Then, before the retrial began, the trial court denied the State's motion in limine to admit evidence relating, in pertinent part, to petitioner's knowledge of the bribe to Judge Maloney. The State filed an interlocutory appeal from the court's decision. People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992 (2001). We found the trial court did not err in denying the bribery evidence because there was no testimony linking petitioner to the bribery activity.
Evidence of "other crimes" is inadmissible to show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime. People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill.App.3d 992, 997, 260 Ill.Dec. 780, 762 N.E.2d 46 (2001). Such evidence is prejudicial because a jury might convict the defendant because it believes that the defendant is a bad person and deserves punishment.
This court affirmed the decision. People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992 (2001). On remand, again before retrial, the prosecution moved to present new evidence closely related to the evidence suppressed by the order that led to the previous appeal. The trial court suppressed the new evidence also and the prosecution now takes another interlocutory appeal. Fields cross-appeals from the denial of his motion to dismiss the charges for violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). I am quoting from the Federal Rules of Evidence and they of course do not govern trials in state courts, but the formulation is standard and Illinois law (though common law rather than codified) is essentially the same. See People v. Rice, supra, 209 Ill.Dec. 635, 651 N.E.2d at 1085 ("it is well settled that the testimony of a witness at a prior hearing is admissible in evidence at trial where the witness is unavailable and when ample opportunity to cross-examine existed at the prior hearing"); People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill.App.3d 992, 260 Ill.Dec. 780, 762 N.E.2d 46, 55 (2001); People v. Taylor, 287 Ill.App.3d 800, 223 Ill.Dec. 138, 679 N.E.2d 82, 86-87 (1997). There is no requirement of corroboration.
After losing an interlocutory appeal in the Illinois Appellate Court involving an evidentiary issue related to Hawkins's codefendant, but winning the issues that affected Hawkins, prosecutors reached a plea agreement with Hawkins in exchange for his testimony against his codefendant. See People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992, 762 N.E.2d 46 (2001). Hawkins pled guilty in exchange for a sentence that gave him the possibility of parole when he turns seventy-two.
Aleman, 313 Ill. App.3d at 65, 729 N.E.2d at 33. Under Illinois law, evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate a defendant's consciousness of guilt. People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App.3d 992, 997, 762 N.E.2d 46, 50 (1st Dist. 2002). As a matter of state law, the Illinois appellate court held the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting evidence of other crimes. Aleman, 313 Ill. App.3d at 65, 729 N.E.2d at 65.
Under Rice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to bar Caudell's testimony. See also People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1003 (2001) (holding that prior testimony of deceased witness should have been admitted where the "motive and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial proceeding are exactly the same as they are today, i.e., the guilt or innocence of [the accused]"); People v. Taylor, 287 Ill. App. 3d 800, 810 (1997) (holding that posttrial motion testimony of unavailable witness was properly admitted at defendant's retrial where "[t]he testimony was given at a proceeding that afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine [the unavailable witness] on the issue of guilt or innocence"). Defendant argues, nonetheless, that Caudell's testimony should not have been admitted because prior defense counsel failed to engage in any meaningful cross-examination.
ΒΆ 154 Case law prior to Torres appears to be relatively consistent on the proposition that, where a full trial is held and a new one is to begin, ultimately the motive and focus of both concern the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill.App.3d 992, 1003 (2001); see also People v. Taylor, 287 Ill.App.3d 800, 809 (1997) (motive and focus of testimony of an unavailable third party, who confessed to crime in a posttrial motion following trial and conviction, would be the same as what would have been derived at retrial). But defendant does not challenge this proposition.
See People v. Gambony, 402 Ill. 74, 80 (1948) (defendant's efforts to"negotiate a settlement through bribery" were properly admitted to show consciousness of guilt); People v. Gwinn, 366 Ill. App. 3d 501, 516-17 (2006) (evidence of defendant's efforts to bribe a witness was properly admitted to show defendant's intent and consciousness of guilt); People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998 (2001) (evidence that defendant participated in a scheme to bribe the trier of fact was admissible to show consciousness of guilt). Though this evidence prejudiced defendant, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value, as the trial's outcome hinged on whether the jury believed Viel's or defendant's account of the events in question.
First, although defendant attempts to minimize the evidence of motive, both Walls and Bates testified that defendant and Carter argued throughout the evening. See People v. Hawkins, 326 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1000 (2001) (although State has no obligation to prove motive, it may introduce evidence that tends to show that an accused had a motive for killing the deceased). While their testimony varied in some particulars, both testified that defendant and Carter exchanged insults and accusations throughout the evening.