Respondent points out that the conduct proscribed by Health and Safety Code section 11379.6, subdivision (a), the crime which appellant purportedly attempted, has been found to "criminalize all acts which are part of the manufacturing process, whether or not those acts directly result in completion of the final product." ( People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 705 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240] ( Heath).) In assessing how close appellant's conduct came to committing the actual offense, respondent claims "the fact that appellant was missing an ingredient for the extraction process does not invalidate the jury's determination of attempted manufacture of a controlled substance."

Transporting the workers alone undoubtedly is sufficient to establish aiding and abetting, provided that knowledge of their activity can reasonably be inferred. The prosecution cited People v. Bradford(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1733, 1739 and People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697 to support the proposition that one need not be present at the site to be guilty of cultivation. Defendant's attempt to distinguish these cases is unpersuasive.

(See People v. Culuko (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 325 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789] [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Moreover, as we noted in People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240], “an offense may have been ‘committed,’ so as to subject its perpetrator to liability for the completed offense as opposed to an attempt to commit it, but still remain in progress for purposes of determining aider and abettor liability. [Citation.] Thus, . . . for purposes of aiding and abetting liability a burglary continues until the perpetrator finally departs from the structure, even though the crime is technically complete upon the initial entry. [Citation.] Similarly, . . . a robbery continues for purposes of aiding and abetting until the stolen property is carried to a place of temporary safety, even though the crime is technically complete when the property is taken from the victim’s person or immediate presence. [Citation.]

"It is evident from the Legislature's use of such all-encompassing language that it intended to criminalize all acts which are part of the manufacturing process, whether or not those acts directly result in completion of the final product." ( People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 705 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 240].) The scope of the prohibition in section 11379.6 is broad because the production of methamphetamine is an incremental, not instantaneous process, often conducted in a piecemeal fashion to avoid detection.

"Under this approach, an offense may have been `committed,' so as to subject its perpetrator to liability for the completed offense as opposed to an attempt to commit it, but still remain in progress for purposes of determining aider and abettor liability." ( People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 707.) Similarly, in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165-1166, the court held that, for purposes of aiding and abetting, a robbery continues until the stolen property is carried to a place of temporary safety, even though the crime is technically complete when property is taken from the victim's person or presence.

In enacting section 11379.6, our state Legislature intended to "criminalize all acts which are part of the manufacturing process [of PCP,]" of which piperidine is an integral part. ( People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 705.) Contrary to appellant's claim, construing section 11379.6 to encompass the manufacture of piperidine for the purpose of manufacturing PCP does not pose an "unacceptable risk" to individuals who possess piperidine for legitimate purposes.

A crime can be complete, for purposes of distinguishing between a completed crime and an attempt, yet still be ongoing for purposes of felony-murder. (Cf. People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 707 [when crime is in progress for purposes of aider and abettor liability].) The test for whether the underlying felony is still ongoing is called the "escape rule."

(Cf. People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 707 [when crime is in progress for purposes of aider and abettor liability].) The test for whether the underlying felony is still ongoing is called the "escape rule."

He acknowledges the California authorities upholding manufacturing convictions under section 11379.6 even when certain ingredients necessary to create the controlled substance are missing. (See People v. Lancellotti (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 809 [absence of reducing agent to produce methamphetamine]; People v. Combs (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 422 [absence of bromobenzene to produce phencyclidine (PCP)]; People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697 (Heath) [absence of sodium hydroxide in substance detected in suspected methamphetamine lab].) Nevertheless, appellant argues this case is more analogous to People v. Luna (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 535 (Luna), in which the First District Court of Appeal overturned a conviction on a lesser included attempt charge under section 11379.6 because there had not been any overt act taken by the defendant "beyond preparation" which could "'be said to be a commencement of the commission of the intended crime. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Luna, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 543.)

The statute does not state that the manufacturing must have occurred within a particular time frame. (People v. Pierson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 983, 990; Luna, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 542; People v. Bergen, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 169, 171; Stone, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713-714; People v. Heath (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 697, 705; Lancellotti, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 812-813; Jackson, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1503-1504.) To the extent Tenbrink was claiming the marijuana and apparatus belonged to a third party, Thomas, " '[t]he inference of dominion and control is easily made when the contraband is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence ....' "