Opinion
A165178
04-04-2024
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HASSON HEDGEPETH, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 174868)
GOLDMAN, J.
In 2017, Hasson Hedgepeth was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison after having been convicted of first degree murder with a related firearm enhancement, as well as other counts and enhancements. In September 2019, this court affirmed Hedgepeth's convictions but remanded for resentencing under then-newly enacted Senate Bill 620, which vests sentencing courts with discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements in the interest of justice. (People v. Hedgepeth (Sept. 25, 2019, A153257) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand, Hedgepeth filed a motion for relief under Penal Codesection 745, enacted as part of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1 et seq.) (the Racial Justice Act). Following briefing, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion under this court's limited remand. Thereafter, the court resentenced Hedgepeth and entered a new judgment.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
On appeal, Hedgepeth contends the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act. We agree, and accordingly reverse the judgment and remand so that the trial court may consider Hedgepeth's motion in the first instance.
After briefing was complete, we asked the parties to brief the potential impact of recent amendments to section 745, effective January 1, 2024, that expanded a defendant's access to relief under the Racial Justice Act. (Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.); (Stats. 2023, ch. 464, § 1).) In response, both parties agreed that this case was still on direct appeal for the purposes of the statute, and thus, that this court could entertain Hedgepeth's Racial Justice Act claim in the first instance, or with good cause, could grant a motion to stay the appeal and remand to the superior court to allow him to present his claim there-essentially the same relief he seeks in the appeal. (See § 745, subd. (b).) Hedgepeth then filed such a motion, and the Attorney General opposed. Having considered the parties' briefs, we conclude that the better course of action is to resolve the appeal on the merits, and we therefore deny Hedgepeth's motion as moot.
Background
I. The Racial Justice Act
Section 745, subdivision (a) prohibits criminal convictions obtained "on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin." A violation of this section is established if it is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[d]uring the defendant's trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant's race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful." (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).)
II. Hedgepeth's Motion
On September 28, 2021, Hedgepeth filed his motion seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act. His motion argued, among other things, that the receipt in evidence of his rap lyrics and the prosecutor's use of those rap lyrics in cross-examination of Hedgepeth and in his arguments to the jury violated the Act because these instances of "racially coded" and "racially charged" language were predicated on "negative racial stereotypes of Black men."
At the hearing on October 1, 2021, the court requested briefing on the "threshold" issue of "whether [the court had] jurisdiction to hear the motion" in view of the terms of the remittitur. Following the parties' briefing, the court concluded that, given the court's limited remand with directions, its discretion on resentencing was limited to whether or not to impose the gun use enhancement.
Discussion
Generally, "when an appellate court remands a matter with directions governing the proceedings on remand,' "those directions are binding on the trial court and must be followed. Any material variance from the directions is unauthorized and void." '" (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64, italics omitted.) In People v. Hargis (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 199, 205, 207 (Hargis), the court held, however, that "[u]nder the unique circumstances" of that case, where the adoption of Proposition 57 represented "a change in the law of such a fundamental nature . . . between [the] reviewing court's issuance of its opinion and the return of jurisdiction to the trial court through issuance of the remittitur," the trial court should have entertained the defendant's motion for a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing. The court explained that its limited remand did not constitute "a straightjacket for the trial court such that it had no power to hear a motion on an issue that could not have been raised on defendant's prior appeal, and which concerned a change in the law that altered the court's authority to adjudicate defendant's case in criminal (adult) court in the first instance." (Id. at p. 207.) Under those circumstances, "[e]ntertaining the motion would not have required the trial court to disobey the remittitur." (Id. at p. 208.)
In People v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 298, the court applied this exception in rejecting the People's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act on remand following a prior appeal. The court explained that "the People cite no case applying this general rule where new legislation becomes effective in the period between the remittitur and the proceedings on remand. '[I]t is well settled that when a case is remanded for resentencing after an appeal, the defendant is entitled to "all the normal rights and procedures available at his original sentencing" [citations], including consideration of any pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.' [Citation.] Here, the [Racial Justice Act's] January 1, 2021, effective date was a pertinent circumstance that arose after the remittitur and before the resentencing hearing. The trial court was not barred from considering it." (Ibid.)
