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People v. Hector H. (In re Hector H.)

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Dec 29, 2011
B231532 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011)

Opinion

B231532

12-29-2011

In re HECTOR H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HECTOR H., Defendant and Appellant.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Julie A. Harris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ46897)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Fred J. Fujioka, Judge. Affirmed.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Julie A. Harris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Hector H., a minor, appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following the juvenile court's finding he committed misdemeanor vandalism causing less than $400 in damage. Hector contends the evidence was insufficient to establish he had the requisite intent to commit the crime. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts.

In July 2010, 16-year-old Hector was a student at a Los Angeles school. Gabriel Aranda was employed as a teacher's assistant at the school, and Hector was one of his students. On the afternoon of July 15, 2010, Aranda briefly left the classroom to retrieve an item from the school office. When he returned, he observed Hector throw a piece of paper to another student. Aranda told Hector to pick up the paper. Hector complied.

Shortly thereafter, someone called to Aranda from outside the classroom, and Aranda turned to look. When he turned back, he caught Hector throwing another piece of paper to another student. Aranda told Hector to pick it up. Hector replied that he " 'didn't do anything.' " Aranda stated that he had seen Hector throw the paper. Hector denied it, stating, " 'You know, you're tripping.' " When Aranda reiterated that he had just seen Hector throw the paper, Hector became furious and said, " 'F[uck] you . . . . You're nobody. You're nobody.' " Hector came towards Aranda, who was standing at the classroom door. Aranda put his arm out defensively to block Hector's approach. Hector complained that Aranda should not touch him. Hector moved close enough that his chest was touching Aranda's. Aranda stated that Hector was getting too close to him and said, " 'If you don't want me to touch you, move away.' " Hector retorted, " 'I feel like punching you.' " Aranda replied, " 'Do whatever you need to do, and I'll do whatever I need to do.' " Hector walked out the classroom door and into the hallway, but then returned to the doorway where Aranda was standing. Hector swung a closed fist at Aranda as if to hit him, but instead turned and struck the wall, creating a hole in the drywall.

A Los Angeles police officer witnessed the incident, and observed that Hector appeared upset and agitated.

2. Procedure.

A juvenile petition filed on September 16, 2010, alleged Hector committed misdemeanor vandalism causing under $400 in damage (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)).At a combined adjudication and dispositional hearing conducted on March 7, 2011, the juvenile court sustained the petition, declared Hector a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and placed him home on probation. Hector appeals.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

DISCUSSION

The evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding.

When determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a petition brought under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, we apply the standard used in criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026; In re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine "whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence [which] is reasonable, credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66; In re V.V., supra, at p. 1026; People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 186-187.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (In re V.V., supra, at p. 1026; People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) Reversal is not warranted unless it appears " 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' [Citation.]" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) "Mental state and intent are rarely susceptible of direct proof and must therefore be proven circumstantially." (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 355.)

Hector contends the People were required to prove he intended to damage the wall when he hit it, and there was insufficient evidence on this point. Implicit in his argument is the contention that vandalism is a specific intent crime. To the contrary, vandalism is a general intent crime. Section 594 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. [¶] (2) Damages.

(3) Destroys." Thus, to commit vandalism within the meaning of section 594, an individual must maliciously damage or destroy real or personal property not his or her own. (In re Leanna W. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.)

"Maliciously" is defined by section 7 as follows: "The words 'malice' and 'maliciously' import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." (§ 7, subd. (4); People v. Watie (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 866, 879.) Accordingly, the statute required proof that Hector intended to commit a wrongful act.

An offense is characterized as a general intent crime when the required mental state entails only an intent to do the act that causes the harm. It is characterized as a specific intent crime when the required mental state entails an intent to cause the resulting harm. (People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 86.) "In other words, if the end in view is simply a proscribed act, the intent required is only a general one because no further acts or future consequences are envisioned from the illegal act. [Citations.] Conversely, when the end in view looks to a further consequence of the act, the intent is specific." (People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1186.) Thus, " '[t]he only intent required for a general intent offense is the purpose or willingness to do the act or omission. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Hernandez (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)

Our analysis begins with an examination of the statutory language. (People v. Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.) Statutes defining specific intent crimes typically contain phrases such as " ' "with the intent to" ' achieve" or " ' "for the purpose of" ' achieving some additional result." (Ibid.) " 'When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to [a] defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.' [Citation.]" (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 82; People v. Hernandez, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500; People v. Alvarado, supra, at p. 1186.)

Use of the term " 'malicious' " in a statute "does not transform an offense into a specific intent crime." (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 85; In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1027 [statutory definition of " 'maliciously,' " in context of arson, did not require the specific intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence]; People v. Hernandez, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500 [" 'Conviction under a statute proscribing conduct done "willfully and maliciously" does not require proof of a specific intent' "]; People v. Alvarado, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.) To the contrary, the term "malicious" is ordinarily an expression of general criminal intent when used in a penal statute. (People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 85; People v. Alvarado, supra, at p. 1188.) Malice, as used in the legal sense, simply means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. (In re V.V., supra, at p. 1028.) A malice requirement ensures that the wrongful act is intentional, rather than accidental. (People v. Atkins, supra, at p. 88.)

