Opinion
A158619
08-26-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHAWNTEL DELLA HOAGLEN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Mendocino County Super. Ct. Nos. SCUK-CRCR-10-14138, SCUK-CRCR-19-31084)
Defendant Shawntel Hoaglen appeals from a postjudgment order denying her request for an additional 71 days of presentence custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5, based on time spent in a residential treatment program that she ultimately did not complete. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying her request because she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to these credits. We agree, reverse the postjudgment order, and remand for the court to award the additional 71 days of custody credits.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In September 2010, Hoaglen was charged in case no. 10-14138 with six felonies: one count of first degree burglary, one count of first degree robbery, two counts of assault, and two counts of false imprisonment. She immediately pleaded guilty to the robbery count, and the remaining counts were dismissed.
The charges were brought under sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a) (burglary), sections 211 and 212.5, subdivision (a) (robbery), former section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury and assault with a deadly weapon), and section 236 (false imprisonment).
The following month, the trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Hoaglen on probation for three years. Her probation conditions required her to complete a residential treatment program, and she was released from jail to a San Francisco program on or around October 29, 2010. The release order directed that she remain at the program "and upon successful completion only, [she] will receive day for day credit towards [her] jail sentence."
Within a few days, on November 1, 2010, Hoaglen absconded from the treatment program, and the trial court summarily revoked probation and issued a bench warrant. Over seven years later, in March 2018, she was arrested on the warrant in Mexico and transported back to Mendocino County. The following month, after she admitted to violating probation by leaving the treatment program without completing it, the court imposed a term of four years for the robbery, suspended execution of the sentence, and reinstated probation.
In July 2018, Hoaglen was charged in a separate case (the misdemeanor case) with child endangerment and being under the influence of methamphetamine. As part of a global resolution, she admitted to violating probation again and pleaded no contest to misdemeanor child endangerment. That October, after the trial court initially indicated it would revoke probation permanently in case no. 10-14138, it was persuaded to reverse course. Addressing Hoaglen, the court stated, "[I]n order to continue on probation, you need to enter what's called a Johnson waiver, and I am going to require that you waive, if you wish to avail yourself of this opportunity, all of your previous custody credits. That is, 195 actual days that you served in county jail would need to be waived in order to reinstate you on probation. [¶] Are you willing to do so?" Hoaglen responded, "Yes."
The charges were brought under section 273a, subdivision (b) (child endangerment), and Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). This appeal is not from an order entered in that case.
"A Johnson waiver is a waiver of a statutory right to credit for time served against a subsequent county jail or state prison sentence pursuant to section 2900.5." (People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 307; People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183, 188 (Johnson).)
The trial court then reinstated probation and ordered that Hoaglen "serve 90 days in the county jail with early release to residential treatment. Day-for-day credit against the 90 days upon successful completion." At the close of the hearing, the court reiterated that Hoaglen would "receive day-for-day credit in her residential program against the 90-day sentence when she successfully completes her program." The written order reinstating probation also stated that Hoaglen was "ordered to serve 90 days in county jail, with the option of day-for-day credit in residential treatment, upon successful completion."
Hoaglen was released from jail to the same San Francisco treatment program on November 7, 2018. Seventy-one days later, on January 4, 2019, she was discharged from the program based on a report she threatened another resident. Later that month, she admitted to violating probation, and the trial court revoked probation and reinstated it with the condition that she serve an additional 30 days in jail.
Based on an incident in late June 2019, Hoaglen was charged in a third matter, case no. 19-31084, with two felonies: reckless driving while evading a peace officer and child endangerment. Hoaglen pleaded no contest to both counts in exchange for the dismissal of a prior-strike allegation, and she stipulated that the plea established a violation of probation in case no. 10-14138 and the misdemeanor case.
The charges were brought under Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a) (reckless evading), and section 273a, subdivision (a) (child endangerment).
Before the September 2019 sentencing hearing, Hoaglen filed a motion to receive custody credits for the 71 days she spent in the San Francisco treatment program between November 2018 and January 2019, on the basis that she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to those credits. Because of a delay in obtaining the reporter's transcript of the hearing at which Hoaglen entered the Johnson waiver, the trial court decided to proceed with sentencing and not award the disputed custody credits but reconsider the issue upon receiving the transcript.
The trial court then permanently revoked probation in case no. 10-14138, terminated probation in the misdemeanor case, and sentenced Hoaglen to a total term of six years in prison, composed of the previously imposed four-year term for robbery in case no. 10-14138 and consecutive terms of 16 months for child endangerment and eight months for reckless driving in case no. 19-31084. She was also sentenced to 90 days in jail in the misdemeanor case. The court awarded 127 days of custody credits.
