Opinion
A121197
7-15-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARK EUGENE HENDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
On October 1, 2005, Rebecca Lynn Siebenmorgen was killed while riding her motorcycle on Highway 1, when a pickup truck driven by Mark Eugene Henderson (appellant) crossed into her lane of traffic, causing a head-on collision. The 19-year-old college student died almost instantly. On November 8, 2007, a jury convicted appellant of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) (count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) (count 2), hit and run causing injury or death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) (count 3), driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)) (count 4), and possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) (count 5). The court found true prior serious felony conviction allegations under Penal Code sections 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1) and 667, subdivision (a), as well as three prior prison term allegations (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant argues his convictions on counts 1 through 3 are not based on substantial evidence. We affirm.
On February 22, 2008, the court dismissed count 4 as a lesser included offense of count 2 and struck the prison priors. The court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 35 years to life.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The fatal collision occurred at approximately 5:15 p.m. on October 1, 2005. Ellen Phillips was driving south on Highway 1 near Half Moon Bay with two passengers. In that locale, the highway has two lanes, one in each direction, separated by solid double yellow lines, with raised dots to indicate the location of the separating lines. Just past the intersection of Highways 1 and 92, Phillips noticed a pickup truck driving directly in front of her, at a significantly slower rate of speed. The truck would speed up and slow down (well below the speed limit) and it "meandered" on the road from the shoulder to over the double yellow lines. Phillips could not pass the truck, because of its changing speed. She and her passengers talked about the trucks driving pattern, their worry about the trucks driver, and calling "911."
At a certain point, as the road began to climb and curve, Phillips noticed that the truck was meandering farther across the double yellow lines into the lane of oncoming traffic. She honked her horn and flashed her headlights at the truck and pulled off to the side of the road to get out of the way. One of the passengers, Rebecca Shapiro, had been trying to call 911 for several minutes, but due to poor cell phone reception had been unable to complete the call. Phillips saw a sedan approach in the opposite lane of traffic followed by a motorcycle. The sedan swerved to avoid the truck, but the motorcycle had no room to navigate; the truck was completely in the motorcycles lane of traffic. Phillips next saw "the motorcycle rider in midair and then on the ground." The truck did not brake prior to the collision.
After the collision, Phillips and others who had been driving in the vicinity approached the motorcyclist who was lying still on the ground. Someone placed a blanket over her. Shapiro finally reached the police on her cell phone.
Phillips then heard noises behind her coming from the pickup truck. She turned and saw that the drivers side door of the truck was open. The trucks driver, appellant, was sitting in the front seat, with his head forward and in his hands. Appellant was speaking in a loud, angry voice. When Phillips next observed appellant, he was standing by his truck weaving and holding on for balance. Later, Phillips saw appellant about halfway up an embankment on the side of the road. His movements were "very uncoordinated and stumbling." "He grasped for branches to help pull himself up and missed a couple of times and stumbled." Someone yelled out to appellant, but he did not turn around or answer. Phillips never saw appellant come to check on the motorcyclist. The next time she saw him, emergency vehicles had arrived and the police had him in handcuffs.
Amanda Hartt was headed north on Highway 1 on October 1, followed by a motorcyclist. Hartt saw a pickup truck travelling southbound that was drifting into her lane of traffic. As the truck continued to drift into her lane, she pulled toward the shoulder to avoid it. The truck did not make any move to correct its trajectory and did not apply its brakes. As Hartt applied her own brakes she heard a "loud boom." When she looked in her rearview mirror, she "saw the person on the motorcycle fly over the truck and land face down in the road." She called 911. Hartt then left her car and ran toward the victim; she saw "[j]ust blood. River of blood."
Hartt saw two men talking to appellant, checking on his condition. Appellant asked what had happened and was told that there was a young woman on a motorcycle who was possibly dead. Appellant started screaming, "Oh, no. Oh, no. God no." Later, Hartt saw appellant run up a hill near the road.
