Opinion
D073132
12-20-2018
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. JUDITH JEAN HOFFMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
Judith Jean Hoffman, in pro. per.; Andrews Law Group, Brian C. Andrews, and David Wilson Jordan for Defendant and Appellant. Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, John C. Hemmerling, Assistant City Attorney, and David E. Miller, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-00021581-CU-MC-CTL) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Affirmed. Judith Jean Hoffman, in pro. per.; Andrews Law Group, Brian C. Andrews, and David Wilson Jordan for Defendant and Appellant. Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, John C. Hemmerling, Assistant City Attorney, and David E. Miller, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Judith Jean Hoffman appeals from an order entered pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7, subdivision (c), appointing a receiver over her residential property and imposing an injunction to prevent her from maintaining substandard property. We conclude Hoffman forfeited her contentions on appeal, and they lack merit in any event. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
BACKGROUND
A. History of Violations
Hoffman owns residential property with a history of complaints and violations of various state and local laws regarding nuisance and substandard housing dating back to 2008, when a complaint regarding the care of several dogs living at the property prompted an investigation of excessive outdoor storage in violation of the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). (See SDMC, § 142.1110 [outdoor storage regulations for residential zones].) The City of San Diego (City) Code Enforcement Division issued a voluntary compliance letter requesting that Hoffman remove all outdoor storage and trash. In September 2008, the code violations had been remedied and the City closed the first case.
In August 2009, following a complaint of "lots of junk in the front yard and tall weeds," the City issued Hoffman a notice of violation of certain SDMC provisions. By September 2009, Hoffman remedied these violations, and the City closed the second case.
In 2011, in response to yet another complaint, City inspectors observed nuisance conditions consisting of trash and debris blocking the garage, a pickup truck parked in the driveway filled with junk, and overgrown bushes and weeds blocking the entry to the home and access to the public sidewalk. The City issued a notice of violation of SDMC section 54.0208, subdivision (a) (failure to maintain real property free from waste). When Hoffman failed to correct the violation, the City issued a notice to request voluntary compliance. The notice identified the following condition: "Storage of miscellaneous items not accessory to the residential use of the property," and instructed, "Remove all items not incidental to the residential use of the property. All permitted items must be screened from view from the street(s)." The notice stated that the condition as alleged violated the SDMC and directed that corrective action must take place within two weeks. The notice further provided:
"Please be advised that if a property inspection is required and the violation could have been easily corrected, an administrative citation . . . could be immediately imposed. . . . [¶] Failure to take corrective action may be cause for further enforcement action. These actions may include criminal prosecution, civil injunction, administrative abatement, civil penalties, revocation of permits, recordation of a [n]otice of [v]iolation, withholding of future municipal permits or notification to the Franchise Tax Board."The City issued an inspection notice when Hoffman still failed to correct the condition. Hoffman did not respond.
In 2012, the City inspected the interior and exterior of the property. Photos taken during that inspection depict excessive, non-accessory outdoor storage and hoarded conditions in the interior of the home.
In 2014, the City issued another inspection notice, but Hoffman did not respond.
In October 2015, the City conducted a subsequent inspection of the property. The truck still sat in the driveway; its tires were flat and its interior was filled with junk, trash, and debris. Items were stacked in front of the garage and around the house. Weeds and brush covered the front yard, blocking the public sidewalk and the path to the front door. The interior of the house smelled like feces and urine. Rat droppings were scattered on the floor. The living room was cluttered with boxes, paper, junk, and items. Paths between rooms were lined with storage and difficult to pass through. The kitchen, dining room, and bedrooms were crowded with rolled up carpets, boxes, unwashed plates, dishes, papers, and trash, making any movement through them difficult or impossible. The laundry room was impassable. Most of the house's windows were partially or completely blocked, preventing exit in an emergency. Several dogs were kenneled and in poor condition. County of San Diego (County) Department of Animal Services evaluated the dogs and issued a citation requiring Hoffman to take them to a vet, provide them with water, and clean the urine and feces from the floor.
