Opinion
G031658.
10-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIELLE LOUISE HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Nancy Olsen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Raquel M. Gonzalez and Deana L. Bohenek, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Danielle Hernandez of second degree robbery of a senior citizen and the court found two prior strike allegations to be true. Hernandez complains she was prejudiced by the admission of prior uncharged act evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)), and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the robbery charge. Neither contention has merit and we affirm.
I
During the early evening hours of April 10, 2002, Patsy Harmon felt a pull on her purse strap as she was putting groceries into the trunk of her car in the parking lot of the Tustin "Vons" market. Harmon screamed when she saw Alex Garcia pulling on the strap, and the duo wrestled for control of the purse.
Another shopper, William Snyder, was leaving the store when Harmon started to scream. Moments after Snyder ran over and tried to reclaim the purse from Garcia, a car, driven by defendant, traveled slowly towards the men and struck Snyders knee. In danger of losing his footing, Snyder leaned on the hood of the car and flung himself forward to escape further injury.
During the fracas, Harmons purse strap broke, allowing Garcia to gain control. Various items fell out of the purse in the process, and Garcia stopped to retrieve a small coin purse on the ground. Garcia yelled something at defendant, sitting in her car with the drivers side window down and the engine running, then turned and fled on foot. Defendant, in turn, sped off from the scene.
Snyder used his cell phone to call 911. Then, joined by two other men, he went after Garcia, caught him, and turned the suspect over to the police. Using information supplied by witnesses, a Tustin police officer located defendant and the car used in the crime at the Sunland Motel in Santa Ana.
Snyder identified defendant as the cars driver at trial. He saw the car as he left the market, noticing defendant seated inside with the lights off and the engine running. As the car hit his knee, he saw a child sitting in the back in a baby seat.
Portraying herself as the unwitting accomplice of a family friend, defendant testified in her own behalf at trial. Some seven months pregnant at the time of the crime, defendant lived with her husband and two young children at the Sunland Motel. A friend, Garcia, had recently moved into the motel and asked her for a ride to the market. Defendant agreed, put her son in the baby seat, and drove Garcia to Vons. They never discussed plans to commit a crime or do anything illegal.
When they arrived at the parking lot, Garcia left and went inside the store. Defendant waited in the car. A short time later, defendant saw Garcia emerge from the store, approach Harmon, and pull on her purse. Scared others would think she was part of this scheme, she slowly made her way out of the parking lot, keeping one eye on Garcia. A loud pounding sound caused her to slam on the brakes, and she saw Snyders hand on the hood of her car. Thinking Snyder was otherwise unharmed, defendant left the scene.
As defendant passed in front of the market, a woman yelled, "`I have your license plate." Defendant told the woman she was not involved in "that" and kept going. She had no intention of letting Garcia back in her car and did not try to hit anyone with the vehicle.
Once outside the parking lot, defendant stopped at the first pay phone she could find. Unable to reach her husband, she drove back to the motel, only to find a police officer waiting for her. Defendant first denied being at Vons that evening, claiming she had visited another market. Shifting gears, she then tried to convince the officer she had actually loaned her car to someone else. To explain the inconsistency, defendant explained she was afraid she would have her then-unborn baby in jail and would spend the rest of her life in prison.
II
At trial evidence of defendants participation in a prior uncharged purse robbery was offered as proof of her intent to commit the instant crime.[] The prosecution argued the evidence was relevant to disprove defendants claim that she had no intent to aid and abet Garcia in the commission of the robbery, and to demonstrate the use of a common plan or scheme in the crimes. Defense counsel challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to show defendants involvement in the earlier offense, and claimed the evidence was unduly prejudicial in any event. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
During the prosecutions case-in-chief, Oria Michaelis testified she went to a Cost Plus store in Santa Ana on April 8, 2002. As she approached the entrance, a Hispanic man started to walk towards her. When he asked for the time, Michaelis responded her watch was broken, and kept going. The man grabbed her purse and a struggle ensued. Michaelis fell down and the man took off with her purse. A car, driven by a young, fair-skinned woman with dirty blond hair, pulled up and stopped in front of Michaelis. The robber jumped into the front passenger seat and the car sped away from the parking lot. Michaelis was able to memorize all but one number of the cars license plate (2XF[]775), and reported this information to the police. Unfortunately, she was unable to identify the driver or the robber in photo lineups. In the charged offense, a witness managed to record the getaway cars license number. A records check revealed plate 2XFT775 was registered to one Ramon Hernandez, defendants husband.
Vickie Madrid was at her parents Santa Ana residence on April 8 and claimed she saw two bald men in a gray Toyota throw something into a nearby dumpster. Her father found Michaeliss purse in the dumpster later that day and summoned the police. On cross-examination, she admitted one of the individuals she saw was a Hispanic man but she could not see the other person inside the car.
