Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Los Angeles, No. SA071006, James R. Dabney, Judge.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Elaine F. Tumonis, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Michael Courts Hester appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations that appellant had four prior convictions for the same offense (Pen. Code, § 666.5) and a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). He was sentenced to six years in state prison. Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of April 18, 2009, Pieter Rousseau parked his white Ford Econoline van in his assigned parking spot at the apartment building where he lived. Rousseau used the van to transport materials for his wood flooring business. Because the lock on the driver's side door did not work properly, Rousseau left the door unlocked and placed the key deep inside the center console. Business invoices and contracts prominently bearing Rousseau's name were left sitting on the dash. Rousseau's registration, insurance papers, and business cards were also in the van.
The following morning, Rousseau discovered that the van was gone. Although he occasionally gave one of his employees permission to drive the van, he had not done so that day. Rousseau called the police and reported the van stolen.
On April 22, 2009, a Los Angeles County sheriff's deputy was patrolling in an advanced surveillance and protection car in the vicinity of Rousseau's apartment when he received an alert on the license plate number of Rousseau's stolen van. The deputy pulled the van over and contacted appellant, the driver and sole occupant. Appellant complied with the deputy's order to exit the van and was otherwise cooperative. There was a key in the van's ignition and no visible damage to the ignition or door looks.
An advanced surveillance and protection car, or "ASAP" car, uses three outside mounted cameras that read vehicle license plates at the rate of one thousand per minute.
The police called Rousseau, who went to the location and identified his van. The documents Rousseau had left in the van were strewn all over the floor and driver's seat. Rousseau verified that he did not know appellant and had not given him permission to drive the van.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. Specifically, he claims there was no evidence from which the jury could have found that he had the requisite intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of his possession of the vehicle.
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, we examine the entire record and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment to determine whether there is reasonable and credible evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811.) We do not redetermine the weight of the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129.)
"To establish a defendant's guilt of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant drove or took a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner's consent, and that the defendant had the specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. [Citation.]" (People v. O'Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574, fn. omitted.) "Mere possession of a stolen car under suspicious circumstances is sufficient to sustain a conviction of unlawful taking." (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 199.) "'Possession of recently stolen property is so incriminating that to warrant conviction there need only be, in addition to possession, slight corroboration in the form of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his guilt.' [Citation.]" (People v. Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 949.) "'Where recently stolen property is found in the conscious possession of a defendant who, upon being questioned by the police, gives a false explanation regarding his possession or remains silent under circumstances indicating a consciousness of guilt, an inference of guilt is permissible and it is for the jury to determine whether or not the inference should be drawn in the light of all the evidence.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 948.)
The evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, is sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. Appellant was stopped while driving a van he knew did not belong to him. Paperwork found strewn throughout the vehicle identified the vehicle's owner, and the vehicle's registration papers were conspicuously torn from the visor and left lying on the floor. This evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that an individual in appellant's position would have reason to know that the vehicle had been stolen. Moreover, appellant did not know the van's owner and did not behave in a manner that would lead a rational trier of fact to believe that he did not intend to at least temporarily deprive the owner of his vehicle. "[S]ection 10851(a) 'proscribes a wide range of conduct.' [Citation.]" (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) "A person can violate section 10851(a) 'either by taking a vehicle with the intent to steal it or by driving it with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner of possession....' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, appellant asserts that "although appellant was found in possession of a recently stolen vehicle, appellant's case does not have the same indicia of corroborative evidence found in other cases of unlawful driving of a stolen vehicle." Whether this is so is irrelevant. None of the cases appellant cites purports to identify evidentiary factors that must be present in order to sustain a conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). Our only task is to determine whether the evidence in this case, construed in favor of the judgment, is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant drove or took a vehicle without the owner's consent with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of his title or possession. (People v. O'Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) Appellant's recent possession of a vehicle stolen from someone he did not know, coupled with the evidence of the paperwork bearing the victim's name strewn throughout the vehicle and the registration being torn from the visor and thrown on the floor, is sufficient to support the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.