Since Stoudemire, a number of panels of this Court, including two decisions in which this author concurred, have purported to limit Stoudemire precisely to the specific facts and question presented, and have held that convictions for crimes committed in separate transactions count as separate convictions for purposes of the statute, even if the convictions are obtained on the same day, because the felon rejected the opportunity to reform after each criminal transaction. See People v Bettistea (After Remand), 181 Mich. App. 194; 448 N.W.2d 781 (1989); People v Reed, 172 Mich. App. 182; 431 N.W.2d 431 (1988); People v Jones, 171 Mich. App. 720; 431 N.W.2d 204 (1988); but see People v Holguin, 180 Mich. 429; 447 N.W.2d 753 (1989), lv den 433 Mich. 900 (1989). We do not believe that Stoudemire can be so limited by this Court.