From this inspection, the City determined the property was in violation of provisions of the Health and Safety Code, California Building Standards Code (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24), and the SDMC, such that the house constituted a "substandard building" pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17920.3.
Section 17920.3 provides in relevant part: "Any building or portion thereof . . . or the premises on which the same is located, in which there exists [a number of enumerated] conditions to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants thereof shall be deemed and hereby is declared to be a substandard building . . . ." The enumerated conditions include "[i]nadequate sanitation" (such as "[i]nfestation of insects, vermin, or rodents"), structural hazards, any nuisance, and conditions that "provide a ready fuel to augment the spread and intensity of fire or explosion arising from any cause." (§ 17920.3, subds. (a)-(c), & (h).)
In August 2016, the City issued another inspection notice. Hoffman scheduled an inspection but then cancelled the day of the scheduled inspection. Prior to the cancellation, a City investigator arrived at the property and observed that the property's condition had not improved. City investigators returned to the property in September 2016 and observed that the code violations remained uncorrected.
B. Notice and Order to Vacate, Repair, and Abate
On September 21, 2016 the City issued a "Notice and Order to Vacate, Repair Substandard Building, and Abate Public Nuisance" pursuant to section 17980.6 (abatement notice) that described the conditions at the property and identified the following Health and Safety Code violations: evidence of infestations of roaches and vermin in the dwelling, in violation of section 17920.3, subdivision (a)(12); excessive storage, junk, trash, and debris in the dwelling, harboring pests, insects and rodents, in violation of section 17920.3, subdivisions (a)(14) and (c); the fence is in complete disrepair, in violation of section 17920.3, subdivision (a)(14); temporary wiring throughout the residence impeding travel through the halls and posing a fire danger due to contact with boxes, clothing, and furniture in violation of section 17920.3, subdivision (d); an accumulation of junk, debris, garbage, rodent harborage which constitutes a fire, health, or safety hazard in violation of section 17920.3, subdivision (j); inadequate exit facilities with excessive storage piles of junk, trash, and debris blocking egress from the property and blocking any clear path of travel inside the dwelling, in violation of section 17920.3, subdivision (l). The notice and order to vacate, repair, and abate also detailed various building code violations (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 24, part 2, §§ 1003.6 & 3401.2 [maintenance]), electrical code violations (id., part 3, § 400.8 [use of extension cords in place of permanent wiring]), and municipal code violations (SDMC, §§ 11.0210 [public nuisance], 121.0302 [required compliance with the land development code], 142.1110 [outdoor storage regulations for residential zones], 142.0510 [general parking regulations], 54.0208 [property maintenance], 142.0560 [development and design regulations for parking facilities], 142.0380 [fence and retaining wall maintenance]).
The 2013 California Building Standards Code, in effect when the abatement notice was issued, was replaced by the existing 2016 California Building Standards Code, effective January 1, 2017.
The abatement notice ordered Hoffman to vacate within 72 hours of the date of posting. It further ordered Hoffman to repair the violations, providing three discrete deadlines: (1) immediately cease using temporary electrical wiring throughout the residence; (2) remove the non-operational vehicle parked in the driveway within 14 days; and (3) remove all non-incidental storage, waste, trash, debris, and vegetation from the interior and exterior of the property and trim and clear all overgrown vegetation from the front, side, and rear yards within 30 days. The notice warned that failure to comply could result in the City seeking appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 17980.7, subdivision (c).
The City posted the abatement notice in a conspicuous place at the property and mailed it to Hoffman via first class mail, pursuant to section 17980.6. The City also filed a notice of pending enforcement action in the records of the County Recorder's office pursuant to section 17985, subdivision (a), and informed Hoffman it had done so.
C. Follow-up Efforts
The City conducted subsequent compliance inspections in November 2016 and April 2017. On both occasions, the condition of the property remained unabated. On April 21, 2017, the City notified Hoffman of its intent to seek the appointment of a receiver for the property pursuant to section 17980.7, subdivision (c).
