In each case it was either assumed the defendant was the driver, or his statements to that effect were accepted as proof of that fact without discussion of the corpus delicti. See, People v. Hess, 24 Ill. App.3d 299, 320 N.E.2d 344 (1974); State v. Clark, 130 Vt. 500, 296 A.2d 475 (1972); State v. Creighton, Iowa, 201 N.W.2d 471 (1972); State v. Kennedy, Mo. App., 530 S.W.2d 479 (1975). Judgment was reversed in each case on the ground that since the state failed to show when the accident occurred, the circumstantial evidence was not such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.
While the evidence does not support a preconceived plan between W.C. and Lucas, it nonetheless shows the devolution of a common criminal design. This case is distinguishable from People v. Hess (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 299, cited by respondent. In Hess, inference alone supported proof of the key element of the crime, and other evidence — defendant and his companion asleep rather than unconscious, car lights turned off, open beer can upright on dashboard, and car in ditch alongside nonbusy township road — militated against the inference that the defendant had been driving while intoxicated.
The State has an obligation to prove every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353 (2001); People v. Hess, 24 Ill. App. 3d 299, 303 (1974). The elements of the crime with which the defendant was charged are (1) driving or being in actual physical control of any vehicle and (2) an alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath of .08 or more. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2006).
The imposition of criminal sanctions must, however, be accompanied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense. ( People v. Hess (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 299, 320 N.E.2d 344.) The revocation of a driver's license must also comply with the requirements of procedural due process.
To conclude otherwise on the record would require a resort to speculation and conjecture. Under such circumstances, there cannot be enough proof to sustain a conviction. People v. Jordan, 4 Ill.2d 155, 163; People v. Hess, 24 Ill. App.3d 299, 303, 320 N.E.2d 344; People v. Halley, 13 Ill. App.3d 719, 724; People v. Dillard, 5 Ill. App.3d 896, 903, 284 N.E.2d 490. Defendant's version of the stabbing, as presented in the instant case, is neither improbable nor is it contradicted in material part. His version is in fact corroborated substantially by the testimony of the State's own witness, Dr. Kaplan, who examined the defendant on the day following the incident.