Opinion
C086387
12-19-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM JOSEPH HENSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16FE010015)
Defendant William Joseph Henson, who suffered from mental health issues, was convicted in October 2017 of attempting to drive and take a vehicle belonging to another person. (Pen. Code, §664, Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in refusing to give a mistake of fact instruction to the jury. (CALCRIM No. 3406.) He also argues the trial court erred in redacting his video recorded statements to police, contending they showed his confused state of mind. We affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 14, 2016, Frank K., Irina K., and 17-year-old Morgan K. were driving through Sacramento in a black 2016 Jeep Grand Cherokee. At 6:00 a.m., they stopped to rest at a local convenience store. Defendant was walking across the street from the store, looking into three pickup trucks parked near each other. Defendant got into a dark-colored pickup truck but then got back out. Frank moved his car closer to the store. There were no other cars in the parking lot. Morgan was asleep in the back of the car, along with the family dog. Frank and Irina got out of the car and went inside the store to buy snacks and use the restroom. They left the car unlocked with one of the key fobs inside so Morgan could get out if he woke up.
While Frank and Irina were inside the store, Morgan briefly went inside to use the restroom and then returned to the car's backseat. Frank saw defendant in the store acting "suspiciously." Defendant was picking up items, carrying them around for a bit, and then placing them down where they did not belong. He also ducked behind things. Frank and Irina got in line for the cashier, but defendant cut in front of them. Defendant put his items on the counter, as though to check out, but then "ran out" of the store, leaving his items there. Defendant then got into the driver's seat of the victims' car. As defendant opened the door, he made eye contact with Morgan, who was sitting in the backseat.
Frank told his wife to call the police and he ran outside. He repeatedly yelled at defendant to get out of the car and watched as defendant tried to start it. Morgan was still in the backseat, looking "stunned," and the dog was "barking furiously." Defendant looked at Frank as he tried to lock the car door. Frank drew his concealed pistol and threatened to shoot if defendant did not get out of the car. Defendant failed to comply, so Frank opened the door and pulled defendant out by the shoulder. Frank threw defendant on the ground and held him there with the gun pointed at his head.
Frank had a permit to carry a concealed firearm.
Police showed up within five minutes. Defendant said, "I only wanted to take it to see my girlfriend." Police handcuffed defendant and detained him in a police car. A portion of a video recording of defendant's conversation with police while he was in the car was played for the jury.
At trial, Deputy Brandon Wright, the responding officer, testified that he suspected defendant was "under the influence of some sort of drug." Defendant appeared unkempt, confused, and disoriented. His speech was "lethargic" and slurred. Defendant also made "nonsensical statements," including that he was there with his girlfriend, Matthew. He also said he was there with his cousin, who was "at" or "inside" a Redbox DVD rental machine. There was a Redbox outside the entrance to the store. Defendant told Wright he had "mental issues" and denied being high. Wright told defendant he was "not making a whole lot of sense." Defendant responded it was "my machine right here." When defendant was arrested, he had $137.50 in cash, his driver's license, jewelry, and keys. The jail did not reject him due to intoxication. Wright testified that he saw a black, brand new pickup truck parked across the street in an area that appeared to be overflow parking for a nearby car dealership.
At trial, defendant's girlfriend at the time of the incident testified she had two children with defendant and had known him for three years. They lived together and shared two cars, a gray sedan and a black SUV. Defendant drove the SUV when he was taking care of their two children, which was most of the time. The jury was shown photos of the cars. The girlfriend testified defendant took multiple medications for mental illness. When he was on his medications he acted "slow" and "kinda lost," with a "calm demeanor." When he failed to take his medication he acted "anxious" and "fast" and would "get moody."
The girlfriend testified that she argued with defendant the evening before the incident, and he left their home. When she woke up at 3:30 the next morning, he still was not there. The gray sedan was also gone. Scared, the girlfriend repeatedly called and texted his phone. When he finally answered, he made no sense and sounded "scared and lost." The call got disconnected. The gray sedan was retrieved from the impound two weeks later.
At trial, defendant testified he suffered from bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. He took seven medications daily for his mental illness. Defendant remembered taking his medications the morning of the day before the incident, but he was unsure whether he took it that evening. At 10:00 p.m., he drove to his family's house in the gray sedan to attend a party. He drank two shots of hard liquor and two light beers. Defendant testified no one had ever told him to avoid alcohol with his medications. He left the party in the car after an hour. Ten minutes later, he swerved to avoid a pedestrian and hit a curb, causing his tire to go flat. Defendant parked his car and blacked out. The next thing he remembered was being in jail.
Dr. Helena Hart-Rathbun testified on defendant's behalf as an expert in psychiatry and the administration of psychiatric medication, including potential side effects. She testified one of defendant's medications (Klonopin) can cause sleepiness, confusion, memory problems, and slurred speech. The medication has a "half-life" of 20 to 50 hours, although a patient could still be affected by the medication for "a few half-lifes." Combining alcohol with the medication is "very dangerous," and physicians "frequently" tell patients to avoid doing so. There is also often a label on the medication bottle warning, "do not combine with alcohol." Each can amplify the other, and alcohol is "often" a cause of overdose and can be fatal. There was a potential for "blackout," during which someone might be able to function physically but not form any memories.
Dr. Hart-Rathbun testified she prescribed Klonopin for defendant in November 2014 and would have told him at the time to avoid alcohol with his medications. From November 2014 to May 2016, defendant's dosage of Klonopin was decreased.
