Opinion
8907 Ind. 3109/14
04-04-2019
Justine M. Luongo, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ronald Alfano of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Eric Del Pozo of counsel), for respondent.
Justine M. Luongo, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ronald Alfano of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Eric Del Pozo of counsel), for respondent.
Friedman, J.P., Gische, Kapnick, Webber, Gesmer, JJ.
Defendant's prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, after a prior prosecution for the actual murder resulted in a trial conviction for manslaughter and gang assault, did not violate the federal or state double jeopardy prohibitions, because conspiracy is not the same offense, for double jeopardy purposes, as murder, manslaughter, or gang assault (see People v. Biggs, 1 N.Y.3d 225, 230, 771 N.Y.S.2d 49, 803 N.E.2d 370 [2003] ). "The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not" ( Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 [1932] [citations omitted] ). Neither the fact that the evidence at the homicide trial would have also supported a conspiracy charge, nor the fact that defendant had been alleged to have acted in concert with other persons, has any relevance under the Blockburger test.
Defendant's plea allocution was sufficient and his plea was valid. The Court of Appeals has "never held that a plea is effective only if a defendant acknowledges committing every element of the pleaded-to offense, or provides a factual exposition for each element of the pleaded-to offense" ( People v. Seeber, 4 N.Y.3d 780, 781, 793 N.Y.S.2d 826, 826 N.E.2d 797 [2005] [citation omitted]; see also People v. Goldstein, 12 N.Y.3d 295, 301, 879 N.Y.S.2d 814, 907 N.E.2d 692 [2009] ). Defendant pleaded guilty knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, in return for a sentence that, we note, was structured so that he would receive no additional incarceration beyond the 20 years he received for the homicide.