Mike Benedetti and his family were driving north on Highway 1 on October 1. Traffic came to a stop, and Benedetti pulled to the side of the road. When he approached the victim, he saw no signs of life. He later found a sleeping bag in the back of the pickup truck that had hit the victim, and used it to cover her. Appellant was in the pickup, he appeared angry, and he was "beating the steering wheel and just carrying on in the truck." Later, Benedetti saw appellant running up the hillside, and yelled twice: "Hey, where are you going?" When appellant did not respond, Benedetti yelled, "Get that fucking guy." Benedetti saw appellant make motions with his right hand in his pocket area and then throw something down and start burying the item with his foot.
Laura and Sean Rich were driving north on Highway 1 on October 1. Traffic came to a stop, and the Riches saw a truck in the middle of the northbound lane, a motorcycle, and a woman lying in the road. Laura Rich saw appellant sitting in the truck; he looked like he was searching for something with his hand. Later, when she walked near appellants truck, she noticed that he "was kind of just staggering, swaying a little bit." He also was mumbling. Still later she saw appellant "groping along, trying to get up the hill, stumbling up the hill."
Ryan Borick was driving south on Highway 1 on October 1. As he approached the Tunitas Creek Bridge, the cars in front of him started to slow. At the front of the line, a pickup truck was causing the slowdown. When the cars in front of him stopped, Borick pulled to the shoulder. He exited his car and saw appellant get out of the truck and scream things to himself. Appellant "rummaged" through his truck and "took off up the hillside" near the road, disappearing over the top of the hill. Borick started up the hill after appellant to make sure he did not get away. He eventually saw appellant crying and sitting on some shrubs and bushes. Appellant looked at Borick and walked away. Borick followed, and as he walked by where appellant had been sitting, he saw a sock. Borick followed as appellant made his way back down to Highway 1. Borick signaled for a police officer and the officer escorted appellant away. Later, Borick went back up the hillside and showed police officers where appellant had walked. The police found the sock Borick had seen earlier, a bandanna appellant had been wearing, and a folded-up dollar bill.
San Mateo County Deputy Sheriff Heindel was the first officer to respond to the scene of the collision, arriving just before 6:00 p.m. He heard several people yell that appellant had left the scene and run up a hill by the side of the road. Heindel eventually saw appellant return to the scene with another man, Borick, following him. Heindel detained appellant, placed him in handcuffs, and sat him in the back of his patrol car.
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Poole responded to the scene of the collision and encountered appellant in the back of Heindels car. Poole "was suspicious [of appellants] sobriety." Appellant was sweating profusely despite the fact that it was somewhat cold at the scene. He was "fidgety" and twitching and could not sit still. Poole also noted that appellants "nostrils were red and inflamed" and "his pupils seemed to be abnormally large." Poole contacted dispatch and asked for a drug recognition expert. Poole concluded appellant had violated Vehicle Code section 21460, subdivision (a), by driving to the left of solid double yellow lines on the roadway.
About 8:22 p.m., appellant was transported from the collision scene to CHP headquarters in Redwood City. There, Poole noted appellant continued to be fidgety and his pupils were still extremely dilated; he "seemed very uneasy and couldnt seem to sit still." About four and one-half to five hours after the collision, Poole administered a breath test for alcohol, but no alcohol was detected. Appellant agreed to provide a urine sample for testing. Although he drank several glasses of water, he claimed he was unable to urinate. At 3:24 a.m., the police took a blood sample instead.
CHP Officer Rohner, a drug recognition expert, evaluated appellant. He began his examination at 10:10 p.m. Rohner had obtained information about appellants driving pattern. Appellants speech pattern was "quiet, mumbling, [he] spoke in low tones." Appellant was also fidgety and "seemed to be unable to sit still." Although it was not hot in the room, appellant was sweating.
