Opinion
November 2, 2000.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Czajka, J.), rendered April 7, 1999, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree (three counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (three counts).
Norbert A. Higgins, Binghamton, for appellant.
Beth G. Cozzolino, District Attorney (Kenneth L. Golden of counsel), Hudson, for respondent.
Before: Mercure, J.P., Spain, Carpinello, Graffeo and Mugglin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and three counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of four years to life. He now appeals challenging the sufficiency of his plea allocution and, alternatively, asserting that the sentence imposed was harsh and excessive.
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of his plea allocution is not preserved for our review inasmuch as defendant failed to move to withdraw the plea under CPL 220.60 (3) or to vacate the judgment of conviction under CPL 440.10 (see, People v. Johnson, 82 N.Y.2d 683, 685; People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 665). Moreover, the narrow exception to the preservation doctrine (see, People v. Lopez,supra, at 666) is not applicable here inasmuch as the record fails to disclose any circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry by County Court prior to accepting defendant's plea (see, People v. Saitch, 260 A.D.2d 724, 725, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1006; People v. Vonderchek, 245 A.D.2d 979, 980, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 945). In any event, we find that defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that his allocution established all of the necessary elements of the crimes to which he pleaded.
Likewise, we conclude that the sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive. Where a sentence is within permissible statutory ranges, it will not be disturbed unless the sentencing court abused its discretion or extraordinary circumstances exist warranting modification (see, People v. Brown, 239 A.D.2d 784, 785, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 870; People v. Parson, 209 A.D.2d 882, 884, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1014). In light of defendant's prior criminal history and the serious nature of the crimes, we find no reason to modify the sentence imposed (see, People v. Brown,supra, at 785; People v. Vasquez, 231 A.D.2d 755, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 931).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.