Opinion
F073282
06-09-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID HERNANDEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Clara M. Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. BF159521A)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M. McNamara, Judge. Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Clara M. Levers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Kane, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
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INTRODUCTION
Martha Reyes's car was stolen in the early morning hours on March 17, 2015. Law enforcement located the car a short time later and defendant David Hernandez, who was walking in the general area where the car was found, was arrested. Prior to his arrest, defendant provided Kern County Sheriff's Deputy John McAdoo with a false name and birthdate.
As discussed, post, the sufficiency of the evidence claim raised on appeal is limited to the lawful detention element of Penal Code section 148.9, subdivision (a). Therefore, other than this brief description of the events underlying the charges in this case, we confine our discussion of the facts to those relevant to resolving that issue.
Defendant was charged by amended information with violating Penal Code section 666.5 (prior conviction enhancement) (count 1); Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (taking or driving stolen vehicle) (count 2); section 496d, subdivision (a) (receiving or possessing stolen vehicle) (count 3); and section 148.9, subdivision (a) (false representation or identification to peace officer) (count 4). The trial court bifurcated count 1; and the jury acquitted defendant of felony counts 2 and 3, and convicted him of count 4, a misdemeanor. The court denied probation, sentenced defendant to 90 days in county jail and imposed a $570 fee. Following sentencing, the court granted defendant's request for a directed verdict on count 1 and found him not guilty.
All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction as unsupported by substantial evidence that he was lawfully detained at the time he provided Deputy McAdoo with a false name and birthdate. (§ 148.9, subd. (a).) The People argue that based on the rulings defendant secured in response to his motions in limine, judicial estoppel applies to bar his sufficiency of the evidence claim. Alternatively, they argue that the prosecutor was precluded from presenting evidence on the element of lawful detention by stipulation and in limine rulings, and that in any event, sufficient evidence supports the conviction.
We reject the People's judicial estoppel and related arguments, and conclude defendant's conviction for violation of section 148.9, subdivision (a) is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse the conviction.
DISCUSSION
I. Background
Section 148.9, subdivision (a) provides: "Any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another person or as a fictitious person to any peace officer listed in Section 830.1 or 830.2, or subdivision (a) of Section 830.33, upon a lawful detention or arrest of the person, either to evade the process of the court, or to evade the proper identification of the person by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor."
The statute unambiguously criminalizes falsely identifying oneself to a peace officer only if the false identification occurs during the course of a lawful detention or arrest. (§ 148.9, subd. (a); People v. Walker (2012) 210 CalApp.4th 1372, 1392; In re Voeurn O. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 793, 796.) The People bear the burden of proof as to each element of a charged offense (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364) and, as such, the prosecutor in this case was required to prove defendant was lawfully detained at the time he provided Deputy McAdoo with a false name and birthdate.
II. Judicial Estoppel
We turn first to the People's assertion that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars defendant from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction because he "virtually stipulated in the trial court that he was detained." Relatedly, the People argue that "the stipulation and in limine order" precluded the prosecutor from offering evidence to establish the element of lawful detainment or arrest. We find these contentions unpersuasive.
Under California law, "'"'[j]udicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. [Citations.] The doctrine's dual goals are to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect parties from opponents' unfair strategies. [Citation.] Application of the doctrine is discretionary.'" [Citation.] The doctrine applies when "(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake." [Citations.]'" (People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 155 (Castillo).)
The People cite no authority for the proposition that judicial estoppel applies against a defendant in a criminal case in circumstances such as these. One Court of Appeal, citing to several federal Courts of Appeals cases, observed that the doctrine has been found inapplicable "against the prosecution in criminal cases." (People v. Watts (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1262 (Watts); cf. People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408-1409 [applying estoppel against a defendant in the context of a motion to suppress, where the defendant concealed his identity and his probation search condition from an officer during a vehicle stop and then claimed there was no probable cause for the traffic stop].) In Castillo, the California Supreme Court applied the doctrine to enforce a stipulation between the parties in a civil commitment proceeding. (Castillo, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 158.) It again considered the doctrine, but found it inapplicable on the facts in People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 116-117. More recently, the court found the criteria for judicial estoppel unmet in People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1061, footnote 12, but, citing to the Court of Appeal's decision in Watts, it did so without deciding whether the doctrine applies in criminal cases.