Appellant told Rohner that he had not taken any drugs except aspirin. Rohner administered a series of psychophysical tests similar to field sobriety tests, but administered in a controlled environment, such as an office. On the "balance" test, appellant displayed a "pronounced two-inch forward and backward sway," and "eyelid tremors were also present." In a "walk and turn" test, appellant had difficulty maintaining his balance and made several mistakes. In a "one leg stand" test, appellant had to put his foot down for balance several times, swayed, and used his arms for balance. In six "finger-to-nose" tests, appellant was only able to find his nose once. In three readings, appellants pulse was recorded at 96 and 102 beats per minute. His blood pressure was 140 over 110. His temperature was normal, although he continued to sweat. His face also appeared rigid and tense, his nasal area was red and irritated, and his eyes were watery. His tongue had a heavy white coating on it. Rohner also measured appellants pupils in different lighting conditions. Based on the test results and other information he had gathered, Rohner concluded appellant was under the influence of a central nervous system stimulant. Rohner conceded methamphetamine can trigger physical reactions similar to those triggered by fear.
Criminalist Gillis performed an analysis of appellants blood sample. Methamphetamine was detected with a concentration of 0.159 micrograms per milliliter and amphetamine was detected at 0.018 micrograms per milliliter, indicating the methamphetamine had partially metabolized before the blood sample was taken. Gillis was not able to determine exactly when appellant had ingested the methamphetamine, but estimated it was within 24 to 48 hours before the blood sample was drawn. He also was not able to determine exactly how much methamphetamine appellant had ingested, although he was able to determine it was more than "whats therapeutically useful."
At trial, Poole identified a dollar bill found where appellant had been sitting on top of the hill. When Poole saw the dollar bill at the scene, it contained a "small rock-like substance, white in color" that was about "three-eighths of an inch wide." Criminalist Munemitsu tested the substance and concluded that it contained cocaine base and weighed 0.26 grams.
Forensic toxicologist Stewart reviewed the police report regarding the collision, the accident investigation report, the drug recognition experts report, and the lab report of appellants blood sample. She concluded that the amount of methamphetamine in appellants blood was "a fairly significant amount of methamphetamine," significantly higher than the therapeutic range. She noted that methamphetamine, a stimulant, affects people in different ways. In general, if a person has recently used the drug, they manifest diluted pupils, elevated temperature, elevated blood pressure and pulse, and relatively quick respiration. Outward manifestations may include euphoria, agitation, aggressiveness, or an inability to sit still.
Stewart stated that a driver who has taken methamphetamine generally has difficulty keeping his or her car in the proper lane of traffic, and may misperceive their own speed leading to driving with erratic speed. When asked if a blood concentration level of 0.159 micrograms per milliliter indicated that the driver was unsafe to drive, Stewart said: "It certainly lays the groundwork for it." As to appellant, Stewart opined that the information in the reports she had reviewed was "consistent" with someone who was driving under the influence of methamphetamine. She also stated that the unsafe driving pattern in this case, as described by several witnesses, "can be attributed to the methamphetamine that was found." Stewart also noted the accident occurred over nine hours before appellants blood was drawn, and it was reasonable to believe appellants blood contained a higher percentage of methamphetamine at the time of the collision.
A representative of the California Department of Motor Vehicles testified appellant had three prior convictions for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). He had been convicted in Santa Cruz County on July 30, 1987, for an offense that occurred on October 14, 1986. He also had been convicted on July 5, 1988, in Santa Clara County for having driven under the influence on April 9, 1988. Finally, he had been convicted on April 5, 1990, in Los Angeles County for having driven under the influence on March 2, 1990. Appellant completed a drunk driving program on May 9, 2000.
Several witnesses testified appellant had been enrolled in different classes where he had been instructed on the dangers of driving while intoxicated. Appellant also took a number of substance abuse classes comprising over 380 hours in 2000 and 2001. One area covered was how drugs affect the body.
Defense Case
Appellant, age 49, testified in his own defense. He acknowledged he had suffered two felony convictions for possession of methamphetamine for sale. The first was in February 1996 in Contra Costa County and the second was in August 2000 in Santa Clara County. He also had been convicted of possession of marijuana for sale in Santa Clara County in September 1987.