Applying the foregoing principles here, it is apparent that vandalism is not a specific intent crime. The acts proscribed by section 594 are defacing, damaging, or destroying the real or personal property of another. (§ 594, subd. (a).) Like the arson statutes at issue in Atkins and In re V.V., the vandalism statute does not require an additional specific intent to achieve a particular consequence. "Language that typically denotes specific intent crimes, such as 'with the intent' to achieve or 'for the purpose of achieving some further act, is absent" from section 594. (See People v. Atkins, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 86.) As with the arson statute at issue in Atkins, the malice requirement in section 594 simply ensures that the defendant's act is deliberate and intentional, rather than accidental, and that the direct, natural, and probable consequences of the act are the damage, defacement, or destruction of property. (See People v. Atkins, supra, at p. 88; see also In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1023 [minors' acts of intentionally igniting and throwing firecracker on dry, brush-covered hillside, although done without the intent to cause a fire or other harm, were sufficient to establish the requisite malice for arson].) The intent to commit a specific harm is not an element of vandalism. Put differently, the People were required to establish Hector committed the act that caused the harm, that is, hit the wall, under circumstances likely to cause damage. The People were not required to prove he specifically intended to put a hole in the wall. (See In re V.V., supra, at p. 1028; see also CALCRIM No. 2900.)

The evidence was sufficient to establish Hector acted with malice. The evidence clearly showed Hector's act of hitting the wall was intentional, not accidental. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500 [for a general intent crime, " ' "the question is whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act" ' "].) He was very angry with Aranda, and stated that he felt like punching Aranda. According to Aranda's testimony, Hector began to swing at him but hit the wall instead. Indeed, Hector agrees the evidence showed he was about to hit Aranda, thought better of it, and "chose to hit the wall instead." As he concedes, he "made a decision to hit the wall."

It may further be inferred that a reasonable person would have realized that the direct, natural, and highly probable consequence of punching the wall with a closed fist would be damage to the wall. (See In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1030 [defendant guilty of arson if he or she acts with awareness of facts that would lead reasonable person to realize the direct, natural, and probable consequences of igniting and throwing a firecracker into dry brush would be the burning of the hillside].) Contrary to Hector's argument, a reasonable person would have known that punching drywall with a closed fist, with the force Hector employed, would result in a hole in the wall. In our view, this is both a matter of common knowledge and common sense. The People were not required to show Hector was subjectively aware that the hole in the wall was the probable consequence of his act; instead, the People were only required to show that he acted with awareness of facts that would have led a reasonable person to so realize. (See In re V.V., supra, at p. 1030 [construing arson statute].) As the court in In re V.V. explained, "Although [the minors] did not intend to set the hillside on fire, they knew that their intentional acts created a fire hazard." (Ibid.) In sum, the evidence was sufficient to prove Hector intentionally hit the wall under circumstances likely to damage it. No more was required.

Hector's contention that In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th 1020, was wrongly decided, and his reliance on the dissenting opinion in that case, are not persuasive. We are, of course, bound to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Likewise, Hector's citation to various cases involving other offenses in which different, or stronger, evidence of intent or knowledge was arguably present, is unavailing. (People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 828; People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619.) That more, different, or stronger evidence demonstrating intent or knowledge may have been present in other cases does not establish the evidence was insufficient here; each case must be considered on its own facts. (See People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1010.)

Alternatively, even if the People had been required to prove Hector intended to damage the wall, the juvenile court reasonably inferred from the evidence that Hector had such an intent. The court explained, "there was an exchange between the minor and [Aranda] . . . . The minor's state of mind is reflected by the statement, 'Fuck you. You're nobody.' I believe the minor was angry, and as a result of his anger, he struck the wall hard enough to cause a hole. And given the minor's state of mind and the manner in which the damage was done, I believe the court could entertain a reasonable inference as to the intent. And, in fact, I'm finding it's proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the minor struck the wall with the intent to damage the wall."

The juvenile court's reasoning was sound. As observed ante, a defendant's mental state and intent generally must be proven circumstantially. (People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 355.) Here, the evidence showed Hector was "furious" with Aranda. Hector was verbally abusive to Aranda and approached him in a hostile, provocative manner. As discussed, the evidence showed he was so angry he began to swing at Aranda, but then turned and intentionally punched the wall with a closed fist. From this evidence the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Hector intended to damage the wall. Certainly, if during an argument an enraged defendant threw a porcelain vase across a room, or heaved a chair at a sliding glass door, no one would hesitate to infer that the defendant intended to break the vase or the glass. In our view, Hector's punch to the wall is no different.

DISPOSITION

The order of wardship is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.


Summaries of

People v. Hector H. (In re Hector H.)

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Dec 29, 2011
B231532 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011)
Case details for

People v. Hector H. (In re Hector H.)

Case Details

Full title:In re HECTOR H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Dec 29, 2011

Citations

B231532 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2011)