As such, Code § 46.2–894's requirement that “the driver” provide his “driver's license number” makes little sense and cannot be given its logical effect unless the driver informs the officer that he was driving. See People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 571–72 (Colo.2011) (holding that Colorado's analogous hit and run statute could only be given logical effect if the driver is required to reveal that he was, in fact, driving the vehicle involved in the accident).Additionally, Code § 46.2–894's first sentence specifically requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident ” to stop and report the required information.

It "also requires a driver to render ‘reasonable assistance’ to any person injured in the accident and, thereafter, to report the accident to police if no officer is present." People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo.2011). Sections 42–4–1601(1) and 42–4–1603(1) further "require a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident to affirmatively identify himself as the driver before leaving the scene of the accident if that fact is not otherwise reasonably apparent from the circumstances."

Accordingly, the underlying crime—leaving the scene of an accident without performing the affirmative obligations imposed by the statute, including the duty to exchange driver information and to render aid to “any person”—remains the same, regardless of the number of persons who sustain injury in the accident. See§ 42–4–1603(1); see also People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 572 (Colo.2011) (holding that a driver violates the leaving the scene of an accident statute by failing to identify himself or herself as the driver). Accordingly, we conclude that the unit of prosecution is the number of accident scenes defendant left before performing his affirmative obligations, not the number of victims injured in a single accident.

See People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551, 556, 558–59 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the state's interest in "enforc[ing] driver responsibility would be thwarted" if drivers "could avoid punishment for Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Serious Injury by failing to have actual knowledge regarding his or her involvement in the accident," and that imposing strict liability was constitutional despite the resulting felony conviction because the statute constitutes a public welfare offense and the penalties, including up to eight years imprisonment, "are small in comparison to many common law crimes" (citations omitted)); see also People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 573 (Colo. 2011) (en banc ) (describing the Colorado hit-and-run statute as a "strict liability offense" (citing Manzo, 144 P.3d at 555, 558 )). For example, in Nevada, the prosecution must prove that the driver had actual or constructive knowledge that he or she was involved in a collision.

¶ 29 We do not apply Telluride Co. ’s dictum in this case because doing so would require us to violate the supreme court's more recent and ubiquitous teaching: we must give effect to all parts of a statute, and our construction must not render parts of the statute meaningless. Robinson v. Legro , 2014 CO 40, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d 1053 ; People v. Hernandez , 250 P.3d 568, 572 (Colo. 2011) ; People v. Terry , 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo. 1990). ¶ 30 Applying Telluride Co. ’s dictum, as the county would have us do, would render meaningless much of the statutory language addressing error correction.

¶ 33 Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the General Assembly's purpose and intent in enacting it. People v. Hernandez , 250 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2011). Therefore, we look first to the plain language of the statute, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings.

We review a court’s statutory construction de novo. People v. Hernandez , 250 P.3d 568, 570-71 (Colo. 2011). ¶ 59 "Our primary purpose in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly."

To determine the meaning of a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 570–71 (Colo.2011); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2010). We look first at the language of the statute and give statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.

To determine the meaning of a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 570-71 (Colo. 2011); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). We look first at the language of the statute and give statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.

To determine the meaning of a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Hernandez, 250 P.3d 568, 570-71 (Colo. 2011); Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). We look first at the language of the statute and give statutory words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.