We are not persuaded by the Attorney General's attempts to distinguish Hargis and Garcia. The Attorney General concedes that the Racial Justice Act, "like Proposition 57, is a fundamental change in California law," but argues that Hargis is distinguishable because the Racial Justice Act "is critically distinct from Proposition 57 in that it does not 'alter the court's authority to adjudicate defendant's case in criminal [] court in the first instance.'" (Hargis, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 207.) The court made that observation, however, in explaining its conclusion that it would not have contradicted the remittitur for the trial court to hear the motion, distinguishing People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359. (Hargis, at pp. 207-208.) Hargis did not treat the effect of Proposition 57 on the trial court's authority to hear the case in the first instance as itself dispositive, and the Attorney General does not develop any argument that, in the absence of such an effect, a trial court would necessarily disobey a remittitur by entertaining a motion based on a fundamental change in law. The Racial Justice Act was enacted "to remedy the harm to the defendant's case and to the integrity of the judicial system." (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(i).) By providing that Section 745 applies "[t]o all cases in which judgment is not final," the Legislature effectuated its intent "to apply the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 retroactively, to ensure equal access to justice for all." (§ 745, subd. (j)(1); Stats 2022, ch. 739, § 1.) Providing a defendant access to relief at the earliest available time is consistent with the Legislature's intent.
The Attorney General argues that Garcia is distinguishable because the violation alleged in that case "related to the defendant's sentence and was expressly raised to support dismissing the firearm enhancement as part of the resentencing authorized by the remittitur." In contrast, Hedgepeth's motion was not directed to his sentence but requested "a new trial free from racial bias." Thus, the Attorney General asserts that granting his motion "would have required the trial court to vacate the convictions that this Court had affirmed on appeal. Doing so would result in the trial court overruling this Court's decision, which is prohibited."
Like the court in Hargis, we do not believe that an order granting Hedgepeth's motion would conflict with this court's prior decision. In our prior decision, we concluded that some of Hedgepeth's lyrics were admissible under the law as it existed at that time and that, to the extent any lyrics were inadmissible, any error was harmless. (People v. Hedgepeth (Sept. 25, 2019, A153257) [nonpub. opn.] 2019 Cal.App. Lexis 6446, at pp. *13-14.) Hedgepeth's right to relief under the Racial Justice Act, however, was not, and could not have been, addressed in his first appeal. (See Hargis, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 207 ["defendant's entitlement to a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing could not have been raised in defendant's appeal from his convictions and sentence, because Proposition 57 did not exist at any time prior to issuance of our opinion in that appeal and, under settled law, defendant was not entitled to such a hearing. As a result, the issue was not, and could not have been, addressed in our remand order, and so it was not within the scope of the remittitur"].) Moreover, a violation of the Racial Justice Act is not subject to a case-specific harmless error analysis. (People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 337.)
Under section 745, subdivision (c), the trial court is required to hold a hearing on claims asserted under the Racial Justice Act when "defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a)." Under section 745, subdivision (h)(2), a "prima facie showing" means "the defendant produces facts that, if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation of [the Racial Justice Act] occurred." Under the Racial Justice Act, "a 'substantial likelihood' requires more than a mere possibility, but less than a standard of more likely than not." (Ibid; see also Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 22 ["The prima facie threshold is . . . lower than the preponderance of the evidence standard required to establish an actual violation of the Racial Justice Act"].) On appeal, the Attorney General does not dispute that Hedgepeth's motion met this standard. Therefore, the trial court's failure to consider the motion was prejudicial and the matter must be remanded.
The parties agree that the trial court erred by failing to grant Hedgepeth custody credits when it entered the new judgment. Correction of the judgment, if necessary, can be done in the trial court on remand.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded with directions to the trial court to consider Hedgepeth's motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act.
WE CONCUR: STREETER, Acting P. J., HITE, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.