the burden of establishing deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436.) A reviewing court must defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's representation falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. (Id. at pp. 436-437.)
Our review of the appellate record discloses that defense counsel filed a written motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, requesting the trial court to strike Holloway's prior strike conviction. The trial court denied the motion. In addition, defense counsel stated that he had made five oral Romero motions, all of which were denied. Defense counsel also stated that he related several plea bargains to Holloway, all of which he refused. The record is not adequate to support Holloway's contention of an undisclosed plea bargain, and we do not discuss it. (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, overruled on other grounds by People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) Finally, Holloway has not established a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome regarding counsel's acts or omissions relating to bail reduction or evidence explaining why Holloway drove in the wrong direction on the freeway ramp. (People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d 262, 288.)
We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that Holloway's attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J., PERREN, J.