Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWF028812. Judith C. Clark, Judge.
Lynelle K. Hee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
HOLLENHORST, Acting P. J.
Defendant and appellant Andrew C. Hernandez was charged with unlawful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a), count 1), false imprisonment (§ 236, count 2), making criminal threats (§ 422, count 3), possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1), count 4), and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count 5). It was also alleged that defendant had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and had one prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior strike conviction. Defendant waived referral of the matter to probation and requested immediate sentencing. The court sentenced him to the low term of two years, doubled pursuant to the strike, for a total of four years in state prison.
Following the sentencing hearing, defendant filed a notice of appeal, indicating the appeal was “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea.” We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 8, 2009, defendant pled not guilty to all counts and denied the prior strike and prior prison allegations.
On July 29, 2009, defendant withdrew his plea and entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior strike conviction. Before accepting the plea, the court questioned him. Defendant confirmed that he had initialed and signed the plea form, he understood everything on the form and the constitutional rights he was waiving, he understood he could be deported if he was not a United States citizen, that no one had threatened him to plead guilty, and that he understood the consequences of his plea. The court then asked if he had any questions for the court or his attorney before entering the plea. Defendant said “No.” He then pled guilty in open court to count 1 (spousal battery) and admitted the prior strike conviction. The court found that the guilty plea and admission were knowing, intelligent, and voluntarily. Defendant also admitted the victim involved was his spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, or parent of his child, and the court found a factual basis for the entry of the plea. The court immediately sentenced him to the low term of two years in state prison, doubled pursuant to the strike conviction. The court also awarded him 39 days of custody credits, which consisted of 27 days of actual credits and 12 days of credits under section 4019.
We note that on January 4, 2010, this court received a copy of an ex parte motion that defendant filed with the trial court, requesting a recalculation of his pre-sentence credits. He claimed he was entitled to 42 days of credit (28 actual days, plus 14 days under section 4019), rather than the 39 days awarded. As of the filing of this opinion, the trial court had not yet responded. It appears that defendant’s recalculation is correct.
On September 24, 2009, defendant filed a notice of appeal indicating that the appeal was “based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea,”
DISCUSSION
Dependant appealed, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493], setting forth a statement of the case and potential arguable issues-whether defendant was properly advised of his rights prior to pleading guilty, and whether he voluntarily waived such rights. Counsel has also requested this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has not done.
We have now concluded our independent review of the record and found no arguable issues.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MCKINSTER J. MILLER J.