Opinion
A130575
12-19-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSE RAYMOND HEILIG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR923122)
The appeal of defendant Jesse Raymond Heilig challenges only the computation of presentence conduct credits. It appears that he has overlooked the controlling provision of the applicable statute and, in all events, the credits were properly calculated.
Defendant was charged with one count of failing to register in violation of Penal Code section 290.031, subdivision (a), with one prior serious violent felony conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d) and 667, subdivisions (b)-(i). Defendant entered a plea of no contest to the charge and the prior strike conviction allegation was dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement. Following the submission of a probation report, the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation subject to numerous conditions, including serving 120 days in county jail with credit for 70 days previously served and 34 days of conduct credits, totaling 104 days' credit. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that under the version of section 4019 that was in effect during the period during which he failed to register, March 1 through March 30, 2010, he was entitled to four days credit for every two days served, or an additional 36 days of credit. The Attorney General agrees with defendant that the version of section 4019 as it was amended, effective January 25, 2010, is controlling. (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex. Sess. 2009-2010, ch. 28, § 50, p. 5271 (Senate Bill. No. 18).) The additional credits provided by section 4019 during the period Senate Bill No. 18 was in effect did not apply in certain circumstances, however. Defendant's brief assumes that in failing to provide the additional credits the court relied on the exception in the statute for persons with a prior serious or violent felony conviction, and he argues that that exception should not have been applied because the allegation that defendant had been convicted of such an offense was stricken as part of the plea bargain. However, as the Attorney General points out, the statute also contained an exception for persons "required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Chapter 5.5 (commencing with Section 290)." (Former § 4019, subds. (b)(2), (c)(2).) For these persons, "a term of six days will be deemed to have been served for every four days spent in actual custody." (Former § 4019, subd. (f).) Defendant has submitted no reply brief, apparently acknowledging that this exception is applicable and that defendant's credits were properly calculated under its provisions.
Defendant points out that he has already served the full sentence, but asserts that since he was placed on probation for three years, "if he should violate probation, it would matter whether he was awarded only 104 days' credit or the 140 days to which he was entitled."
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Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
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Pollak, Acting P.J.
We concur:
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Siggins, J.
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Jenkins, J.