Appellant was homeless, and the night before the accident he slept in his truck, for only three hours, at a beach in San Francisco. The next day he purchased cocaine and methamphetamine in the Haight around noon and then drove to Fort Funston to watch the hang gliders. He spent the afternoon there then drove south on Highway 1. He did not ingest the drugs.
Near Half Moon Bay, appellant became drowsy, and he remembers little after that. He does not remember the accident. He remembers being asked if he was all right and being told he had been in an accident and the victim was dead. He "freaked out" and screamed. He left the truck and provided his sleeping bag to cover the victim.
He then remembered that he had drugs in his truck and went back to dispose of them before the police arrived. He grabbed the drugs and "started going up the cliff." When asked if he thought that it probably looked like he was fleeing the scene, appellant conceded: "That probably had crossed my mind, yes." He also acknowledged it was "fair to say [he was] determined to get away from people watching what [he was] doing." Appellant went over the crest of the hill to a flat area, sat down, "and started to figure out a way to get rid of the dope [he] had." He took the methamphetamine out of the sock and decided to "snort it" and eat the baggy it came in "so there wouldnt be any evidence of methamphetamine found." He was prepared to ingest the cocaine, but saw someone following him. Appellant walked away looking for a place to dispose of the cocaine. Appellant acknowledged that he could have disposed of the methamphetamine by spreading it among the weeds in the scrub, but he did not do that. He also acknowledged that by ingesting the methamphetamine, he was choosing to "get high," and he knew the drugs would be in his system and detectable by a blood or urine test. He said he "lost" the cocaine on the way back to the road.
When talking to the police, appellant denied ingesting any drugs. He also denied throwing any drugs on the ground and kicking dirt on them. In his interview with the police, appellant never claimed he had fallen asleep while driving.
The day after his arrest, he called Susan Antonetti from the jail. The call was recorded. He told Antonetti the accident was not his fault and he was not under the influence. The victim came into his lane, he swerved left, she swerved back and hit him head-on. He was not tired and did not drift over into the lane of incoming traffic.
Appellant denied involvement in a prior incident in which he poured a baggie of white powder from his car window as the police attempted to conduct a traffic stop.
Halle Weingarten, a forensic toxicologist, testified that it could not be determined from the blood test results when or how appellant had ingested methamphetamine and there is no blood level at which scientists say a person is under the influence of methamphetamine. She cited two studies showing that the average blood level of methamphetamine for persons arrested for driving under the influence was 0.25 and 0.35, respectively. She also opined that science does not know the amount of methamphetamine that results in unsafe driving.
Weingarten testified that methamphetamine peaks in the blood almost instantly if injected or snorted, and in three to six hours if swallowed. Methamphetamine has a half-life ranging from six to 30 hours, depending on the user. The effects last from four to six hours regardless of how it is ingested. To know a users level around the time of driving, the test should be administered immediately. Weingarten said it was likely appellants blood level was not much higher around the time of the accident than when his blood was drawn, especially if the methamphetamine in his system had a half-life of 30 hours.
Weingarten said that appellants amphetamine level of 0.018 indicates he was not binging. This was a one-time use or appellant used infrequently. She opined that appellants symptoms, i.e., sweating, fidgeting, and pupil size, are typical of the "fight-or-flight" response and it cannot be said they were caused by stimulant abuse. Drug recognition expert examinations have a very high failure rate in correctly recognizing intoxication from stimulants. Weingarten testified that appellant exhibited several symptoms inconsistent with methamphetamine abuse. His pulse was not elevated, his speech was slow and quiet rather than fast, his temperature was normal, and his blood pressure was not particularly high. His physical tests were "so-so," but that was not surprising for someone who is older and not in good shape. His droopy eyelids could be a sign of drowsiness. Weingarten concluded that appellant merely showed "fight-or-flight" symptoms, and that his symptoms did not permit her to say "unequivocally" there had been drug abuse. She also said appellants driving was not consistent with methamphetamine abuse, which tends to result in aggressive and risky driving. She thought appellants driving was more consistent with someone who was "drowsy."
