People v. Hayes

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Carmen

    36 Cal.2d 768 (Cal. 1951)   Cited 320 times
    Finding defendant was entitled to involuntary manslaughter instruction because there was some evidence that suggested defendant shot only to frighten victim but stumbled, and noting whether acts amounted to negligence or malice was a question for the jury

    [6] It has been repeatedly held that it is reversible error to refuse a manslaughter instruction in a case where murder is charged, and the evidence would warrant a conviction of manslaughter. ( People v. Wilson, 29 Cal.App. 563 [ 156 P. 377]; People v. Hayes, 9 Cal.App. 301 [ 99 P. 386]; People v. Sidelinger, 9 Cal.App. 298 [ 99 P. 390]; People v. Darrow, 212 Cal. 167 [ 298 P. 1]; People v. Wallace, 2 Cal.App.2d 238 [ 37 P.2d 1053]; People v. Best, 13 Cal.App.2d 606 [ 57 P.2d 168].) It is said in People v. Hayes, 9 Cal.App. 301, 305 [ 99 P. 386], quoting from Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 [16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980]: "In the Stevenson case the judgment was reversed solely for the reason that the trial court refused to submit to the jury the issue of manslaughter.

  2. People v. Mitchell

    14 Cal.2d 237 (Cal. 1939)   Cited 17 times
    In Mitchell, the court had found the defendant's testimony did not support a heat-of-passion theory but possibly supported self-defense.

    In the case of People v. Wilson, 29 Cal.App. 563 [ 156 P. 377], the facts were not nearly so strong in the defendant's favor as were those in the instant case with respect to the defense of this defendant, and yet it was ruled not only that the defendant was entitled to have given to the jury an instruction by which the crime of manslaughter would be defined, but also that the failure of the trial court to give such an instruction to the jury constituted prejudicial error; — and solely for those reasons the judgment was reversed. In the case of People v. Hayes, 9 Cal.App. 301, 305 [ 99 P. 386], the court said: "The case of Stevenson v. UnitedStates, 162 U.S. 313 [16 Sup. Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980], is a case in its essential particulars similar to the case at bar. In the Stevenson case the judgment was reversed solely for the reason that the trial court refused to submit to the jury the issue of manslaughter.

  3. People v. Modesto

    59 Cal.2d 722 (Cal. 1963)   Cited 174 times
    In Modesto,supra, and again in Sedeno, we concluded that the right at issue was "the constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence" (Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33; Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913), but neither those decisions, nor any other of our authorities before or since, specified that we were relying to any degree on federal constitutional principles.

    Inasmuch as the majority rely so heavily on selected language from Carmen it seems appropriate to point out also that of the seven decisions purportedly relied on for such language as the majority in the case at bench appear to emphasize in Carmen, two ( People v. Hayes (1908) 9 Cal.App. 301 [ 99 P. 386]; and People v. Sidelinger (1908) 9 Cal.App. 298 [ 99 P. 390]) were decided prior to the adoption in 1911 of article VI, section 4 1/2, of our Constitution; and in none of the remaining five ( People v. Darrow (1931) 212 Cal. 167 [ 298 P. 1]; People v. Best (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 606 [ 57 P.2d 168]; People v. Wallace (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 238 [ 37 P.2d 1053]; People v. Wilson (1916) 29 Cal.App. 563 [ 156 P. 377]; People v. Carroll (1912) 20 Cal.App. 41 [ 128 P. 4]) was there any discussion of the effect of that constitutional provision on the point in issue. Moreover, the decisions are plainly distinguishable from the case at bench on the ground (see pp. 786-787 of 36 Cal.2d) that where the jury are properlyinstructed on both degrees of murder and choose to convict the defendant of second degree murder only, a failure to instruct on evidence of manslaughter is prejudicial error because itappears from the evidence, the instructions, and the verdict that the defendant might reas

  4. People v. Bolden

    71 Cal.App.4th 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 3 times
    Noting the general rule that a person engaged in mutual combat may not claim self-defense

    There must be some evidence of initial aggression on the part of the victim, as well as evidence the defendant was armed or armed himor herself during the altercation. (See, e.g., People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 771-772; Welch, supra, at pp. 837-838, 840; People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at pp. 380-381, 382; People v. Landrum (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 372, 374 [67 Cal.Rptr. 911]; People v. Alfreds (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 666, 668-669 [59 Cal.Rptr. 647]; People v. Bross (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 157, 163 [49 Cal.Rptr. 402]; People v. Hayes (1908) 9 Cal.App. 301, 303-304 [99 P. 386].) One may act in self-defense when it reasonably appears there is imminent danger that one's assailant intends to commit a felony upon one's person.

  5. People v. Eppers

    205 Cal.App.2d 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 15 times

    (See People v. Driscoll, 53 Cal.App.2d 590, 595 [ 128 P.2d 382]; People v. Miller, 67 Cal.App. 674, 679-680 [ 228 P. 68].) The cited cases are: People v. Carnine, 41 Cal.2d 384, 390 [ 260 P.2d 16]; People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768, 772 [ 228 P.2d 281]; People v. Darrow, 212 Cal. 167, 183 [ 298 P. 1]; People v. Wong Hing, 176 Cal. 699, 705 [ 169 P. 357]; People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 233-234 [3 P. 818]; People v. Burns, 88 Cal.App.2d 867, 871 [ 200 P.2d 134]; People v. Perkins, 75 Cal.App.2d 875, 881 [ 171 P.2d 919]; People v. Wallace, 2 Cal.App.2d 238, 242-243 [ 37 P.2d 1053]; People v. Peete, 54 Cal.App. 333, 356-359 [ 202 P. 51]; People v. Wilson, 29 Cal.App. 563 [ 156 P. 377]; People v. Carroll, 20 Cal.App. 41, 45 [ 128 P. 4]; People v. Hayes, 9 Cal.App. 301, 305 [ 99 P. 386]; People v. Quimby, 6 Cal.App. 482, 486 [ 92 P. 493]; People v. Williamson, 6 Cal.App. 336, 339 [ 92 P. 313]; People v. Stofer, 3 Cal.App. 416, 418 [ 86 P. 734]. [4] An appellate court will not weigh the truth or falsity of evidence to determine whether an instruction based thereon should be given.

  6. The People v. McCoy

    79 Cal.App.4th 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    The trial court refused to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction apparently reasoning that under no view of the evidence could the jury find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal, in the companion case of People v. Hayes (1908) 9 Cal.App. 301, 99 P. 386, found it was error for the trial court to refuse the manslaughter instruction. In Sidelinger the Court of Appeal found the failure to give the manslaughter instruction was prejudicial as to Sidelinger stating, "If, in fact, Hayes actually killed Jenks, and in so doing only committed the crime of manslaughter, his aiders and abettors were only guilty of manslaughter.

  7. People v. Pia

    14 Cal.App. 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910)

    In Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, [16 Am. Rep. 48, 7 So. 38], the syllabus (which correctly states the point decided) is as follows: "In a prosecution for rape declarations made by the accused three months before the commission of the crime, tending to show his desire to have carnal knowledge of the prosecutrix, as well as his belief that she would not yield to his wishes, are relevant, as affording to the jury a basis for inferring that he had gratified his passion in the manner charged in the indictment." (See, also, Ricks v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 229, [ 87 S.W. 345]; 4 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 3103; People v. Hayes, 9 Cal.App. 301, [99 P. 389]; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, [36 Am. Rep. 89]; Kerr on Homicide, 462.) The fact that the declarations were made by the defendant a month before the commission of the offense was a matter which went to the probative force of the testimony but not to its admissibility.