People v. Moritz (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 498, 504; People v. Spaulding (1988), 172 Ill. App.3d 484, 485. • 3 We begin our analysis by noting that the crime of reckless conduct is a broad, all-inclusive offense ( Carrigan v. Board of Fire Police Commissioners (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 303, 309; People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 825) that "is aimed primarily at the reckless homicide type of conduct where no homicide results" (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 12-5(a), Committee Comments, at 573 (Smith-Hurd 1979)). However, the committee comments to section 12-5(a) do not limit the scope of the statute to such conduct.

• 3 With regard to the nature and elements of the offense (subparagraph (3)), an indictment is sufficient if it is framed on the wording of the statute. ( People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 394 N.E.2d 80.) If the statute is not descriptive of the acts which constitute the offense, or if the statute is general in nature, more particulars must be added. ( People v. Ford (1971), 1 Ill. App.3d 780, 276 N.E.2d 820.) "The determination of whether these standards have been met is accomplished by reference to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the charging instrument as read and interpreted by a reasonable person." People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 824, 394 N.E.2d 80, 82.

Defendant here was charged by means of a verified uniform traffic ticket complaint which: (1) named the offense as "Leaving scene of accident — Personal Injury"; (2) cited section 11-401(a) of the Vehicle Code; (3) stated the time, date, and place of the offense; and (4) named defendant as the offender. Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the ticket to particularize the nature of the injury impaired his ability to mount an effective defense, since the existence of a personal injury is an essential element of the charged offense, citing People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158, and People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 394 N.E.2d 80. In Griffin, the supreme court held that a charge of reckless driving required considerable particularity, since the offense was sufficiently general as to support other actions as well, and that the lack of specificity could lead to double jeopardy problems.

This court invalidated the information because it gave no indication as to what acts and omissions led to the legal conclusions set forth. See also People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 823 (invalidated complaint which alleged that defendant "performed recklessly certain acts which caused bodily harm to or endangered the bodily safety of [another]"). In addition, some crimes have been held to be so fact-specific that certain elements of the offense must be set forth in exact detail.

( Griffin, 36 Ill.2d at 434-35.) In People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 824, the court held: "[A] charging document which adopts the language of the statute is sufficient if the words of the statute particularize the offense so that an accused is apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he is charged.

To determine whether these standards have been met, reference must be made to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the charging instrument as read and interpreted by a reasonable person. People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 824, 394 N.E.2d 80. • 2 Defendant argues that by failing to include a description of the criminal act, the complaint and information here failed to particularize the criminal conduct involved.

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12-5. In People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 825, 394 N.E.2d 80, the court determined that the reckless-conduct statute was not sufficient alone in a charging instrument and that greater specificity of the alleged conduct was required. The instrument in Hayes mirrored the language of the statute in describing the offense allegedly committed.

In the same vein, other courts have held that an information charging reckless driving must allege facts from which the defendant can determine the act with which he is charged. ( People v. Green (1938), 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, overruled on other grounds in People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158.) Also, unless a defendant is advised of the particular acts relied upon to allege a charge of reckless driving, he is not advised of the nature and elements of the offense. ( People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158.) So too, in People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 394 N.E.2d 80, the court found that a complaint charging reckless conduct in the language of the statute was not sufficient. The court held that the reckless conduct statute was so general that the charging instrument must provide more specific details of the alleged criminal conduct than those contained in the statute itself. Here, the charge was stated in the bare language of the statute and did not specify the conduct which was performed in an unreasonable manner.

People v. Boyle (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 791, 797, 396 N.E.2d 1347; People v. Clark (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 496, 499, 371 N.E.2d 33; People v. Jones (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 575, 577, 277 N.E.2d 144; People v. Mowen (1969), 109 Ill. App.2d 62, 68-69, 248 N.E.2d 685. • 3 The defendant's citation to People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 394 N.E.2d 80, and People v. Griffin (1967), 36 Ill.2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158, is unpersuasive in that Hayes was a reckless conduct case and Griffin was a reckless driving case. The Illinois courts have repeatedly distinguished simple recklessness cases from reckless homicide cases in terms of the necessity for particularized indictments.

Where, as here, the statute allegedly violated is framed in generic language, defendant continues, a complaint merely reciting the statutory definition will fail if its language does not apprise the defendant of the precise offense with which he is charged. In support of his position, defendant urges that we consider People v. Hayes (1979), 75 Ill. App.3d 822, 394 N.E.2d 80 (complaint framed in language of reckless-conduct statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12-5) held insufficient), and People v. Lyda (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 906, 327 N.E.2d 494 (indictment framed in words of obstructing-justice statute (Ill.