Opinion
4-23-0687
01-03-2024
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Adams County No. 21JA45 Honorable John C. Wooleyhan, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
DEARMOND JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 2 In February 2023, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Henry P. (Father), as to his minor child, H.P. (born November 2018). Following a hearing on the State's motion in August 2023, the trial court found Father an "unfit person" within the meaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) and, after finding it was in the minor's best interest, terminated Father's parental rights.
¶ 3 On appeal, Father argues the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights where the court's unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 On June 16, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging H.P., age two, and two other minors, ages five and eight, were neglected and/or abused minors. (The other two minors are not part of this appeal.) The State alleged H.P.'s mother, Shaquila W., (1) was unsuccessfully discharged from intact services, (2) was physically abusing the eightyear-old minor, (3) had deteriorating mental health issues requiring hospitalization, and (4) was in an ongoing abusive relationship. (Shaquila W. is not a party to this appeal.) Father was not named in the petition. The trial court entered a temporary custody order, which suspended visitation.
¶ 6 On July 1, 2021, the State filed an amended petition, which named Henry P. as the father of H.P. On August 26, 2021, the Cook County Sheriff's Office personally served Father with an order to appear at a September 2021 hearing. No report of proceedings exists in the record from the September 2021 hearing. However, later orders note none of the three putative fathers appeared at the hearing, and all were defaulted.
¶ 7 In December 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for adjudication. The court noted, "[t]here has been services processed on each of the named fathers, who have not appeared in any of these cases." The court adjudicated the children neglected.
¶ 8 A dispositional order entered on January 25, 2022, for all three children stated "father" was unfit because of "lack of interest, mental health, substance use, criminal behavior." The order did not specify if the findings related to a specific father.
¶ 9 On February 6, 2023, the trial court ordered all three putative fathers submit to DNA testing to determine parentage.
¶ 10 The same day, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights. As to Father, the petition alleged he was unfit for (1) failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to H.P.'s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(b) (West 2022)) and (2) abandonment (750 ILCS 50/1(a) (West 2022)).
¶ 11 On February 23, 2023, Father appeared for the first time at a hearing on the motion for termination of parental rights. The trial court appointed the Adams County Public Defender's Office to represent Father.
¶ 12 The termination hearing commenced in August 2023.
¶ 13 Alison Ketsenburg testified she was a public service administrator for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and acted as a supervisor for the children's cases. Relevant to Father, Ketsenburg testified H.P. came into care in summer 2021 and DCFS conducted an integrated assessment at that time. Father did not participate in the initial integrated assessment. A service plan generated in January 2022 indicated Father still needed to complete the integrated assessment. He had no visits with H.P., did not send any gifts, cards, or letters, and was not in contact with the caseworker. Ketsenburg agreed Father's visits were suspended by the trial court. Ketsenburg also stated Father's DNA results confirming him as H.P.'s father arrived the day before the hearing.
¶ 14 Nykosi Simmons testified she was the caseworker for H.P. beginning in June 2022. Simmons's first contact with Father was in September 2022, at which time he was asked to complete the integrated assessment. The service plan for December 2022, which Simmons explained covered the prior six months, required Father to participate in mental health counseling and parenting classes. As Father resided in Cook County, Simmons was "going to refer services closer to where he was located." Simmons did not receive anything showing Father participated in services. Simmons generated another service plan in June 2023, covering the period from January 2023 to June 2023. Father reported to Simmons he was scheduled for a mental health service assessment, but Simmons never received documentation confirming he completed the assessment. Father sent no gifts, cards, or letters to H.P. and had no visits with H.P. Father did ask Simmons how H.P. was doing when they met in person after the February 2023 hearing. On cross-examination, when asked if Father was unable to appear in Adams County until February 2023 due to "legal matters in Cook County," Simmons responded, "I believe so." She also agreed Father's visitations were suspended.
¶ 15 The trial court found Father was personally served with a summons in August 2021 and was "on notice from that date forward." Father did have some contact with the caseworkers from "time to time" and completed the integrated assessment, but the court found Father never provided the caseworkers with any information showing he was progressing in services. Further, there was never a request to have visits with H.P. reinstated. The court found the allegations of unfitness were proven by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 16 The trial court proceeded directly to the best interest hearing. After evidence and argument, the court found it was in the best interest of H.P. to terminate Father's parental rights. ¶ 17 This appeal followed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, Father argues only that the trial court's fitness determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He does not challenge the court's best interest finding.
¶ 20 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2022)) govern how the State may terminate parental rights. In re D.F., 201 Ill.2d 476, 494, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two necessary steps the State must take before terminating a person's parental rights-the State must first show the parent is an "unfit person," and then the State must show terminating parental rights serves the best interest of the child. D.F., 201 Ill.2d at 494-95. Here, Father only challenges the trial court's determination of unfitness.
¶ 21" 'The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.'" In re A.L., 409 Ill.App.3d 492, 500, 949 N.E.2d 1123, 1129 (2011) (quoting In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d 1057, 1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 604 (2004)). The Adoption Act provides several grounds on which a trial court may find a parent "unfit." 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022). Despite several potential bases for unfitness, "sufficient evidence of one statutory ground *** [is] enough to support a [court's] finding that someone [is] an unfit person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83, 19 N.E.3d 227; see In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill.App.3d 1052, 1064, 859 N.E.2d 123, 135 (2006) ("A finding of unfitness will stand if supported by any one of the statutory grounds set forth in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act.") (citing In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 422, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1122 (2001)).
¶ 22 This court pays" 'great deference'" to a trial court's fitness finding" 'because of [that court's] superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.'" A.L., 409 Ill.App.3d at 500 (quoting Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d at 1067). We "will not reverse a trial court's fitness finding unless it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the record." A.L., 409 Ill.App.3d at 500.
¶ 23 Subsection (b) of the Adoption Act provides that a trial court may find a parent unfit for failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022). When examining allegations under subsection (b), a trial court must focus on the parent's reasonable efforts and consider any circumstances that may have made it difficult for the parent to visit, communicate with, or otherwise show interest in the child. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d 239, 259, 810 N.E.2d 108, 124-25 (2004). However, a parent must show a reasonable amount of interest, concern, or responsibility-a demonstration of "some interest or affection" toward the child is not enough. Jaron Z., 348 Ill.App.3d at 259.
¶ 24 Here, the record on appeal shows Father was personally served in August 2021. For over a year thereafter, Father was not involved in this case. Father argues he could not travel to Adams County until February 2023 due to unspecified "legal issues." He does not explain, however, how his legal issues prevented him from maintaining contact with DCFS or the trial court. Even after Father was in contact with DCFS, the record is devoid of any evidence he was progressing in any services beyond completing the integrated assessment. Although visitations were suspended from the outset of this case, there is no evidence Father made any requests or showed any interest in having visits reinstated. While Father focuses on his inquiry into H.P.'s well-being, asking about the well-being of his minor child on one occasion is insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable amount of interest, concern, or responsibility. Based on the evidence presented at the fitness hearing, the court's finding Father failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility regarding the child's welfare was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, as the opposite conclusion is not clearly evident. See A.L., 409 Ill.App.3d at 500.
¶ 25 Because we can affirm the trial court's unfitness finding on this basis, we need not consider the other statutory ground upon which the court found Father unfit. F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 83 ("[S]ufficient evidence of one statutory ground *** [is] enough to support a [court's] finding that someone [is] an unfit person." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 26 We note Father does not challenge the trial court's best interest finding on appeal. Accordingly, we find the court committed no error in terminating his parental rights to H.P.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 29 Affirmed.