Opinion
2-24-0394
09-27-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KERA A. HEBENSTREIT, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 24-CF-1328 Honorable Marina Lark Cowart and Clint Hull, Judges, Presiding.
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hutchinson and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BIRKETT JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State's petition to detain defendant.
¶ 2 In this interlocutory appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), defendant, Kera A. Hebenstreit, appeals from orders of the circuit court of Kane County granting the State's verified petition to deny her pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act), and denying her subsequent motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2). Defendant, through appointed counsel, declined to file a memorandum as permitted by Rule 604(h)(7). She therefore stands on the arguments raised in her motion for relief, namely that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that she committed a detainable offense; (2) she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that risk. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On June 23, 2024, defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth violation, with an alcohol concentration of 0.16 or more (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1)-(2), (d)(2)(C) (West 2022)); two counts of aggravated DUI for driving under the influence while not possessing a valid driver's license (id. §11-501(a)(1)-(2), (d)(1)(H)); two counts of aggravated DUI for driving under the influence when she knowingly did not possess liability insurance (id. § 11-501(a)(1)-(2), (d)(1)(I)); two counts of aggravated DUI for driving under the influence while her license was suspended or revoked (id § 11-501(a)(1)-(2), (d)(1)(G)); and one count of driving while her license was revoked due to a charge of driving under the influence, third offense (id. § 5/6-303(a)).
¶ 5 Defendant was charged with these offenses following her involvement in a hit-and-run collision that occurred on June 22, 2024, at the intersection of Bluff City Boulevard and South Liberty Street in Elgin. Officers of the Elgin police department were dispatched to the scene and spoke with several witnesses. The witnesses reported that, just prior to the collision, defendant exited her Chevrolet Trailblazer and was in a "road rage" dispute with another vehicle. Defendant was stumbling and unable to maintain her balance. She eventually returned to her vehicle and proceeded though the intersection while the traffic light was red, and she collided with another vehicle. Defendant then left the scene travelling northbound on South Liberty Street. An officer observed defendant, with vehicle keys in her hand, walking eastbound on Hastings Street, which is approximately 3 blocks north of the collision site. Defendant was stumbling and appeared to be disoriented, had glassy eyes, and the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emitted from her mouth. Defendant denied driving or knowing anything about the Trailblazer. Nearby, officers located defendant's Trailblazer, and it had significant front-end damage. The keys that defendant held in her hand when she was confronted by the officer belonged to that vehicle. Witnesses identified the Chevrolet Trailblazer as the vehicle that was involved in the collision and defendant as its driver. Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests at the scene. She was arrested and taken to the Elgin police department, where a breathalyzer test was administered and revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.221.
¶ 6 Defendant has a significant history of DUI offenses as evidenced by her certified driving abstract. In July 2004 and again in March 2006, she was convicted of DUI in Cook County. In Du Page County, in 2010, she pleaded guilty to aggravated DUI, a class 2 felony, for her third DUI conviction. Defendant violated her probation in January 2013 and received 30 days in jail. Defendant later obtained a restricted driving permit (RDP), and a breath alcohol ignition intercept device (BAIID) was installed in her vehicle. The RDP and BAIID were revoked in December 2015. She was issued another RDP in 2018, but it was revoked in 2019.
¶ 7 At the time of the instant offense, charges were pending against defendant in Du Page County for DUI, resisting a peace officer, and transportation of alcohol by driver stemming from a July 2023 arrest, and she was on probation for an April 2023 conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
¶ 8 On June 24, 2024, after a hearing, the trial court ordered that defendant be detained pending trial. Defendant filed a motion for relief, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2024.
¶ 9 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 All persons charged with a criminal offense in Illinois are eligible for pretrial release, which is governed by article 110 of the Code, as amended by the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2022). To overcome the presumption that a defendant is eligible for pretrial release, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an offense that qualifies for pretrial detention; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(e).
¶ 12 We review the trial court's decision to deny pretrial release under a bifurcated standard. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. We apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the court's factual findings, including whether a defendant poses a threat and whether any condition or combination of conditions could mitigate that threat. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. The ultimate decision of whether a defendant should be denied pretrial release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's determination is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. Id.