Devinder Grewal testified as an expert in auto handling, mechanical engineering, auto dynamics, and accident reconstruction. He said appellants truck uses a "twin I-beam front suspension" that is prone to "bump steer," i.e., going over bumps can cause the truck to steer in a particular direction, and "torque steer," i.e., the body roll of the truck causes the same effect. Grewal took a truck similar to appellants on a test drive at the collision site. The road curved where the collision occurred. Grewal took his hands off the steering wheel and, as the truck went into the curve, the truck naturally drifted into the oncoming lane of traffic. In Grewals tests, he did not take any manual corrective action to adjust the drift of the truck.
Rebuttal Case
Santa Clara Police Officer Dixon described an incident in May 1991 in which he and other officers were trying to stop appellants truck on the road. He saw appellant throw out of the drivers side window a baggie from which a cloud of white powder emerged.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"The standard of appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is settled. `In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing courts task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] "`Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "`If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." [Citations.]" [Citation.] [Citation.]" (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1296.)
II. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Verdicts for Murder and Gross Voluntary Manslaughter While Intoxicated
As to counts 1 and 2, appellant raises an identical challenge: the prosecution failed to prove he was under the influence of a drug when he drove. However, the evidence supporting this determination was overwhelming.
Appellant also makes this challenge as to count 4. However, we disregard that claim since count 4 was dismissed.
Witnesses testified that appellants driving pattern prior to the accident was so erratic that they attempted to call 911. The accident itself occurred when appellant drifted entirely into the opposite lane of traffic and, without braking, hit the victims motorcycle head-on. Following the collision, appellant emerged from his pickup truck and was weaving, staggering and swaying. He was also mumbling to himself. Before appellant walked away from the scene, he was observed searching for something in his truck. Appellant concedes he was getting the cocaine and methamphetamine he had purchased earlier in order to conceal them from the law enforcement officers he knew would be arriving.
After appellant was taken into custody, Poole noted he was sweating profusely, fidgety, twitching, and unable to sit still. After appellant was transported to CHP headquarters, a breath test was administered and no alcohol was detected. A subsequent blood sample revealed the presence of methamphetamine and amphetamine in his system. At CHP headquarters, appellant performed poorly on a series of psychophysical tests. A forensic toxicologist reviewed the relevant reports, including the lab report of appellants blood sample. She concluded there was a significant amount of methamphetamine in appellants blood, and his driving was consistent with someone driving under the influence of methamphetamine.
Appellant mounted a vigorous defense, aimed at providing an alternate, less culpable explanation for the prosecution evidence. That is, appellant did not deny the poor driving, causing the collision, his behavior postaccident, or the results of the blood test. Instead he argued his poor driving resulted from being sleepy, his postaccident symptoms reflected his response to fear or stress (the "fight-or-flight" response), and he had consumed methamphetamine during the interval between the collision and his arrest. Two different experts provided testimony supporting these alternate explanations, but the jury rejected them and convicted appellant.
On appeal, appellants argument is succinct, but ultimately unavailing. As his opening brief concludes, "In sum, virtually every piece of evidence pointing to [appellants] being under the influence had an innocent explanation. Accordingly, one cannot reasonably infer from such evidence that [appellant] was under the influence when he drove." (Italics in original.) On appeal, however, we review the evidence "in the light most favorable to the judgment" (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11), and we do not reweigh it. It is irrelevant whether substantial evidence supports appellants defense and equally irrelevant if, in our view, his evidence outweighed the prosecutions proof. The sole question we face in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is whether substantial evidence of guilt exists. As to counts 1 and 2, it does.
III. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Verdict for Hit and Run
Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a), provides: "The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, resulting . . . in the death of a person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Section 20003 and 20004." Section 20003 requires that the driver provide certain information to "any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident" and provide reasonable assistance to the person injured. Section 20004 provides that in the event the accident resulted in a persons death the driver must, without delay, report the accident to the appropriate police authorities, if there is no traffic or police officer at the accident scene. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant failed to comply with at least one of these duties, and the jury must unanimously agree on the duty he failed to perform. (People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 710.)