D. Complaint
In June 2017, the City and the People of the State of California (collectively, Respondents) filed a complaint against Hoffman detailing the history of complaints and violations and the current condition of the property. The complaint requested the appointment of a receiver, a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions to prohibit Hoffman from maintaining a "substandard property in violation of state and local ordinance provisions and as a public nuisance, which is a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the public and its occupant." It further requested civil penalties, costs, and other equitable relief.
E. Ex Parte Application to Appoint Receiver
Respondents moved ex parte for the appointment of a receiver and a temporary restraining order. In support of their request, they submitted evidence including interior and exterior photographs of the property and nine declarations from various City and County employees.
City investigators provided declarations detailing the history of complaints beginning in 2008, unsuccessful attempts over the years to work with Hoffman to remedy the problems, and, with accompanying photographic exhibits, the conditions observed during inspections in 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, and 2017. The investigators' declarations described overgrown vegetation and debris impeding access to the front door; excessive trash and debris both in and outside the home; an overwhelming stench of urine and feces in the house; evidence of rat and roach infestation; and interior hoarding with debris, boxes, and papers that prevented access to exits in the event of an emergency and limited access throughout the house. The declarations described the current conditions constituting a nuisance, the factors indicating a public safety hazard based on the condition of the property, and the imminent need for appointment of a receiver.
Employees of the County's Department of Animal Services provided declarations explaining that, in response to complaints of animal abuse and neglect, they observed dogs living "in conditions of squalor," exhibiting mange, and showing other signs of neglect, as well as interior hoarding within the dwelling, and dried urine and feces caked to the floor.
The City fire marshal provided a declaration in which he opined that the extreme hoarding conditions observed at the property posed a significant fire hazard to the occupant, the community, and to firefighters.
Respondents argued that the hazards posed by the condition of the property, and Hoffman's failure to take remedial action, warranted an immediate court order appointing a receiver to abate the conditions.
The parties—including Hoffman—appeared for an ex parte hearing. No witnesses testified on behalf of the parties, and the court heard argument based on the contents of the papers submitted. Following the hearing, the court issued an ex parte order immediately appointing a receiver; issuing a temporary restraining order enjoining Hoffman from maintaining a substandard property in violation of state and local building laws and as a public nuisance which is a threat to the health, safety, and public welfare; and issuing an order to show cause why the receiver should not be confirmed, the public nuisance abated, and injunctive relief granted.
F. Order Confirming Appointment of Receiver
The parties appeared for a hearing on the court's order to show cause. Hoffman was represented by counsel. Again, no witnesses testified on behalf of the parties; the court heard argument based on the contents of papers submitted.
On October 6, the court entered an order confirming appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 17980.7, subdivision (c). The court found that the property is substandard under section 17920.3 and is a public nuisance, and that conditions at the property violate the Health and Safety Code and the SDMC. The court further found that violations at the property are so extensive that they endanger the health and safety of the occupant and the public. The court found that the City issued and served notices and orders under section 17980.6, and Hoffman was afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the conditions but failed to do so. The court further found that the substandard conditions likely would persist without appointment of a receiver, all persons with an interest in the property were afforded notice of the City's intention to petition for appointment of a receiver, and the City's receiver nominee had demonstrated the capacity and expertise to undertake and supervise rehabilitation of the property.
The court directed the receiver "to take full control and possession of the [property] and to take such actions as necessary to abate the public nuisance and to remedy all [s]tate and local housing code violations." The court also entered a preliminary injunction "enjoin[ing] and restrain[ing]" Hoffman from "[m]aintaining a substandard property . . . in violation of state and local building laws and as a public nuisance which is a threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the public." The court further ordered that Hoffman "shall not interfere, obstruct, or resist the efforts of the [r]eceiver to manage, rehabilitate, and maintain the [property]."
