Opinion
1236 KA 19–00107
12-20-2019
DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (THERESA L. PREZIOSO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. CAROLINE A. WOJTASZEK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (LAURA T. JORDAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (THERESA L. PREZIOSO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
CAROLINE A. WOJTASZEK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (LAURA T. JORDAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CURRAN, WINSLOW, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted assault in the first degree ( Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.10[1] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v. Lopez , 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ). Supreme Court engaged defendant in "an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice" ( People v. Hicks , 89 A.D.3d 1480, 1480, 932 N.Y.S.2d 412 [4th Dept. 2011], lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 924, 942 N.Y.S.2d 463, 965 N.E.2d 965 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and the record establishes that he "understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty" ( Lopez , 6 N.Y.3d at 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ). The valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence (see id. at 255–256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.