People v Horton, 98 Mich. App. 62, 66; 296 N.W.2d 184 (1980). People v Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216; 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969); People v Wolfe, 5 Mich. App. 543, 549-550; 147 N.W.2d 447 (1967), lv den 379 Mich. 756 (1967). The strict standard of reliability which must be satisfied in the case of an anonymous or criminal informant or "professional stool pigeon" does not apply to ordinary, known citizens who supply information to the police.
In People v Tebedo, 81 Mich. App. 535; 265 N.W.2d 406 (1978), we held that an arrest warrant is not required for a valid arrest when an officer has reasonable cause to believe that there has been a felony committed and reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed it. The officer's reasonable belief must be based on what he observes or what he learns from a reliable source. Information supplied from a reliable citizen source is enough to found a reasonable belief, People v Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216; 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969). Such a belief may be founded upon a description related to police officers by a complainant, People v Timothy Jackson, 11 Mich. App. 630; 162 N.W.2d 114 (1968).
Rather, the officer must entertain an honest, actual belief, based on reasonable grounds, that the arrested individual committed a felony. People v Herrara, 19 Mich. App. 216; 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969). People v Johnnie Mae Jones, 12 Mich. App. 369; 163 N.W.2d 22 (1968).
It has further been required that the arresting officer actually "believe" rather than merely "suspect" that the person arrested has committed the felony. Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42 ( 90 S Ct 1975, 26 L Ed 2d 419); People v. Kuntze (1963), 371 Mich. 419; People v. Harper (1962), 365 Mich. 494; People v. Herrera (1969), 19 Mich. App. 216; People v. Johnnie Mae Jones (1968), 12 Mich. App. 369; People v. Pantoja (1970), 28 Mich. App. 681; People v. Sansoni (1968), 10 Mich. App. 558; generally see, 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest, §§ 22-25, pp 711-716; 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law Procedure (2d ed), § 220, pp 243-250. In the instant case, the facts confronting the officers at the time the arrest was made were (1) that an armed robbery of a bar had been committed by a woman; (2) a description of that woman; (3) the license number of an automobile which was occupied by two women (one a redhead) and a man and was outside the bar shortly before the bar was robbed; (4) that the auto in question was parked outside the residence of a former employee of the bar; (5) that facts indicated the robbery was an inside job; and (6) that when they entered the residence two women (one a redhead) were seen, one matching the description of the woman robber.
"Where a warrant has not been obtained, the validity of the search depends on the law's appraisal of the reasonableness of the search, only unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures being barred." And see, People v. Gonzales (1959), 356 Mich. 247, 253; People v. Zeigler (1960), 358 Mich. 355, 375; People v. Herrera (1969), 19 Mich. App. 216, 229. For reasons which follow, we hold that the warrantless conduct of the police in taking defendant's car and subsequently dusting it for fingerprints was reasonable in constitutional terms.
Defendant's threshold argument is that, notwithstanding the fact that Shelby possessed "reasonable cause to believe that a felony [had] been committed and reasonable cause to believe that [Eddington had] committed it," see MCLA § 764.15(d) [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.874(d)], the entry into defendant's apartment without an arrest warrant was unreasonable and unlawful because the entering officers had no justifiable excuse for their failure to obtain a warrant. A similar contention was presented to this Court in People v. Herrera (1969), 19 Mich. App. 216, and we rejected it saying: "Upon consideration of US Const, Am 4, and Const 1963, art 1, § 11, we find no valid basis for the adoption of defendant's cited standard for reasonableness regarding searches as the standard to be applicable to arrests."
' People v. McDonald, supra, [ 13 Mich. App. 226 (1968)] at 232. "And see People v. Gonzales (1959), 356 Mich. 247, 253; People v. Zeigler (1960), 358 Mich. 355, 375; People v. Herrera, supra [ 19 Mich. App. 216 (1969)]. On this record we hold Shelby's conduct to be reasonable in constitutional terms.
The state authorities are apparently in accord with the federal view of retroactivity, but they do not have as much of a problem with the date of prospective applications as does the United States Supreme Court.See State v. Reyes, 81 N.M. 404, 467 P.2d 730, 732 (1970); Thornton v. State, 451 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex.Cr.App. 1970); State v. Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529, 537 (1969); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713, 720 (1969); Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 256 A.2d 384, 389-392 (1969). At common law there was no authority for the proposition that a judicial decision made law only for the future.
We need not consider the contention that the requirement of a warrant for a search whenever a reasonable opportunity for officers to procure the warrant exists, expressed in cases such as Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, and United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, cited by appellant, is equally applicable to a warrant for arrest. We note that the analogy was rejected in People v. Herrera, 19 Mich.App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529, 532[2, 3]. Nor need we consider whether the doctrine of Ross v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 349 F.2d 210, dealing with prejudicial pre-arrest delay (See Note — Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due-Process Standards, 43 NYUL.J. 722 [1968]), might have been invoked by timely objection. The ultimate answer to appellant's contention is that an allegedly illegal arrest affords no grounds for relief upon collateral attack from a judgment of conviction.
Under the circumstances, the admission of the gun into evidence over defense counsel's objection was proper. People v. Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216 (1969); People v. Surles, 29 Mich. App. 132 (1970); People v. Nelson, 29 Mich. App. 251 (1970). We find no merit in the defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney failed to object prior to trial to the admission of the gun.