On October 10, Hoffman filed an "emergency motion demmurrer [sic] to quash the ex parte application, and dismiss the complaint, and repeal assignment of receiver," in which she argued that the allegations of the conditions of her property were vague and did not support the finding of a dire health and safety concern. She claimed she had hired a construction project manager to help remediate conditions on the property and offered evidence consisting of business cards, certificates, and other documents referencing the construction project manager's purported qualifications. However, she offered no evidence of her purported efforts to remediate the property and no evidence of improved conditions. Nor did she submit any evidence to refute or rebut Respondents' descriptions of the condition of her property.
The parties appeared for a hearing on Hoffman's motion. No witnesses testified on behalf of the parties, no additional evidence was offered, and the court heard argument based on the contents of the papers submitted. Afterward, the court denied Hoffman's motion.
Hoffman appeared at the hearing in propria persona.
G. Appeal
Hoffman timely filed a notice of appeal of the receiver order entered October 6. She subsequently filed in this court an "emergency request to stay proceedings," which we construed as a petition for writ of supersedeas and denied on January 18, 2018.
Hoffman asserts various arguments on appeal. She contends the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter the receiver order because a purported pending bankruptcy should have stayed proceedings. She also contends she requested an administrative hearing, which she claims should have precluded the case from proceeding below. She argues service of the complaint was improper because it was served by a City investigator, "not by an uninvolved party." She claims she had improper notice of the code violations, in violation of her rights to due process. The remainder of Hoffman's arguments relate to the sufficiency of evidence of substandard property conditions, public health hazard, or emergency conditions to justify appointing a receiver.
DISCUSSION
A. Principles of Appellate Review
Hoffman has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal, and the arguments she makes are devoid of any legal analysis or factual basis in the record. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.
"It is . . . a fundamental rule of appellate review that an appealed judgment or order is presumed correct. [Citation.] . . . . To overcome this presumption, the appellant must provide an adequate appellate record demonstrating error. [Citation.] ' "A necessary corollary to this rule [is] that a record is inadequate . . . if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he [or she] provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which the decision of the trial court could be affirmed." [Citation]' [Citation.] Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or order is correct, and on that basis, affirm." (Jade Fashion & Co. Inc. v. Harkham Indus., Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 643-644.) Here, Hoffman failed to include crucial documents in the record, including Respondents' complaint, Respondents' application to appoint a receiver, and all the evidence Respondents submitted to support their receivership request. Hoffman's failure to provide an adequate record " 'requires that the issue[s] [on appeal] be resolved against [her].' " (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
Hoffman's record on appeal contains only the October 6 order for confirmation of receiver and preliminary injunction, another order entered that day approving the receiver's monthly accounting for August, Hoffman's "emergency motion demmurrer [sic] to quash," a minute order denying without prejudice an ex parte application filed by the receiver, the notice of appeal, and the notice designating the record on appeal. We granted Respondents' motion to augment the record to include documents including the complaint; the ex parte application for an order appointing a receiver; the memorandum, declarations, and lodged evidence submitted in support thereof; and the trial court's ex parte order granting the application.
Hoffman's briefing is also defective. An appellant must support all factual statements in briefs with citations to the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)), and confine statements "to matters in the record" on appeal. (Id., rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) An appellant also is required to "[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority." (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) "To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, 'it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.' [Citations.] Hence, conclusory claims of error will fail." (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Hoffman has violated these requirements—she makes no citations to record evidence (only oblique references to statements in her trial briefs), makes claims unsupported by the record, and cites no legal authority relevant to the issues on appeal. Because Hoffman has failed to present any coherent or comprehensible legal arguments supported by citations to the record and relevant case law, she has forfeited her claims on appeal. (See Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817 [points asserted on appeal were forfeited where opening brief was "a rambling and disjointed series of accusations, . . . none of which can be considered 'meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error,' " and argument section contained "no citations to the record at all"].)
B. Receiver Order
Even if Hoffman had preserved her claims on appeal, they nevertheless lack merit. As we explain, there was no procedural or substantive bar precluding the trial court from appointing a receiver, and there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's appointment of a receiver to abate conditions on the property that constituted a public nuisance and posed a threat to the health and safety of the occupants and the public.