¶ 13 Defendant raises three arguments in support of her appeal. First, she contends that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that she committed the charged offenses. Second, she asserts that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case. Third, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risk that defendant's pretrial release would pose. We reject all three arguments.
¶ 14 Concerning the first argument, defendant suggests that the State's reliance on a police synopsis is insufficient to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that she committed a detainable offense. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). She notes that the State's proffer relied on the synopsis prepared by an Elgin police officer and a certified copy of defendant's driving abstract, and she contends that synopses are based on a standard of probable cause that is "significantly lower" than the clear-and-convincing standard necessary to satisfy this proposition. While it is true that the Act requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant committed a qualifying offense (id. § 5/110-6.1(e)(1)), it also expressly permits the State to "present evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information" (id. § 5/110-6.1(f)(2)). This court has repeatedly held that a police synopsis alone may satisfy the State's burden. People v. Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 24; People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24; People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (2d) 230546-U. The synopsis, which defendant does not challenge as being unreliable, related that defendant was involved in a road rage altercation with another motorist. During that incident, witnesses observed defendant stumbling and unable to maintain her balance. She eventually returned to her vehicle and proceeded through the intersection against a red light, colliding with another vehicle. Defendant then fled the scene heading north. An officer eventually located defendant, who was walking southbound. She appeared disoriented and was stumbling, had glassy eyes, and the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanated from her breath. Witnesses at the scene identified defendant's vehicle, which had significant front-end damage, as the vehicle that caused the collision and defendant as its driver. A breathalyzer test administered at the police station showed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.221, well above the legal limit. Based on these circumstances and the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court's finding that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed aggravated DUI, which is a detainable offense, is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 15 Next, defendant contends in her motion for relief that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, as contemplated in section 110-6.1(g) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022)). She faults the trial court for relying on the police synopsis and her driving abstract, and she concludes that the court's finding as to her dangerousness was erroneous. This argument plainly fails. Section 110-6.1(g) of the Code lists several factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community. They include, among others: (1) the nature and circumstances of the charged offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed to a pose a threat and the nature of the threat; and (4) whether, at the time of the offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or other release from custody pending trial. Id. No single factor is dispositive. See id. The court emphasized that its finding of dangerousness was not based solely on the fact that defendant was accused of aggravated DUI, but rather, on the particular facts of the case and defendant's 20-year history of driving while intoxicated, which demonstrates that she is a danger to other motorists and the community in general. It emphasized that, while defendant was intoxicated, she engaged in an argument with another motorist, disregarded a stoplight, caused an accident, and fled the scene. The court also emphasized that "this is the fifth alleged DUI," as there "had been three priors that [defendant has] either received supervision or a conviction for." It also pointed to defendant's pending DUI case in Du Page County and the fact that she was on probation for unlawful possession of a controlled substance at the time of the instant offenses. Given defendant's longstanding pattern of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the trial court's finding that she poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community is amply supported by the record.
¶ 16 Defendant last argues that the State failed to prove that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat she posed to the community. She asserts that the trial court could have placed her on a secure continuous remote alcohol monitor (SCRAM) or on electronic home monitoring (EHM), as she suggested at the detention hearing. According to defendant, either of those options would have put her "in the mindset that the Court is watching her." Defendant further asserts that the court's finding on this proposition was influenced by the court's erroneous finding that she "poses a real and present threat to anyone." We reject this argument. In issuing its ruling, the court underscored defendant's "history of noncompliance." Specifically, defendant has a "substantial history of driving when [she's] not allowed to," and the court noted that defendant had a pending case in Du Page County for DUI when she committed the instant aggravated DUI offenses. In rejecting defendant's assertion that she could be outfitted with a SCRAM device or placed on EHM, the court noted that defendant was "already being watched by Court[s] in two other counties in addition to this one," and that the supervision had, so far, not deterred her from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Moreover, it noted that defendant had previously been provided with a BAIID device and a restricted driving permit, but both were revoked by the Illinois Secretary of State. These circumstances, in the court's view, indicated that defendant is unable to abide by court orders and thus, there was no condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate the threat defendant poses to the community. Given defendant's persistent failure to comply with court orders, the court's finding that no conditions could mitigate the threat her release would pose to the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court's decision to detain defendant while she awaits trial is an abuse of discretion.
¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Kane County granting the State's petition to detain.
¶ 19 Affirmed.