The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that Hoaglen received a 14-month term for child endangerment. Accordingly, the abstract must be amended to indicate the term is actually 16 months. --------
A few days after sentencing, Hoaglen sought reconsideration of the award of custody credits and submitted a letter from the San Francisco treatment program confirming she spent 71 days there. At a hearing on September 30, 2019, after it received the reporter's transcript of the hearing at which Hoaglen entered the Johnson waiver (which was presided over by a different judge), the trial court denied Hoaglen's request for 71 additional days of custody credits. Addressing Hoaglen, it explained: "I think it's clear that [the other judge] wanted you to be successful on probation, Ms. Hoaglen. Of course, everyone wants you to be successful on probation. [¶] And that you were to get a benefit against the 90-day sentence only if you successfully completed that residential treatment program. [¶] And the record is clear that you didn't [complete] that program. So I'm not going to grant those custody credits based on [the other judge's] order." Hoaglen appealed the September 30 order.
II.
DISCUSSION
Under section 2900.5, subdivision (a), "when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a . . . rehabilitation facility . . . or similar residential institution, all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order, . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment." In addition, under section 2900.5, subdivision (f), time spent in such a facility "in lieu of imprisonment in a county jail . . . shall qualify as mandatory time in jail." A trial court may, however, "require a defendant, as a condition of probation, to waive entitlement to . . . custody credits for time that the defendant spends in a residential drug treatment facility." (People v. Thurman (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1457.) Here, it is undisputed that Hoaglen was entitled to 71 days of custody credits for the time she spent in the San Francisco treatment program if she did not validly waive her right to them.
" ' "As with the waiver of any significant right by a criminal defendant, a defendant's waiver of entitlement to section 2900.5 custody credits must, of course, be knowing and intelligent." ' [Citation.] ' "To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry should begin and end with deciding whether the defendant understood he [or she] was giving up custody credits to which he [or she] was otherwise entitled." ' " (People v. Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 830.) Thus, "a custody credit waiver may be found to have been voluntary and intelligent from the totality of the circumstances, even if the sentencing court failed to follow the 'better course' of specifically advising the defendant regarding the scope of his [or her] waiver." (People v. Burks (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 232, 235.) Whether a waiver of custody credits was knowing and intelligent is a question of law reviewed de novo. (See People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80; Arevalo, at p. 830.)
Hoaglen claims that although at the October 2018 hearing she entered a valid Johnson waiver of 195 days of custody credits for time already spent in jail, the trial court did not "elicit a waiver of [the future] residential treatment program credits from [her]." The Attorney General responds that while "the court did not take an express waiver of [her] right to have the credits applied to any future incarceration" and "did not expressly include the successful completion of the [treatment] program within the scope of the Johnson waiver," Hoaglen nevertheless " 'understood [she] was relinquishing or giving up custody credits to which [she] was otherwise entitled.' "
We agree with Hoaglen that she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to the 71 days of custody credits for time she later spent in residential treatment. In entering the Johnson waiver, she agreed to waive, in the trial court's words, only "all of [her] previous custody credits. That is, 195 actual days that [she] served in county jail." Thus, as the Attorney General agrees, she did not expressly waive her right to future residential treatment credits, and the Johnson waiver did not condition the earning of those credits on successfully completing a treatment program.
Despite the lack of any express waiver of custody credits for time spent in residential treatment, the Attorney General argues that Hoaglen nevertheless " 'understood [she] was relinquishing or giving up custody credits to which [she] was otherwise entitled.' " (Quoting People v. Arnold, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 308.) He relies on the fact that the trial court "unequivocally told [Hoaglen] she had to complete the residential program to receive credits for it against her jail sentence." But while the court clearly informed her, both orally and in its written order, that she would receive "day-for-day credit" for time spent in residential treatment only if she successfully completed the program, it never conveyed the information that she was entitled to these custody credits unless she waived them.
Specifically, we cannot agree with the Attorney General that "[t]he fact that the [trial] court put a limitation on those credits effectively informed [Hoaglen] she was otherwise entitled to credits for time spent in residential treatment." A defendant could also plausibly interpret the court's advisements to mean that, without a need for a waiver, there is simply no entitlement under the law to custody credits for time spent in an uncompleted treatment program. And contrary to the Attorney General's position, this interpretation would not "render the court's statement[s] meaningless": The statements could also be construed as merely reminding Hoaglen of the importance of completing residential treatment and encouraging her to do so. Thus, although the court unambiguously told Hoaglen that she would not receive custody credits for time spent in a treatment program if she did not ultimately finish it, the court did not inform her that receiving custody credits for an incomplete program was even possible. As a result, she could not have knowingly and intelligently waived her right to such credits.
III.
DISPOSITION
The September 30, 2019 order denying Hoaglen's request for custody credits is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial court to award her 71 days of custody credits based on the time spent in the San Francisco residential treatment program between November 2018 and January 2019. The court shall issue an amended abstract of judgment that reflects the correct number of credits, as well as the 16-month term for child endangerment, and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
/s/_________
Humes, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Margulies, J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.