All further undesignated section references are to the Vehicle Code.
Section 20003, subdivision (a), provides: "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall also give his or her name, current residence address, the names and current residence addresses of any occupant of the drivers vehicle injured in the accident, the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with, and shall give the information to any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident. The driver also shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements for transporting, any injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if that transportation is requested by any injured person."
Section 20004 provides: "In the event of death of any person resulting from an accident, the driver of any vehicle involved after fulfilling the requirements of this division, and if there be no traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident to whom to give the information required by Section 20003, shall, without delay, report the accident to the nearest office of the Department of the California Highway Patrol or office of a duly authorized police authority and submit with the report the information required by Section 20003."
Substantial evidence supports the jurys conclusion that appellant failed to comply with the duties imposed by sections 20003 and 20004. Section 20001 required appellant to stop after the accident, and he did so. His truck came to rest after hitting the side of the embankment, and it is unclear from the record whether, following the collision, appellants truck was driveable. After being told that the victim was dead, appellant exited the vehicle and struggled up the hillside, away from the accident scene and the crowd that had gathered there. He testified that before he left, he provided a sleeping bag to cover the victim, but witness Benedetti refuted that statement. As Benedetti saw appellant run up the hill, he yelled, "Hey, where are you going." Appellant did not respond. After Borick observed appellant run up the hillside and disappear, he followed appellant to ensure he did not escape. After observing Borick, appellant returned to the accident scene.
Appellant relies on People v. Scofield, supra, 203 Cal. 703 to argue his duty to render assistance to the victim "is excused if it is unnecessary, as when, for example, assistance is being rendered by others." However, in this case, the jury was entitled to conclude that appellant fled the scene moments after the collision without personally checking on the victims condition and without ensuring that the bystanders present were able to provide all necessary assistance. People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009 is instructive. In Scheer, the court concluded that "[W]here, as here, the driver flees the scene without inquiring about or otherwise investigating the victim[s] condition, he has failed to [provide the assistance required.] [Citation.] Additionally, the mere presence of bystanders who arguably gathered to aid the victim[] does not guarantee that the injured person will receive all necessary aid. In some instances, for example, a bystander may be willing, but not physically capable, of removing the victim from the wreck, or a bystander may be willing to call for help but no phone is available . . . . [¶]. . . The fortuitous fulfillment of the drivers duty to render reasonable assistance to the injured victim . . . by Good Samaritans cannot operate to exonerate the driver and nullify the fact such duty was breached by the driver. To reach a contrary conclusion would impermissibly immunize the driver from the penal consequences of such breach and encourage scofflaws to violate both the letter and spirit of the law." (Id. at pp. 1028-1029.)
Appellant argues People v. Scheer is inapposite because, before he left the scene, he was informed by one of the witnesses that the victim was dead. We disagree that this secondhand information from a civilian witness who was a stranger to appellant is, as a matter of law, sufficient to excuse appellants responsibility to provide reasonable assistance. The jury was entitled to conclude appellant had a responsibility to verify the victims condition before leaving the scene and trusting others to provide any aid necessary.
In any event, even if appellant had sufficient information to justifiably conclude no reasonable assistance to the victim was required, he failed to provide the required information to the police. Appellant argues "Poole . . . contacted [appellant] moments after he (Poole) arrived on the scene. Neither Poole nor any other officer testified that [appellant] failed to provide any required information." This argument ignores that appellant attempted to flee the scene and was thwarted by a witness who would not let him escape. Appellant never testified he was intending to report to the police after a brief timeout on the top of the embankment. And even if this could reasonably be inferred from his testimony, the jury was not required to draw this inference. Appellant, himself, conceded that it probably looked like he was fleeing the scene, when he scrambled up the hillside.
Vehicle Code section 20004 required appellant "without delay [to] report the accident to the nearest" law enforcement authority because no officer was present at the scene. Substantial evidence exists to establish his failure to do so.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
JONES, P.J.
NEEDHAM, J.