Opinion
No. 2010KN033524.
2012-04-24
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Allen HAYNES, Defendant.
Rachel Ramsay–Lowe, Assistant District Attorney, Kings County District Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for The People. Debora Silverman, Esq., Brooklyn Defenders Services, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant Duran.
Rachel Ramsay–Lowe, Assistant District Attorney, Kings County District Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for The People. Debora Silverman, Esq., Brooklyn Defenders Services, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant Duran.
EVELYN J. LAPORTE, J.
The defendant, ALLEN HAYNES, stands charged before this court with one count of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree (PL § 130.60[2] ) and one count Endangering the Welfare of a Child (PL § 260.10[1] ) based on an event that occurred on April 18, 2010 involving one Ebonasia Hazelton.
By papers dated January 3, 2012, the People move to introduce prior bad acts of the defendant that are not charged in the instant criminal complaint through the exception to the rule against the use of propensity evidence as set forth in People v. Molineux 168 N.Y. 264 (1901); specifically to show the defendant's motive, intent and absence of accident or mistake. The People want to introduce testimony by one Kim Haynes–Wilkinson that the defendant molested her in 1983 when he placed his hands on her vagina and forced her to touch his penis. In response to the People's motion, the defendant moves to exclude Ms. Haynes–Wilkinson testimony as a matter of law because it is not relevant. Alternatively, the defendant moves to preclude the testimony because its prejudicial impact outweighs any potential probative value. The court agrees with the defendant and finds that the proposed testimony is not relevant as a matter of law.
BACKGROUND
The charges in this case stem from the allegation that the defendant rubbed his hand on a 9–year–old girl's vagina. The girl, Ebonasia Hazelton (born on 11/28/00) told her mother of the incident. Miss Hazelton alleges that on April 18, 2010, while playing with Allen Haynes, whom she refers to as her grandfather, she fell on the floor and he placed his hand inside her underwear, touching her vagina. Mr. Haynes was arrested on April 20, 2010. After his arraignment, Mr. Haynes was released on his own recognizance.
DISCUSSION
Evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is not admissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime. However, in People v. Molineux (supra), the Court of Appeals created five exceptions where such evidence of prior bad acts may be used if being offered to establish: (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) common scheme or plan; or (5) identity. See People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901). In this case, the People contend that testimony from the witness about the defendant's alleged prior sexual misconduct against Ms. Haynes–Wilkinson in 1983 is relevant to prove intent, absence of mistake, and identity.
The People's theory suggests that in order to prove the defendant's intent when touching Miss Hazelton, it must be shown that the actions were not accidental. Such conduct must not be open to interpretation and therefore must be unambiguous. The People contend that to overcome the inference of innocent conduct, the testimony by Kim Haynes–Wilkinson regarding her alleged abuse by Mr. Haynes is necessary. Similarly, the People argue that her testimony would prove any absence of mistake by the defendant in his conduct with Miss Hazelton, because if such actions were committed by him before it disproves the possibility of mistake in the instant case.
The defendant counters by arguing that the question of intent or lack of mistake is not at issue in the case at trial. The court agrees with the defendant and notes that neither of these defenses have been raised by him at any time. In People v. Clarke, 90 AD3d 777 (2011), the court found that “there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would infer that the defendant's acts of sexual abuse lacked intent such that it was necessary to prove an absence of mistake. Moreover, the defendant did not contest the element of intent or offer mistake as a defense,” ( Id. at 778). In that case, the trial court permitted the complaining victim to testify about an alleged prior uncharged incident of sexual abuse by the defendant. The court instructed the jury to only consider the evidence to determine whether there was a lack of mistake in the crimes charged. However, on appeal the court found that this was error and a new trial was ordered.
In the case before this court, Mr. Haynes has only stated that he cannot remember if the actions occurred; he has not argued that the touching was accidental, which would call his intent into question. Furthermore, intent may be inferred from the nature of the crime. Thus, the prejudicial weight of the evidence outweighs its probative value and accordningly, testimony of the uncharged crime should be precluded. ( C.f., People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233 (1987), where evidence of 15 prior transactions to produce false DMV documents was properly admitted because it was necessary to establish the defendant's intent for the particular transaction charged and the issuance of a false document lacked mistake.)
The People argue that a second reason for the necessity of the testimony is to show the defendant's identity. This argument is without merit. The identity of the defendant has never been in question. The People site People v. Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241 (1982) in support of their argument that Ms. Haynes–Wilkinson testimony establishes the identity of the defendant. However, in Beam, the identity of the defendant was not known to the victim—the victim was only able to provide a limited description of his attack by a stranger. The Beam court permitted witnesses to testify to establish a pattern of identity. In the instant case, Mr. Haynes is known to Miss Hazelton as the husband of her grandmother and even refers to him as her grandfather. Whether Mr. Haynes abused Ms. Haynes–Wilkinson in 1983 has absolutely no bearing on his identity. A person known to one victim does not establish his identity when he is previously known to a second alleged victim.
CONCLUSION
The testimony that the People wish to produce in their case-in-chief is not admissible as it does not fall into any Molineux exception. This court finds that this testimony would be irrelevant to the case at bar. In light of this ruling, the court need not consider the probative value versus prejudicial effect of the testimony. Similarly, the issue as to the remoteness in time of the evidence is moot. No Ventimiglia hearing is necessary to establish what testimony will be elicited.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to preclude the testimony of Ms. Haynes–Wilkinson is granted.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.