The bias of a witness, whether favorable to or adverse to the defendant, is always pertinent on the question of the credibility of the witness. People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 720, 336 N.E.2d 264, 266. Involved in this case are the prejudices of Pansy O'Dell arising from her marital relationship with the defendant and her relationship with the case as a severed co-indictee.
• 3, 4 Generally, a witness' feelings of hostility or distrust toward defendant affect his credibility, are relevant areas of inquiry and, hence, are within the scope of cross-examination. ( People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 336 N.E.2d 264.) Defendant also cites authority for the proposition that the admissibility of impeachment as to bias, motive or prejudice is not dependent upon a preliminary showing by counsel that he can establish facts to discredit the witness.
The bias or hostility of a witness toward a party, manifested in the present case by the threat made by the witness against the accused (see People v. Bote (1941), 376 Ill. 264, 33 N.E.2d 449) is always pertinent on the question of credibility, as the feelings of the witness may well influence the tenor of that witness' testimony and the manner in which he testifies. ( People v. Mullinax (1979), 67 Ill. App.3d 936, 384 N.E.2d 1372; People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 336 N.E.2d 264.) Indeed, there is authority in support of the proposition that it is reversible error to prohibit cross-examination of a witness or matters showing bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely when, as in the instant cases, the defendant's theory is that the State's witness is unbelievable. ( People v. Lake (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 428, 378 N.E.2d 364.) Because Reinhofer provided the most damaging evidence against Hobson at the trial, we are of the opinion that the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination of Reinhofer on the subject of his threat to Hobson was manifestly prejudicial to that defendant. The credibility of Reinhofer is of the utmost importance in the cases before us. Both defendants' convictions hinge upon Reinhofer's credibility and the jury's acceptance of his testimony as true.
( People v. Emerling (1930), 341 Ill. 424, 173 N.E. 474.) A witness' interest in the outcome of a case, or hostility toward the defendant, are relevant to a showing of bias or interest, because such feelings of hostility may well influence the manner in which the witness testifies. People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 336 N.E.2d 264. • 3 Although the offer of proof did demonstrate some ill feeling by Kaiser toward another witness (Lucy Mullinax), which as the State contends would be irrelevant ( People v. Whitehead (1966), 68 Ill. App.2d 488, 216 N.E.2d 237), it also exhibited a degree of hostility toward the defendant and her interest in his conviction.
We find Seel's first contention, that the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to participate in a voir dire examination of Sophia Nash amounted to a denial of due process, completely unsupported. As authority for the proposition that a right to such participation exists, Seel relies on two Illinois decisions, People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill.2d 331, 231 N.E.2d 451, and People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 336 N.E.2d 264. Neither of these decisions, however, recognizes such a right.
[Citations.]" ( People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 720, 336 N.E.2d 264, 266.) Here, the trial court concluded from the testimony regarding the sweater that there was animosity between the Bishops and the Latin Kings and that some of the prosecution witnesses were affiliated with the Bishops, and some of the defense witnesses with the Latin Kings. Because of the inconsistencies in the testimony and the possibility of gang related bias, the court rejected the testimony of both sides, except for what it termed the spontaneous and positive identification of defendant by Ernesto made shortly after the incident.
It would seem clear that a witness may be impeached in a criminal case by showing bias or interest in the outcome of the trial because it is pertinent to the credibility of that witness. ( People v. Sawyer (1971), 48 Ill.2d 127, 268 N.E.2d 689; People v. Henson (1975), 32 Ill. App.3d 717, 336 N.E.2d 264.) Since the record clearly reflects that this was the precise reason that the testimony was admitted here, there was no error. • 5 Sievers further claims that in the second trial the court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences because he had no prior criminal record.