Opinion
SC: 163255 COA: 353077
03-25-2022
PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Latonya Renee HOBSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 13, 2021 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE Section II of the Court of Appeals opinion, REVERSE Section III of the Court of Appeals opinion, and REMAND this case to the Wayne Circuit Court as on reconsideration granted to reopen the proofs and permit the defendant to provide additional testimony regarding the prejudice prong of her Strickland claim under People v. Ginther , 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973). Pursuant to this Court's June 2, 2017 order, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the performance of the defendant's trial and appellate counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error. At that hearing, the defendant was repeatedly questioned about a life with the possibility of parole sentence for second-degree murder, but it is uncontroverted that such a sentence was not a possibility at the time of the defendant's trial. MCL 769.9(2) ; People v. Moore , 164 Mich.App. 378, 386-392, 417 N.W.2d 508 (1987). The defendant raised this error in a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. The circuit court thus failed to determine if the defendant would have accepted the plea that she was actually offered, a finding required under Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the possibility that the circuit court might have rejected the plea agreement is grounds for denying relief. The circuit court did not reach that issue in this case and there is no basis in the record to assume that the circuit court would have refused to accept the plea that the defendant was actually offered.
Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Zahra, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I cannot conclude that the trial court erred by finding that defendant failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that she would have accepted the prosecution's plea offer had she been effectively advised by trial counsel, as is required in order to establish prejudice for purposes of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. There is very little in the record of this decades-old case to show what motivated defendant to reject the offered plea deal. While the Ginther hearing provided defendant an opportunity to demonstrate that she would have accepted the plea, reviewing courts must remain mindful of the fact that credibility determinations remain the responsibility of the trial courts. Here, defendant primarily presented self-serving testimony that she would have done whatever trial counsel advised her to do; this evidence was subject to credibility findings by the trial court and, even if accepted as true, does not equate to a showing that defendant would have accepted the plea offer but for trial counsel's deficient performance. While a questionable hypothetical situation was posed to defendant at the Ginther hearing—she was asked if she would have accepted a sentence with a maximum of life with parole even though such a sentence was not available —her uncertain response to that question is noteworthy given that the maximum that would have been possible under the plea deal actually offered would have been a very lengthy term of years. Defendant's explicit reluctance to state that she would have accepted a plea with a maximum of parolable life—"I guess I would have took the twenty-five to life"—would seem to apply with equal force to the lengthy term-of-years maximum that could have been imposed under the proffered plea deal. Therefore, even if the terms of the hypothetical situation itself were not available to defendant, the equivocal nature of defendant's response is informative as to whether she would have accepted the plea deal and can have a great impact on the trial court's credibility determination. In any event, defendant's lukewarm response to a hypothetical situation that was not directly applicable does not relieve her of her burden to establish prejudice.
Where a defendant alleges that he or she would have accepted a plea offer and not proceeded to trial because of trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, a defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e. , that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. [Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 164, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012).]
People v. Ginther , 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973).
See MCL 769.9(2) ; People v. Moore , 164 Mich.App. 378, 386-392, 417 N.W.2d 508 (1987).
In sum, defendant bears the burden to show that she would have accepted the plea offer but for counsel's erroneous advice, and she has not done so. The trial court assessed the credibility of the witnesses, as best as it could in a case this old, and was not convinced that defendant satisfied her burden. I would not disturb this credibility determination. For these reasons, and because I find it hard to believe that a "do-over" Ginther hearing will be productive or a good use of the trial court's resources, I would deny leave to appeal.