Defense counsel argued during opening and closing arguments at trial that defendant got into the victims' SUV because he was "extremely intoxicated" and thought it was his black SUV. The trial court declined defendant's request to give a mistake of fact jury instruction based on CALCRIM No. 3406. Citing People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823, the trial court reasoned that a defendant's mistake of fact could not be considered reasonable if it was due to delusions caused by voluntary intoxication.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to have admitted a larger segment of the video recording of defendant's conversation with Deputy Wright while he was detained in the police car, arguing it was not hearsay and showed his "impaired" state of mind. The trial court watched the video and held a hearing, which included testimony from Deputy Wright that he suspected defendant was under the influence, in part due to some "bizarre" statements. (Evid. Code, § 402.)
The court noted the potential relevance of the video of the interview was to "allow the jury to evaluate the defendant's mental state by hearing his voice or potentially any inappropriate comments that he made that might be considered bizarre and were considered bizarre by this officer." The evidence was "clearly hearsay" and "not to be used for the truth of the matter asserted." Although defendant's statements were "self-serving" and not "particularly probative" as to defendant's state of mind or intoxication, the court ultimately admitted the following portions of the interview: (1) defendant's statement that his girlfriend's name was Matthew, (2) a discussion regarding the Redbox machine, including whether his cousin was "at" or "inside" the machine, (3) Deputy Wright's "holy cow, for real?" statement, indicating his surprise at defendant's statements, (4) defendant's statements that he had "mental issues" but was not using drugs, and (5) defendant's statement that it was his "machine right here." The court admitted these statements despite comparing defendant's speech pattern during the interview with a recorded jail call and finding "nothing particular[]" to suggest defendant was under the influence.
The trial court excluded portions of the conversation about whether defendant knew his age, defendant's denial of narcotics use, defendant's claim that he used his "hands" and "ID," a discussion about the "rest of the people" defendant was with, and defendant's statement that he did not understand his Miranda rights. The court found these excluded statements had "very little probative value." The court also reasoned the statements could be "confusing" to the jury.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 . --------
In December 2017, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on five years' probation with a year in county jail.
Defendant filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Mistake Of Fact Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give a mistake of fact instruction.
"In a criminal case, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence." (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 885.) "Included within this duty is the '. . . obligation to instruct on defenses, . . . and on the relationship of these defenses to the elements of the charged offense . . .' where '. . . it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense . . . .' " (People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133, 140.) A trial court does not err in failing to instruct on a defense if there was no substantial evidence supporting it. (See People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944.) We review de novo a trial court's decision to refuse to give an instruction. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733 [the decision to instruct is a "mixed question of law and fact that . . . is . . . predominantly legal" and "should be examined without deference"].)
The defense of mistake of fact requires that defendant had a mistaken belief "relate[d] to a set of circumstances which, if existent or true, would make the act charged an innocent act." (People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108, 115.) "[I]f the mental state of the crime is a specific intent or knowledge, then the mistaken belief must only be actual." (Ibid.)
Defendant argues the trial court's reasoning was incorrect because the law does not require a mistake of fact to be reasonable if the mistake negates the specific intent required by the statute. The People concede, and we agree.
Under section 29.4, subdivision (b), "[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent." Because Vehicle Code section 10851 is a specific intent crime, the trial court erred in refusing to give the mistake of fact instruction based on defendant's voluntary intoxication. (See People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180 [" '[t]he elements necessary to establish a violation of [Veh. Code, § 10851] are the defendant's driving or taking of a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owner's consent, and with specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession' "], italics added.)
The People argue that, despite the error of reasoning, it was still proper to refuse to instruct the jury regarding mistake of fact because substantial evidence did not support the instruction, and we agree. (See People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 62 [a "trial court's ruling may be affirmed if it was correct on any theory, even if we conclude the court was incorrect in its reasoning"].) Despite defendant's argument at trial that he mistakenly tried to take the victims' SUV because he thought it was his, defendant testified he had no memory of the event. After hitting the curb with the sedan, he blacked out until he was in jail. Defendant's comment that he "only wanted to take [the car] to see [his] girlfriend" does not indicate he mistakenly believed the victims' car was his. That he was carrying cash, keys, and a wallet is not substantial evidence defendant thought he was taking his own car, especially since he made eye contact with Morgan as he opened the door of the victims' SUV and continually tried to start the SUV despite the "furiously" barking dog in the backseat and instructions from Frank to get out of the car. Defendant's specific intent is further evidenced by his suspicious conduct inside the convenience store showing he knew the SUV likely belonged to Frank and Irina who defendant ensured were distracted while he rushed to take their SUV.
II
The Redacted Video
Defendant contends the trial court erred in redacting the video from the in-car camera. According to defendant, the entire video was relevant to his state of mind and admissible under Evidence Code section 1250. The People argue the evidence was properly excluded because it was not probative, lacked trustworthiness, and was excludable under Evidence Code sections 1252 and 352. We find defendant's contentions without merit.
Under Evidence Code section 352, "[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." We review relevancy and Evidence Code section 352 rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 282; see also People v. Brown (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1337.)
We have reviewed the entire transcript of the video, and we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings that the redacted portions of defendant's "self-serving" statements had "very little probative value" as to defendant's "impaired" mental state and risked confusing the jury. Whether defendant denied using drugs, remembered his year of birth as he was sitting in the back of a police car, or claimed to not understand his Miranda rights was not particularly relevant as to whether defendant was too intoxicated to form the specific intent required to be convicted of attempting to drive or take the victims' vehicle.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Murray, J. /s/_________
Renner, J.