86 Ill. App.3d 162, 171, 407 N.E.2d 1058, 1066, citing Malo v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 157, 361 N.E.2d 1201. More recently, in People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782, the court considered the applicability of a special circumstances exception requiring an instruction regarding the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Hebein court noted that in Indiana, the exception has been narrowly construed to apply only where there is a direct comment on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In Aliwoli, we considered the applicability of a "special circumstances exception" requiring an instruction regarding the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Specifically, we noted that in both People v. Hebein, 111 Ill. App. 3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782 (1982), and People v. Alerte, 120 Ill. App. 3d 962, 458 N.E.2d 1106 (1983), we recognized special circumstances exist where the prosecutor's remarks imply the defendant will be set free if he is found insane. Aliwoli, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 618, citing Hebein, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 838-39, and Alerte, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 972-73.
Generally, a trial court is not required to give a jury an instruction which relates the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. People v. Glenn (1992), 233 Ill. App.3d 666; People v. Liberg (1985), 138 Ill. App.3d 986, 990, 486 N.E.2d 973; People v. Alerte (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 962, 458 N.E.2d 1106, habeas corpus granted United States ex rel. Alerte v. Lane (N.D. Ill. 1989), 725 F. Supp. 936; People v. Ford (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 59, 62, 454 N.E.2d 1095; People v. Parker (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 321, 329, 447 N.E.2d 457; People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 837-40, 444 N.E.2d 782; People v. Pitts (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 451, 456, 432 N.E.2d 1062; People v. Upshaw (1981), 103 Ill. App.3d 690, 698, 431 N.E.2d 1138; People v. La Fiura (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 714, 719, 415 N.E.2d 1365; People v. Meeker (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 162, 407 N.E.2d 1058.Glenn, very recently decided by this appellate district, correctly observes that no Illinois case has reversed a conviction for failure to instruct as to consequences. At least 24 jurisdictions have required such an instruction: See Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P.2d 907; People v. Moore (1985), 166 Cal.App.3d 540, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856; People v. Thomson (1979), 197 Colo. 232, 591 P.2d 1031; State v. Wood (1988), 208 Conn. 125, 545 A.2d 1026; Taylor v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1955), 222 F.2d 398; Roberts v. State (Fla. 1976), 335 So.2d 285; Spraggins v. State (1988), 258 Ga. 32, 364 S.E.2d 861; State v. Amorin (1978), 58 Haw. 623, 574 P.2d 895; State v. Hamilton (1975), 216 Kan. 559, 534 P.2d 226; State v. Babin (La. 19
Moreover, we do not conclude that defense counsel's failure to make a further inquiry into the matter rose to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we note that an attorney's decisions relating to the selection of jurors generally involve matters of trial strategy, Huls v Lockhart, 958 F.2d 212, 214-215 (CA 8, 1992); Palacio v State, 333 S.C. 506, 516-517; 511 S.E.2d 62 (1999); People v Hebein, 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 848; 444 N.E.2d 782 (1982), which we normally decline to evaluate with the benefit of hindsight, People v Williams, 240 Mich. App. 316, 331-332; 614 N.W.2d 647 (2000). Second, Juror 457 informed the court that she could keep her personal life separate from defendant's case, and she answered affirmatively when the court asked whether she could be fair and impartial.
A good summary of the objections to Lyles is found in People v. Meeker, 86 Ill. App.3d 162, 41 Ill.Dec. 560, 567, 407 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (1980): Alabama ( Gray v. State, 482 So.2d 1318 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), cert. denied 482 So.2d 1318 (Ala. Jan. 31, 1986)); Arizona ( State v. McLoughlin, 133 Ariz. 458, 652 P.2d 531 (1982)); Arkansas ( Madison v. State, 287 Ark. 179, 697 S.W.2d 106 (1985)); Connecticut ( State v. Wade, 96 Conn. 238, 113 A. 458 (1921), State v. Holmquist, 173 Conn. 140, 376 A.2d 1111 (1973), cert. denied 434 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 306, 54 L.Ed.2d 193 (1977)); Delaware ( Hand v. State, 354 A.2d 140 (Del. 1976), Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985)); Idaho ( State v. Gratiot, 104 Idaho 782, 663 P.2d 1084 (1983)); Illinois ( People v. Meeker, 86 Ill. App.3d 162, 41 Ill.Dec. 560, 407 N.E.2d 1058 (1980), People v. Hebein, 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 67 Ill.Dec. 546, 444 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. 1982), People v. Alerte, 120 Ill. App.3d 962, 76 Ill.Dec. 452, 458 N.E.2d 1106 (1983), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1105, 105 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed.2d 773 (1985)); Indiana ( Dipert v. State, 259 Ind. 260, 286 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1972), Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. 1986)); Iowa ( State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1979), State v. Oppelt, 329 N.W.2d 17 (Iowa 1983)); Kentucky ( Edwards v. Com., 554 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 999, 98 S.Ct. 642, 54 L.Ed.2d 495 (1977), Ice v. Com., 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 860, 105 S.Ct. 192, 83 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984)); Maine ( State v. Dyer, 371 A.2d 1079 (Me. 1977), State v. Condon, 468 A.2d 1348 (Me. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1204, 104 S.Ct. 2385, 81 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984)); Michigan ( People v. Goad, 421 Mich. 20, 364 N.W.2d 584 (1984)); Minnesota ( State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976), State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481 (Minn.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 973, 100 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.2d 388 (1979)); Mississippi ( Smith v. S
" ( People v. Coleman (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 285, 289, 464 N.E.2d 706, 709; see also People v. Akins (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 908, 351 N.E.2d 366 (a mere pause in the altercation may be sufficient to constitute a cooling-off period).) The provocation must also be proportionate to the retaliation it generates, and if a victim is attacked and killed with violence out of all proportion to the provocation, the crime is murder, not manslaughter. ( People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782.) This is especially true if, as here, the homicide was committed with a deadly weapon.
Defendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion and it is therefore waived for purposes of review. ( People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 842-43, 444 N.E.2d 782.) Nor does it fall under the plain error rule ( People v. Smith (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 26, 416 N.E.2d 814), since the lineup identification was not so substantially erroneous as to require consideration. People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782.
While Meeker refused to adopt any general rule, it noted that one State (Indiana) had carved a very narrow, "special circumstances" exception, in which the giving of a consequence instruction is proper where a direct comment by the prosecutor plants an erroneous view of the law in the minds of the jury. ( Meeker, 86 Ill. App.3d at 171, 407 N.E.2d at 1066; see also People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782 (reviewing current status of Indiana law on exception).) As Meeker found no special circumstances to warrant an instruction, it affirmed the trial court's rejection of the tendered instruction.
Mutual quarrel or combat is among the recognized forms of serious provocation. ( People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782.) Where there is some evidence of these facts in the record which, if believed by a jury, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, then a tendered manslaughter instruction must be given. Peoplev. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill.2d 411, 420-21, 415 N.E.2d 358. At trial, defendant relied on his own testimony to provide the necessary evidentiary basis for the instruction.
Moreover, there is no requirement that an officer spontaneously offer a suspect the opportunity to make a phone call. People v. Hebein (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 830, 444 N.E.2d 782. • 13 Defendant also points to his physical discomfort as support for his contention that his statements were involuntarily coerced.