Opinion
F041016.
7-15-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM HENRY HOGLAND, Defendant and Appellant.
Barbara Coffman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen and John G. McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A Stanislaus County jury convicted appellant William Hogland of battery against a custodial officer in violation of Penal Code section 243.1.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court sentenced Hogland to a four-year prison term based on an admitted prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (d).) On appeal, Hogland contends his conviction under section 243.1 violated his right to equal protection under the law. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 17, 2002, Deputy Sheriff Jose Galvan worked as a custodial officer at the Stanislaus County Public Safety Center where Hogland was held on lockdown status. As Deputy Galvan approached with a dinner tray, he heard Hogland repeatedly throwing his chair in his cell. The deputy told Hogland to stop and left the tray.
From approximately 30 feet away, Deputy Galvan again heard Hogland throwing the chair. The deputy returned to Hoglands cell and instructed him to face the wall with his hands behind his back. As Deputy Galvan proceeded to remove the chair from the cell, Hogland threw his food tray toward the deputy and hit the chair. Hogland then tackled the deputy by wrapping his hands around his waist. The deputy kneed Hogland in the upper torso several times, pushed him off, and placed him in handcuffs. Although Hogland received several scratches to his face and forearm, he did not injure Deputy Galvan.
DISCUSSION
The Penal Code defines the crime of battery as "any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." (& sect; 242.) Before 1976, section 243 addressed battery without designation of any particular victim. In 1976, the Legislature enacted section 243.1 to establish a harsher punishment for the new crime of battery against a custodial officer. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1126, § 6, p. 5041.) Section 243.1 provides:
"When a battery is committed against the person of a custodial officer as defined in Section 831 of the Penal Code, and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a custodial officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the custodial officer is engaged in the performance of his or her duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison."
In 1982, section 243 was amended to include custodial officers in its growing list of specifically enumerated victims to whom protection was extended. (Stats. 1982, ch. 1353, § 2, p. 5048.) Under the amendment, section 243, subdivision (b), became:
"When a battery is committed against the person of a ... custodial officer, ... engaged in the performance of his or her duties, ... and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a ... custodial officer, ... engaged in the performance of his or her duties, ... the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($ 1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both the fine and imprisonment."
In 1983, the Legislature increased the maximum fine from $ 1,000 to $ 2,000. (Stats. 1983, ch. 1092, § 252, subd. (b), p. 4028.)
Section 243, subdivision (c), further added that if the battery results in injury to the custodial officer, the offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor or felony. When the Legislature amended section 243, it did not amend or delete section 243.1; consequently, the code now contains three provisions that deal with battery against a custodial officer.
Hogland contends the current statutory scheme treats identically situated offenders unequally. A defendant who commits a battery on a custodial officer resulting in no injury, but charged under section 243.1, is treated as a felon while the same conduct charged under section 243, subdivision (b) results in a misdemeanor. Moreover, a person who inflicts injury against a custodial officer may only receive a misdemeanor conviction under section 243.1, but the same act would result in a felony under section 243.
"A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or public offense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infractions." (§ 17, subd. (a).)
Hogland believes his felony conviction under section 243.1 violates his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. " In order to establish a meritorious claim under the equal protection provisions of our state and federal Constitutions [a defendant] must first show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. [Citation.] Equal protection applies to ensure that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment; equal protection does not require identical treatment. " (People v. Taylor (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 318, 322.)
Hogland urges this court to consider his claim under the reasoning of People v. Wilkinson (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 72. Several days after Hogland filed his opening brief, however, the Supreme Court granted review of Wilkinson. (Id ., review granted Dec. 11, 2002, S111028.) We therefore may not consider the opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 976(d), 977(a).)
The Fourth Appellate District found the statutory scheme prohibiting battery against a custodial officer rational in People v. Chenze (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 521. In Chenze, the defendant argued the more recently enacted section 243 irreconcilably conflicted with the older section 243.1 that made all batteries against custodial officers felonies. (Id . at p. 526.) The Chenze court noted the Legislature disregarded a committee suggestion to delete section 243.1 and found legislative history suggesting multiple options to charge battery against a custodial officer would likely increase the number of convictions. (Id. at p. 527.) In rejecting the defendants argument, the Chenze court reasoned:
"In view of the fact that the Legislature amended section 243 to include custodial officers when it was aware of section 243.1, it is apparent the Legislature intended to give prosecutors a full panoply of prosecutorial options for a battery on a custodial officer. Under section 243, the offense may be punished as a misdemeanor ( § 243, subd. (b)), or a misdemeanor or felony if injury is inflicted ( § 243, subd. (c)(1)). But the Legislature also apparently envisioned that there might be circumstances under which no or only slight injury was inflicted, but felony charges would nonetheless still be appropriate. Accordingly, it did not repeal section 243.1, and has very recently amended it." (Ibid.)
Hogland asserts the Chenze decision is inapposite because it did not consider equal protection principles and ignored the anomaly that conduct that is more egregious may be punished less severely. However, as the above passage indicates, the Chenze court expressly observed that a defendant convicted of an injurious battery ( § 243, subd. (c)(1)) could be punished less harshly than a defendant convicted of a non-injurious battery (§ 243.1.) The court found that the Legislature considered the possibility that felony punishment would, in some circumstances, be more appropriate than misdemeanor treatment for batteries against custodial officers with no or slight injury. Chenze thus effectively considered the matter in light of the defendants right to equal protection.
Although a statute is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds if it does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose (People v. Silva (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167), the Legislatures "judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable circumstance that might suffice to characterize the classification as reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious." (People v. Taylor, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 318, quoting McLaughlin v. State of Florida (1964) 379 U.S. 184, 191, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 85 S. Ct. 283.) It is well-settled that the Legislature may provide different punishments for the same offense (People v. Superior Court (Caswell) (1988) 46 Cal.3d 381, 395, 250 Cal. Rptr. 515, 758 P.2d 1046) and that a prosecutor may prosecute under any of multiple criminal statutes for a single act so long as it does
not discriminate against a particular class of defendants. (United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114, 123-124, 60 L. Ed. 2d 755, 99 S. Ct. 2198; Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 573-576.) Hogland fails to demonstrate the statutory scheme regarding battery against a custodial officer violates his right to equal protection under the law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.