In imposing sentence, a trial judge must be concerned with the rehabilitation of a defendant, but also with the need to deter similar criminal conduct, to protect society from law violators, and to encourage respect for the law. ( People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 357 N.E.2d 884.) Illinois statutes provide a term of not less than 20 nor more than 60 years for first degree murder. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(a).)
The defendant has not set forth a clear showing of abuse of discretion and without such a showing, a reviewing court cannot disturb the sentence. People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 357 N.E.2d 884. Affirmed.
Under the facts presented, the appellant does not appear any more or less culpable than codefendant, Grincavich. Moreover, the sentences of 3 to 12 years and 2 to 8 years do not appear to be grossly disparate. Although Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (58 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(4)) authorizes this court to reduce or modify sentences imposed by trial courts, the rule does not authorize this court to "tinker" with sentences. ( People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884.) Furthermore, the imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion, and, absent abuse of this discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered on review. ( People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882.)
Considering the presentencing data and the prior criminal records which were before the court below — coupled with the fact that the sentences are within the statutory range for Class I felony offenses — we are loath to "tinker" with the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion. People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884. The trial court is affirmed.
• 7 The sentences imposed in this case are within the statutory limits for Class 1 felonies and our careful review of the record fails to disclose an abuse of discretion by the court which imposed those sentences. Absent evidence of such an abuse in the record, we decline to tinker with the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883; People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 378, 383, 362 N.E.2d 90, 94; People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences entered in this cause.
• 8 The record before us does not reflect that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in imposing a sentence of imprisonment on the instant defendant. Without such an abuse evident in the record, we decline to tinker with the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883; Honn; People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885. The defendant has raised a number of other issues concerning the sufficiency of the proof introduced at both of his trials.
As we have often done, we again decline to tinker with sentences imposed by the circuit court unless there is evidence that the court abused its discretion. People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 378, 383, 362 N.E.2d 90, 94; People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and the sentences imposed thereon.
As we have done on numerous occasions, we again hold that we decline to tinker with a sentence imposed by the trial court unless there is an abuse of discretion. People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 378, 383, 362 N.E.2d 90, 94; People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885. • 4 Defendant, while escaping from the scene of the robbery, swerved his automobile into a uniformed police officer who was attempting to arrest him. Although the officer was pinned between the escaping vehicle and another, the defendant did not stop. Still, however, defendant was only sentenced to concurrent terms of 2 to 6 years' imprisonment.
We are, as Honn demonstrates, sensitive to the tension inherent in the sometimes conflicting factors which a judge must weigh when he imposes a sentence. As we noted in Honn and other cases ( e.g., People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885), we will not tinker with a sentence imposed by the trial court unless the court has somehow abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. The defendant contends that he has an excellent potential for rehabilitation because he has expressed remorse for his crimes, voluntarily surrendered to the police, and voluntarily confessed to the crimes.
While we recognize that Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (58 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(4)) authorizes this court to reduce or modify sentences imposed by trial courts, we also recognize that the rule does not authorize this court to tinker with sentences or to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. People v. Hines (1976), 44 Ill. App.3d 204, 206, 357 N.E.2d 884, 885. • 12 Finally, we note that the trial court, on the State's motion, vacated the judgments entered on the jury's aggravated incest verdicts on June 15, 1977, subsequent to defendant's filing of a notice of appeal on June 8, 1977. It is clear, therefore, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the case on June 15, 1977, and that its action of that date was void from the moment that it was purportedly entered.