1. Applicable Law
"Sections 17980.6 and 17980.7 of the Health and Safety Code compose a statutory scheme providing certain remedies to address substandard residential housing that is unsafe to occupy. Pursuant to section 17980.6, an enforcement agency may issue a notice to an owner to repair or abate property conditions that violate state or local building standards and substantially endanger the health and safety of residents or the public. Section 17980.7 provides that, if the owner fails to comply with the notice despite having been afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so, the enforcement agency may seek judicial appointment of a receiver to assume control over the property and remediate the violations or take other appropriate action." (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 912, fn. omitted (City of Santa Monica) [affirming orders appointing receiver over substandard property, denying landlord's motion for reconsideration, and authorizing receiver to forgo rehabilitation and to contract for demolition].)
"We review an order appointing a receiver for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of discretion is demonstrated if the court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence or the court applied an improper legal standard or otherwise based its determination on an error of law. [Citation.] 'As to factual issues, "we determine whether the record provides substantial evidence supporting the trial court's factual findings. [Citation.] Applying the substantial evidence test on appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable inference in favor of the trial court's findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor. . . . We uphold the trial court's findings unless they so lack evidentiary support that they are unreasonable." ' " (City of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 458, 466 (City of Crescent City).)
2. Hoffman Has Not Established Error
Hoffman contends the trial court lacked the authority to consider Respondents' request to appoint a receiver, and that it erred in granting the request. We consider Hoffman's arguments in turn, rejecting all of them.
First, Hoffman contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a receiver due to pending bankruptcy proceedings. Because she provides no evidence in the record of a pending bankruptcy, her claim fails. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1011.) She also fails to cite any legal authority supporting her claim. Although filing a bankruptcy petition typically operates to stay commencement of a judicial action or other proceedings against a debtor (11 U.S.C. § 362, subd. (a)(1)-(2)), actions by "a governmental unit" to enforce its police and regulatory powers are excepted from the stay. (11 U.S.C. § 362, subd. (b)(4) [a bankruptcy petition does not act to stay "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit's . . . police and regulatory power . . . ."].) Here, Respondents seek to enforce and remedy code violations designed to protect the public health and safety. Such government actions in furtherance of the public health, safety and welfare are "classic exercises of the police power" which are excepted from the automatic stay. (See Javens v. City of Hazel Park (In re Javens) (6th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 359, 365 [affirming bankruptcy court's determination that the city's demolition orders to raze buildings condemned as public nuisances and as dangers to public health, safety and welfare were excepted from the automatic stay]; Fallen Leaf Protection Assn. v. State of Cal. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 816, 825 [declaration of nuisance is within governmental police power].)
Second, Hoffman contends she requested an administrative hearing, and this request should have precluded the case from proceeding. Hoffman has not established she raised this argument in the trial court, so it is forfeited. (Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603 (Johnson) [" 'issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal' "]; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 400 ["[a]n appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method"].) Hoffman also fails to provide any relevant legal authority supporting her position that such a request—assuming it had been made—would preclude appointment of a receiver under section 17980.7, subdivision (c). Instead, she cites two inapposite cases, Yarbrough v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197 and Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, which address incarcerated, indigent civil defendants' rights of access to the courts. We therefore reject Hoffman's claim.
Third, Hoffman claims Respondents' complaint was improperly served by a City investigator, "not by an uninvolved party." We reject Hoffman's claim that the trial court's order must be reversed because she was not properly served. Hoffman made a general appearance, which operated as consent to jurisdiction over her and waived any challenge to purported defects in the service of process. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 679.)
The record does not reflect who served the complaint. Even assuming Hoffman is correct that a City investigator served the complaint, Hoffman has not established a procedural violation. Service of a complaint may be accomplished "by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 414.10.) The City investigator is not a party to the action.