Here, we need not decide under what circumstances the doctrine might be applicable in a criminal case because we agree with defendant that the trial court's in limine rulings did not preclude the prosecutor from proving the lawful detention element of the offense. Defendant sought to preclude the introduction of evidence that he was under the influence of a controlled substance and that he was on parole. The court held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 and ruled Deputy McAdoo could not testify that defendant was or appeared to be under the influence. He could, however, testify about his conversation with defendant regarding his name and date of birth, and he could testify defendant was detained on the street. The court subsequently stated, "I've got to make sure you are clear. I don't want any confusion. [¶] The deputy is going to come in and say, I detained the person. We had a conversation. He told me he was going in this direction. Lay out the situation as follows: that didn't make sense to me. I asked him his name, age, date of birth. I checked it. Based upon foundation, I rechecked it. That's it."
We observe that while the parties could have entered into a stipulation to the lawful detention element, they did not do so. (E.g., People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 754-755.) Moreover, there is no suggestion in the record that the parties thought otherwise: the jury was instructed on all of the elements and the prosecutor acknowledged his burden of proof as to each element during closing argument.
The prosecutor subsequently filed a brief regarding defendant's status as a parolee, arguing that his status was critical to show he was evading process or proper identification. The court denied the request because evading process of the court was not at issue in the case.
We conclude that under the terms of the court's ruling, the prosecutor was not precluded from eliciting testimony about whether defendant was detained and/or at what point he was detained as related to providing the false name and birthdate. Thus, in the absence of support in the record for the People's position that defendant has taken two totally inconsistent positions (Castillo, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 155), we reject their judicial estoppel and related arguments.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, the relevant inquiry governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence "'is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055, cert. den. (2016) ___ U.S. ___ .) "The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) "In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence." (Ibid.) "'[I]t is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt ....'" (People v. Nguyen, supra, at pp. 1055-1056.) "A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support"' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio, supra, at p. 357.) However, "speculation, supposition and suspicion are patently insufficient to support an inference of fact." (People v. Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 951; accord, People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 35; see People v. Xiong (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1268.)
B. Analysis
We are also unpersuaded by the People's argument that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support a reasonable inference defendant was lawfully detained at the time he provided Deputy McAdoo with a false name and birthdate. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury, in relevant part, "[T]he People must prove that Deputy McAdoo was a peace officer who was lawfully detaining or attempting to detain the defendant." However, McAdoo did not testify defendant was lawfully detained when he provided the false name and birthdate nor did he testify to facts that would support a reasonable inference defendant was lawfully detained at the time.
On direct examination, McAdoo testified it is common practice to ask someone's name and birthdate for "officer[] safety [and as] part of our investigation to find out who we're talking about." He then testified that in an attempt to trip defendant up, he asked defendant's age. Defendant's answer did not match the birthdate previously provided. McAdoo did a records search and pressed defendant further on his name, but defendant persisted in claiming to be David Ramirez. McAdoo testified he was "[e]ventually ... able to learn [defendant's] true identity" and once other deputies arrived, "[he] turned the investigation over to them."
On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
"[Defense counsel]: Let me ask you[,] Deputy McAdoo, did you after you - so you contacted Mr. Hernandez, engaged him in conversation. Did you then arrest him? Detain him? What did you do with him?
[Prosecutor]: Objection. Relevance.
The Court: Just ask that one question. Did you detain him at that time?
[Deputy McAdoo]: Yes. Eventually, he was under detention."
The relevant statute criminalizes conduct that occurs only during lawful detention or arrest, as we have previously stated, and lawful detention is a legal term with specific meaning. (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56; People v. Walker, supra, 210 CalApp.4th at pp. 1381-1382; In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; In re Voeurn O., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 797.) The parties do not contend otherwise.
Although the parties do not raise the issue, the trial court apparently failed to define lawful detention for the jury, leaving it to rely on "ordinary, everyday meaning[]," as separately instructed. (See People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 988 [the trial court's obligation to instruct on general principles of law "comes into play when a statutory term 'does not have a plain, unambiguous meaning,' has a 'particular and restricted meaning' [citation], or has a technical meaning peculiar to the law or an area of law [citation]"].) --------
Here, there was no evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant was being lawfully detained within the meaning of the law at the time he provided Deputy McAdoo with a false name and birthdate. Evidence that Deputy McAdoo asked defendant a few questions and defendant responded with false information does not suffice to establish element of lawful detention. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821; In re Voeurn O., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 797.) Accordingly, defendant is entitled to reversal.
DISPOSITION
Defendant's conviction on count 4 is reversed.