A brief review of the governing law in this area is in order. Evidence that a defendant committed crimes other than those currently charged is not admissible to prove bad character or a criminal disposition. But such evidence is admissible on other issues, like the identity of the perpetrator of the charged crimes, the existence of a common plan or scheme, or the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the charged crimes. (Evid. Code, § 1101.) To be admissible, the charged and uncharged crimes must be sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of identity, common plan, or intent. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403 (Ewoldt).) A trial courts ruling on this issue is reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 14.)
To establish relevance on the issue of identity, an uncharged crime must be very similar to the charged offense. Put another way, the charged and uncharged offenses must display a "`pattern and characteristics . . . so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature." (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) We note the "strength of the inference in any case depends upon two factors: (1) the degree of distinctiveness of individual shared marks, and (2) the number of minimally distinctive shared marks." (People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 756, original italics, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12.) To establish a common design or plan, "the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual." (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) Finally, the least degree of similarity between charged and uncharged crimes is required to establish relevance on the issue of intent. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) In this particular context, the evidence of the uncharged crimes need only be "sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] to support the inference that the defendant `"probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courts ruling, we think the charged and uncharged crimes shared enough similar features to warrant admissibility in this instance. In both cases, a Hispanic male staked out an unsuspecting woman and grabbed her purse in a busy store parking lot. In each case, a getaway car was waiting, its lights off and engine running, with a fair-skinned blonde woman behind the wheel. Save for one digit, the license plate of the getaway car was the same in each robbery. The license number on defendants husbands car matched the suspect plate in all but one respect. In the earlier case, the driver spirited the purse-snatcher away after the crime was complete. In this incident, the driver approached but sped off when a witness tried to intercede on the victims behalf.
Based on the numerous and distinctive shared characteristics, we also find there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant committed both the charged and uncharged offenses.[] Queried about the Cost Plus robbery on different occasions, defendant told a different, and inconsistent, story each time, supplying additional, albeit circumstantial, evidence of her guilt. The charged and uncharged offenses were sufficiently similar to show a common design or plan and to support an inference that defendant harbored the same intent —— to aid and abet a robbery —— in each instance. There was no error in the admission of this evidence.
True, some of the shared elements, e.g., a purse snatching, use of a getaway car, etc., may not be highly distinctive in and of themselves. But the peculiar combination of these elements is.
Finally, we treat with defendants claim that the probative value of the uncharged crimes evidence was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. The abuse of discretion standard applies to this issue as well. To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, a defendant must show the trial courts ruling "falls outside the bounds of reason." (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226.)
That was not the case here. As detailed above, the charged and uncharged crimes shared numerous similarities, and thus the uncharged offense was highly probative on the issues of common plan and intent in the charged case. Considering the other half of the equation, we acknowledge evidence of the uncharged offense was potentially damaging to defendants case. "But prejudice of this sort is inherent whenever other crimes evidence is admitted [citation], and the risk of such prejudice was not unusually grave here." (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 372.) Neither crime was any more inflammatory than the other, and the jurors received limiting instructions explaining the proper use of the other crimes evidence.
The probative value of the evidence was further enhanced by the temporal proximity of the two incidents, the first occurring just two days before the second. Evidence of each crime came from independent sources, and each offense was proved through independent witnesses. We discern no abuse of discretion on this record.
III
Advancing what is essentially a "house of cards" argument, defendant complains the second degree robbery conviction cannot stand, absent the inadmissible uncharged crimes evidence. The contention lacks merit.
Our review of this issue is limited: In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, the question we must "`ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 271.) Specifically, defendant claims the evidence is insufficient to show she was present at the scene of the crime for the purpose of assisting in the commission of the crime. We disagree. Based on the evidence offered at trial, we think a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt defendant harbored the requisite intent to assist Garcia in the commission of the robbery.
As People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259 explains, an aider and abettor is a principal and shares the perpetrators culpability for the crime. "`[A]n aider and abettor is a person who, "acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime." [Citation.]" (People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1462.)
Here, the evidence showed defendant drove Garcia to the market and waited outside the store with her car headlights off and the engine running. Defendant drove slowly and struck Snyder just as he was about to apprehend Garcia. She did not stop to see if Snyder was injured or offer any assistance to Harmon. Garcia yelled something at her, and she quickly fled from the scene. As defendant decamped, another witness yelled she had the cars license number and saw what defendant did. Defendant testified she did nothing more than give a friend a ride to the market; when she figured out what Garcia had in mind, she was too frightened to do anything more than flee from the scene. When questioned about the crime, defendant changed her story each time. Given the conflict in the evidence, it was the jurys task to determine the credibility of the witnesses in reaching their verdict. Putting the other crimes evidence to the side, our review of the record persuades us there was substantial evidence to support the robbery conviction. It is not our office to reweigh it.
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR, SILLS, P. J. IKOLA, J.