Fourth, Hoffman claims the City "did not follow proper 'notice' procedures," violating her due process rights. Without citing any statutory provisions, Hoffman contends the code "has not been followed properly" and notice was improper because, other than setting times for inspections, the notices "never provided any information on what was to be inspected nor did they specify what was to be corrected. No time frame for any follow-up was thus provided to plaintiff [sic] since no actions aside from setting each inspection were ever required or requested." She further claims, "The very first such document received after 2011 was the posting of the Nuisance Notice in September 2016. Otherwise all 'Notices' had simply stated repeated demands for access that was allowed under DURESS and intimidation."
We reject Hoffman's contention that her due process rights were violated because she was not adequately informed of the claims against her or what violations she had to cure. Hoffman has not established that the City failed to follow appropriate procedures for posting and serving the abatement notice, or for recording the notice of pending enforcement action. (See §§ 17980.6, 17985, subdivision (a).) Nor does she even contend that she was not provided adequate notice of the receivership application. (§ 17980.7, subd. (c); Code Civ. Proc., § 415.10 et seq.) She appeared at the hearings thereon. As such, Hoffman has failed to establish any basis in fact or law for her contention that "notice procedures" were inadequate. (City of Santa Monica, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 927 [where property owner received timely notice of the city's receivership petition and motion and exercised his right to be heard on the receivership matter the trial court's appointment of a receiver cannot be said to violate property owner's due process rights].)
Finally, we reject Hoffman's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence of substandard property conditions, public health hazard, or emergency conditions to justify appointing a receiver. Hoffman contends the evidence was not properly submitted, the evidence was false, or the evidence was outdated. To the extent she failed to object to the evidence presented to the trial court, Hoffman has forfeited any claim of error. (Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 603.) Hoffman's claims also fail on the merits.
"A motion for the appointment of a receiver is expressly classified as a ' "[l]aw and motion" ' proceeding under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1103(a)(2). Under rule 3.1306, 'Evidence received at a law and motion hearing must be by declaration or request for judicial notice without testimony or cross-examination, unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown.' " (City of Crescent City, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at pp. 464-465.) Here, there is no indication in the record that Hoffman even attempted to refute or rebut Respondents' evidence, or that Respondents' evidence was improperly submitted to the trial court.
Respondents' evidence consisted of the numerous declarations and lodged exhibits described herein.
Hoffman misapprehends the standard of review in claiming the evidence was false or outdated. We do not assess credibility or reweigh the evidence on appeal. (See City of Crescent City, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) The City submitted numerous declarations as well as photographic and documentary evidence detailing the substandard conditions of the property, the unsuccessful attempts to work with Hoffman to remedy the problems, and the imminent need for relief. The older evidence merely establishes that the nuisance has existed, unabated, for a significant period—lending additional support to the trial court's decision to appoint a receiver to abate the property conditions. (See City of Santa Monica, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 933 [listing fact that "City had tried unsuccessfully for many, many years to compel [building owner] to repair or abate the serious . . . code violations that existed on his property" as evidence supporting trial court's order authorizing receiver to contract for building's demolition].)
Hoffman's contention that there was no proof of "a factual emergency" likewise lacks merit. Respondents presented detailed evidence documenting rat and roach infestation, extreme hoarding conditions, animal abuse and neglect, dried urine and feces caked to the floor, and fire hazards, among other substandard conditions. Respondents submitted a declaration from a City fire marshal opining that the conditions at Hoffman's property pose a significant fire hazard to Hoffman, the community, and to firefighters, and that conditions at the property justify abatement by court order. Hoffman was given more than eight months from issuance of the abatement notice to remedy the conditions but failed to do so.
In sum, we find no abuse of discretion. The numerous declarations and supporting exhibits submitted by various City and County employees detailing the history of noncompliance and the current condition of Hoffman's property constitute substantial evidentiary support for the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law justifying appointment of a receiver. (City of Crescent City, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.)
DISPOSITION
The October 6 order confirming appointment of the receiver and imposing a preliminary injunction is affirmed.
GUERRERO, J. WE CONCUR: NARES, Acting P. J. DATO, J.