On the other hand, as the district court and the government both emphasize, identical or very similar “reasonable and prudent” standard statutes are ubiquitous throughout the United States, and have been uniformly upheld against constitutional challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez–Cejas, 2009 WL 914873, at *4 (D.Nev. Jan. 15, 2009), aff'd, 2009 WL 961464 (D.Nev. April 2, 2009); United States v. Johnson, 2006 WL 435975, at **3–4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2006), aff'd, 258 Fed.Appx. 510 (4th Cir.2007); Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla.1970); United States v. Marmolejo, 2007 WL 915195 (S.D.Ohio 2007); State v. Coppes, 247 Iowa 1057, 78 N.W.2d 10 (1956); State v. Shapiro, 751 So.2d 337, 341–42 (La.Ct.App.1999); State v. Giovengo, 692 So.2d 462 (La.Ct.App.1997); State v. Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409, 270 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct.1966); State v. Quinones, 2003 WL 22939467, at **4–5 (Oh.Ct.App.2003); State v. Bush, 182 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio Com.Pl.1962); State v. Harton, 108 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tenn.Crim.App.2002); Logan City v. Carlsen, 585 P.2d 449 (Ut.1978). As these cases make clear, imprecision in statutes such as the one here simply build in needed flexibility while incorporating a comprehensible, normative standard easily understood by the ordinary driver, and giving fair warning as to what conduct on his or her part is prohibited.
This holding is consistent with the holdings of our sister state jurisdictions which have been called upon to construe similar enactments which establish driving standards in "reasonable and prudent" terms.State v. Bush, 182 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio, 1962); People v. Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409, 270 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. 1966); People v. DeCasaus, 150 Cal.App.2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 (1957); Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970). The second point on appeal, that of insufficiency of the evidence, presents a matter that is not appealable to this Court.
“define [s] the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand [the] prohibited conduct”); United States v. Johnson, No. 5:04CR65–1–V, 2006 WL 435975, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2006) (holding the “statute's failure to specify an exact ‘safe’ distance does not render [it] unconstitutionally vague”); State v. Giovengo, 692 So.2d 462, 463 (La.Ct.App.1997) (“[T]he language of the statute, given a generally accepted meaning and read in pari materia, would indicate that a following car should leave enough room in case the car in front stopped suddenly.”); Logan City v. Carlsen, 585 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah 1978) (holding “that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague and that it adequately informs the operators of motor vehicles of the kind of conduct that is forbidden”); Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139, 140 (Fla.1970) (holding “it is clear that ‘men of common intelligence’ would know [the statute's] meaning and would not be required to guess as to its application”); State v. Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409, 270 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (N.Y.Cty.Ct.1966) (finding “the instant statute is not too vague or indefinite and is therefore not unconstitutional”).¶ 35.
Oct. 4, 1999) (holding Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609(b)(2), which creates defense to failure to appear based upon a "reasonable excuse," not to be unconstitutionally vague); State v. Aaron Cooper, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9708-CR-00368, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1015, at *6 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept. 29, 1998, at Nashville) (finding Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402(a)(1), including phrase "any article used or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon," not to be unconstitutionally vague) (emphasis added)). In addition, other states have upheld "following too closely" statutes with identical wording as that contained in the Tennessee statute. SeeState v. Shapiro, 751 So.2d 337, 342 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1999); Logan City v. Carlsen, 585 P.2d 449, 450 (Ut. 1978); People v. Heid, 270 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476, 50 Misc.2d 409 (N.Y. 1966). We believe our sister states correctly decided this issue and see no reason to hold differently.
Petitioner was able nonetheless to bring his vehicle to a safe stop behind the police car. The record bears no other evidence to support a finding that petitioner drove so closely behind the police car as to constitute an unreasonably and improvident operation of his vehicle (see People v. Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409). ¶ The decision to revoke petitioner's license is not based on a mere resolution of credibility between the conflicting testimony of petitioner and the officer. If this were the case, the administrative findings would have to be accepted by the court ( Matter of Perry v Department of MotorVehicles, 61 A.D.2d 1088).
Two lower court decisions have held the statute constitutional. (See, People v Heid, 50 Misc.2d 409 [Westchester County Ct 1966]; People v Giustiniani, 73 Misc.2d 223 [New Rochelle City Ct 1973].) The Court of Appeals has held that terminology similar to the language found in section 1129 (a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is constitutional.
" Contrariwise, People v. Heid ( 50 Misc.2d 409 [County Ct., Westchester County, 1966]), held this section to be constitutional. The court there relied upon the rationale of People v. Lewis ( 13 N.Y.2d 180).