Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD201980, Albert T. Harutunian and David J. Danielsen, Judges.
McINTYRE, J.
Agustin Hirugami appeals a judgment entered on his plea of guilt to selling methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for sale. He contends that the superior court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of drugs found in his home because (1) the premises from which the methamphetamine was seized were not described with particularity in the warrant pursuant to which the search occurred and those premises were not included in the warrant's description of the property to be searched; and (2) once the agents discovered that the property had more than one living unit, they were required to seek court authorization before searching the portion of the premises where he lived. We find his arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In August and September 2006, officers from the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) placed a wiretap on Hirugami's phone and, as a result of information obtained thereby, were able to observe Hirugami selling methamphetamine on three different occasions. In October 2006, DEA agents obtained a warrant to search "the residence located at 864 Toyne Street" in San Diego, where Hirugami had been seen frequently coming and going during their investigation; the warrant described the premises as a "single-family[,] single story house" with a white front east-facing door and an overhang displaying the address numbers and authorized a search "of the premises and all parts therein, including rooms, attics . . ., garages and outbuildings assigned to or part of [that] residence[.]"
In executing the warrant, a number of officers entered and walked through the main part of the house and found three women and a child there. As they did so, other agents who had gone into the backyard noted that there was another door on the side of the house. Entering this part of the house, officers found Hirugami and conducted a search of his separate living space, which had its own kitchen, a bedroom and a living room/dining room area. The search revealed a Tupperware container with 269.3 grams of methamphetamine in it, and a loaded .380 semi-automatic handgun, in a dresser in the bedroom. Hirugami was arrested and charged with three counts of selling methamphetamine and four counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale.
Prior to trial, Hirugami moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs uncovered by the search of his apartment, contending that the search was outside the scope of what was authorized by the warrant. At the suppression hearing, DEA Special Agent Sean Stephen testified that the structure at 864 Toyne Street appeared to be a single family home and that the side door to the main residence, which looked on entry as though it led into a converted garage, did not display any separate address number. He also testified that the entire property was enclosed by a fence and it had only one mailbox. After entertaining the arguments of counsel, the court denied Hirugami's motion, finding in part that the officers believed in good faith the premises constituted a single family residence, that the warrant was based on a showing of probable cause to search Hirugami's living area and that the officers' subsequent discovery that that area was separated from the rest of the house by an interior wall did not invalidate the warrant.
Shortly thereafter, Hirugami pleaded guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale and two counts of selling methamphetamine and admitted enhancement allegations that he was armed during the commission of the possession count. The court dismissed the remaining counts and sentenced Hirugami to three years in prison. Hirugami appeals.
DISCUSSION
To guard against general exploratory searches, the law requires that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; § 1525; Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84.) However, absolute precision is not required and a search warrant will be found to have sufficient particularity if the description set forth therein "is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended" and "whether there is any reasonable probability that another premise[s] might be mistakenly searched." (People v. Amador (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 392.) Further, a warrant must be read in a common sense and realistic manner, not a hypertechnical one. (Id. at pp. 392-393, citing United States v. Turner (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d 1508, 1510.)
Whether a warrant complies with the constitutional requirement of particularity is a question of law, subject to our independent review, although we must defer to the trial court's determination of the facts so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Amador, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 393.) Strong policy favors searches conducted pursuant to a warrant rather than those undertaken on some other allowable basis and, for this reason, a warrant is presumed to have been valid. (Ibid.) Accordingly, a defendant who challenges a warrant's sufficiency bears the burden of establishing that its errors and omissions are fatal to its enforceability. (See ibid.)
Here, although Hirugami appears to suggest to the contrary, the warrant in question clearly describes the premises to be searched. However, although a warrant to search a single dwelling unit located at a particular address may validly permit the search of outbuildings and appurtenances thereto, it will not support the search of multiple living units on the same property absent the existence of probable cause to search each unit or a reasonable basis for believing that the entire premises are a single living unit. (People v. Estrada (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 136, 146 [holding that an overly broad warrant is void]; see generally People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 881, fn. 5.)
Here, the superior court found that the issuance of the warrant was based on probable cause to search the entire premises, which appeared from an exterior vantage point to be a single family home. This finding is supported by the evidence showing that the house appeared from all exterior manifestations to be a single family dwelling. Hirugami's living quarters did not have a number or letter that identified it as a separate unit and the house had only one mailbox, one electric meter, one driveway and one completely fenced backyard. (See, e.g., United States v. Kyles (2d Cir.1994) 40 F.3d 519, 522; United States v. Whitney (9th Cir.1980) 633 F.2d 902, 907-908.) In fact, the only indication that the converted garage was being used as a separate living quarters was not apparent until after the officers gained entry to it and saw that it had a kitchen, living area and bedroom that was not connected to the main house. On this evidence, the court properly found that, based on the information available to the officers at the time they executed the warrant, they reasonably believed the garage was part of the family residence and therefore within the scope of the warrant.
Hirugami nonetheless contends that once the officers entered his unit and discovered that it was separate from the main house, they were required to discontinue their search and seek an amended warrant applicable only to his unit. He relies on United States v. Kurt (9th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2d 309 and People v. Sanchez (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 664 in support of this argument. These cases, however, are totally inapposite to the issue he raises and do not establish his point. (See United States v. Kurt, supra, 986 F.2d at p. 310 [addressing the validity of a warrant on which the address was altered at the direction of the court based on unsworn statements of the attesting officer]; People v. Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at pp. 680-683 [addressing in relevant part the officer's conduct in obtaining a revalidated and reissued warrant rather than an entirely new warrant].)
The law is clear that a search of an entire premises is permitted when there is probable cause for believing that the premises are a single living unit and that the constitutionality of the officers' execution of a search warrant is assessed "in light of the information available to them at the time they acted." (Maryland v. Garrison, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 85, 87-88.) Despite the fact that Hirugami's living quarters were separate and distinct from the residence identified in the warrant, the search was lawful based on the officers' reasonable belief that those quarters were within the scope of the warrant. (Id. at pp. 87-89; compare United States v. Cannon (9th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 875, 879-880 [holding that officers are required to stop a search and obtain a separate warrant upon discovering that the place being searched constituted the separate living quarters of a third party as to whom no probable cause was established].)
Hirugami also argues that the officers' conduct was constitutionally infirm in accordance with United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 922-923, which held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to exclude evidence found by an officer who conducts a search in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant that is issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but is later determined to be invalid based on the absence of probable cause. Here, however, Hirugami does not (and did not in the proceedings below) assert that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search his residence and, accordingly, the analysis of United States v. Leon is simply inapplicable.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the superior court did not err in denying Hirugami's motion to suppress the drug evidence found in his unit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting J., IRION, J.