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People v. Hedge

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 13, 2008
No. D050292 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MATTHEW HARVEY HEDGE, Defendant and Appellant. D050292 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division March 13, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Michael D. Wellington, Judge, Super. Ct. No. MH99668

McINTYRE, J.

Matthew Harvey Hedge appeals a judgment recommitting him to an indeterminate term at the Atascadero State Hospital under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq. (the Act), all statutory references are to the Welf. & Inst. Code unless otherwise specified), contending that, as a result of recent statutory amendments, the court lacked jurisdiction to recommit him and that the court violated his statutory and due process rights by limiting him to six peremptory challenges at trial. We find Hedge's arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 1989, Hedge pleaded guilty to two counts each of forcible lewd acts on a child and lewd acts on a child and was sentenced to prison for 12 years. (People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1472.) After Hedge completed his sentence in 1998, he was found to be a sexually violent predator and committed to the Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to the Act on several occasions. (Id. at pp. 1472-1474.) In late 2004, Hedge petitioned for outpatient treatment and his request was granted. He was released in November 2005, but his outpatient status was revoked in January 2006 after he violated the conditions thereof and he was recommitted to the Atscadero State Hospital until July 2006.

Prior to the expiration of Hedge's then-current commitment period, the district attorney filed a petition seeking to extend his commitment. In October 2006, Hedge moved to dismiss the recommitment proceedings, arguing that recent statutory amendments deprived the superior court of jurisdiction to recommit him. The court denied the motion and at the recommitment trial, a jury found that Hedge was a sexually violent predator. In January 2007, the court recommitted Hedge for an indeterminate term. Hedge appeals.

DISCUSSION

1. Superior Court Jurisdiction to Recommit

A person must be committed as an SVP if the People prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person currently suffers from a mental disorder that seriously impairs the person's ability to control his or her sexually violent behavior and creates a substantial danger that the person will commit a sexually violent offense if released. (§§ 6600, 6604; People v. Williams (2003) 31 Cal.4th 757, 776.) Prior to 2006, section 6604 of the Act provided that a sexually violent predator was subject to a two-year term and that the People were required to obtain a new order determining the person to be an SVP for each successive two-year commitment. (People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 559, 564.) In 2006, however, legislative amendment and the California voters' approval of Proposition 83 (known as "Jessica's Law") changed the existing two-year commitment term under section 6604 an indeterminate term of confinement, from which the SVP can petition for release. (People v. Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 562-563, citing §§ 6604, 6605, subd. (b), 6608, subd. (a); see Historical and Statutory Notes, 73D West's Ann. Welf. & Inst. Code (2008 supp.) foll. § 6604, p. 134; Prop. 83, § 27, approved Nov. 7, 2006, eff. Nov. 8, 2006.)

Hedge does not dispute the court's finding that he qualifies as a sexually violent predator, but argues that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to recommit him because the legislative amendments to section 6604 deleted the prior statutory authorization for recommitment of a person at the end of an existing two-year commitment under the Act. (The Attorney General points out that Proposition 83's amendment of the law corrected the challenged deficiency in the legislative amendment. Hedge does not respond to this point, but we will assume, without deciding, that the statute as amended by the Legislature is operative here.) Hedge's argument, however, has recently been considered and rejected by this court (People v. Shields, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 564) and we are unpersuaded by his contention that the issue was incorrectly decided in that case. (See also People v. Carroll (Dec. 27, 2007, F051709) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ [2007 DJDAR, p. 18994.) Accordingly, we reject Hedge's argument that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to recommit him.

2. Limitation on Peremptory Challenges

In a criminal case, the defendant is entitled to exercise ten peremptory challenges unless the offense with which he is charged is punishable by life in prison or death, in which case the number of allowable peremptory challenges is increased to twenty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).) In civil proceedings, and in criminal cases where the offense is punishable with a maximum term of imprisonment of 90 days or less, each party is entitled to exercise six such challenges. (Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subds. (b) & (c).)

Hedge contends that the trial court should have allowed him twenty peremptory challenges in light of the fact that the recommitment term was indeterminate rather than a fixed period. However, a trial to determine whether a person is subject to commitment (or recommitment) as a sexually violent predator is "a special proceeding of a civil nature[.]" (People v. Calhoun (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 519, 521.) Further, the California Supreme Court has made clear that even in a special civil proceeding that is related to criminal charges for which the person might be subjected to imprisonment for life or to capital punishment, a party is only entitled to six peremptory challenges. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th, 764, 807 [special civil proceeding to determine a capital defendant's mental competence to stand trial].)

Hedge nonetheless argues that the indeterminate term of a recommitment is closely analogous to a prison sentence for life and thus we must interpret Code of Civil Procedure section 231 to afford the same number of peremptory challenges in both instances to "avoid . . . the constitutional problems inherent in providing unequal protection to similarly situated defendants." However, we reject Hedge's contention that one who is the subject of a recommitment proceeding under the Act is similarly situated to a criminal defendant who is charged with a crime, the punishment for which is life in prison or death. (Accord People v. Calhoun, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529-530.)

A commitment (or recommitment) under the Act is designed to protect the public from one who suffers from a mental condition that renders him a danger to others (see §§ 6600, subd. (a), 6601, subds. (c), (f), 6602, 6602.5, 6604) and, as such, it does not implicate the two primary objectives of criminal punishment, retribution for culpable behavior and deterrence. (People v. Calhoun, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) Scienter, which is required to be established in a criminal action, is not a prerequisite to a commitment under the Act and there is no expectation that the possibility of a commitment will have the effect of deterring a sexually violent predator's dangerous behavior. (See § 6600, subd. (a).)

Further, unlike criminal punishment, the confinement of a sexually violent predator is not designed to be punitive in nature. Although a commitment under the Act involves an affirmative restraint on the committed person's liberty, "the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment." (United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 746). To the contrary, the State has a legitimate nonpunitive interest in confining "mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public[.]" (Id. at pp. 748-749.)

Further, the notion that the potentially indefinite duration of a confinement under the Act, as recently amended, renders it punitive (and thus brings a confinement proceeding into alignment with a criminal proceeding) is unsupportable. (See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 363-364.) The duration of the confinement under the Act is tied to the stated purpose of the commitment, that is, to hold the person only so long as his mental abnormality creates a danger to others and thus it is only potentially indefinite, subject to the Department of Mental Health's annual review of the committed person's mental condition and the right of the committed person to seek release from confinement based on a showing that he no longer poses the requisite danger. (Ibid.; §§ 6600, subd. (a), 6605, subd. (a), 6608, subds. (a), (d).)

For these reasons, we conclude that a person subject to commitment (or recommitment) proceedings under the Act is not similarly situated to a criminal defendant who is being tried for offenses that might result in his incarceration for life and thus that allowing six rather than twenty peremptory challenges in the former situation does not violate equal protection principles. (People v. Calhoun, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529-520.) The trial court's application of Code of Civil Procedure section 231, subdivision (b) here does not support a reversal of the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P.J., McDONALD, J.


Summaries of

People v. Hedge

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Mar 13, 2008
No. D050292 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Hedge

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MATTHEW HARVEY HEDGE, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Mar 13, 2008

Citations

No. D050292 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008)