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People v. Hawkins

212 Ill. App. 3d 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
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People v. Hawkins

13 Citing cases

  1. People v. Staten

    159 Ill. 2d 419 (Ill. 1994)   Cited 87 times
    In Staten, this court rejected the notion that the additional conditions imposed by the legislature in section 3-8-10 are "meaningless" or mere technicalities, finding that the information required was properly mandated "for the administrative convenience of the State" and that the legislature intended to place the burden of compliance on the demanding defendant who, as noted, is already incarcerated and thus suffers no additional loss of liberty.

    An attorney's failure to seek discharge of his client on speedy-trial grounds generally will be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been discharged had a timely motion for discharge been made and no justification has been proffered for the attorney's failure to bring such a motion. People v. Morris (1954), 3 Ill.2d 437; People v. Alcazar (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 344; People v. Hawkins (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 973. Defendant relies on Alcazar and Hawkins in support of the contention that his counsel's failure to assert his right to speedy trial deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel.

  2. People v. Stanley

    266 Ill. App. 3d 307 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 17 times
    Finding that appellate counsel's failure to raise speedy trial violation amounted to deficient performance

    Counsel's failure to move for a speedy trial discharge of new and additional charges may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Alcazar (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 344, 527 N.E.2d 325; People v. Hawkins (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 973, 571 N.E.2d 1049. In this case, defendant was originally charged with one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony.

  3. People v. Williams

    204 Ill. 2d 191 (Ill. 2003)   Cited 137 times
    Explaining that both obiter dicta and judicial dicta are unnecessary comments but differentiating judicial dicta because it involves a question that was briefed and argued by the parties, while obiter dicta does not

    Until 1998, the appellate court uniformly followed the rule announced in Williams. See People v. Stanley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 307, 311 (1994); People v. Hinkle, 234 Ill. App. 3d 663, 666 (1992); People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 981 (1991); People v. Howard, 205 Ill. App. 3d 702, 710 (1990); see also People v. Parker, 59 Ill. App. 3d 302, 304-05 (1978); People v. King, 8 Ill. App. 3d 2, 5 (1972); People v. Williams, 2 Ill. App. 3d 993, 994-95 (1971); People v. Alcazar, 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354 (1988). People v. Gooden, 296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (1998), aff'd in part rev'd in part, 189 Ill. 2d 209 (2000), changed that.

  4. People v. Quigley

    183 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 1998)   Cited 87 times
    Holding that mandatory joinder is not applicable in cases of mistrial

    If the charges are required to be brought in a single prosecution, the speedy-trial period begins to run when the speedy-trial demand is filed, even if the State brings some of the charges at a later date. "Where new and additional charges arise from the same facts as did the original charges and the State had knowledge of these facts at the commencement of the prosecution, the time within which trial is to begin on the new and additional charges is subject to the same statutory limitation that is applied to the original charges." People v. Williams, 94 Ill. App.3d 241, 248-49 (1981); see also People v. Stanley, 266 Ill. App.3d 307, 309-11 (1994); People v. Hinkle, 234 Ill. App.3d 663, 666-68 (1992); People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App.3d 973, 979-81 (1991); People v. Howard, 205 Ill. App.3d 702, 710 (1990); People v. Wilkey, 202 Ill. App.3d 756, 758 (1990); People v. Crowe, 195 Ill. App.3d 212, 214-16 (1990); People v. Alcazar, 173 Ill. App.3d 344, 354 (1988); People v. Rodgers, 106 Ill. App.3d 741, 744 (1982); People v. King, 8 Ill. App.3d 2, 4-6 (1972). The State argues that the misdemeanor and aggravated DUI charges were not subject to the same speedy-trial limitation.

  5. People v. Kerwin

    159 Ill. 2d 436 (Ill. 1994)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Kerwin (1994), 159 Ill.2d 436, 445, 639 N.E.2d 539, our supreme court found defense counsel's performance "questionable.

    In People v. Alcazar (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 344, defendant's conviction was reversed upon a finding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make a speedy-trial challenge to the late-filed charge. (Accord People v. Hawkins (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 973.) Based on these authorities, defense counsel should have objected to the State's filing of the two additional felony charges on the day of trial; the trial court likely would have dismissed those charges as violative of defendant's right to speedy trial under section 103-5(a). Kae Ecklebarger, a social worker with the El Paso department of social services, testified in the State's case in chief.

  6. People v. Rogers

    2020 Ill. App. 3d 180088 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    We can discern no strategic reason to justify counsel's decision not to move to dismiss the charges because counsel previously filed a speedy trial demand and objected to several of the State's continuances, protecting this right. See People v. Dalton , 2017 IL App (3d) 150213, ΒΆ 28, 414 Ill.Dec. 248, 79 N.E.3d 883 ; People v. Hawkins , 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 983-84, 157 Ill.Dec. 30, 571 N.E.2d 1049 (1991) ; People v. Alcazar , 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354-55, 122 Ill.Dec. 827, 527 N.E.2d 325 (1988). Moreover, defense counsel could not have obtained a greater result for defendant by continuing with the proceeding, as the remedy for the speedy trial violation was dismissal of the charges.

  7. People v. Dalton

    2017 Ill. App. 3d 150213 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 16 times

    There is no strategic reason for trial counsel to fail to move to dismiss a charge that violates defendant's right to a speedy trial. See People v. Hawkins , 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 983, 157 Ill.Dec. 30, 571 N.E.2d 1049 (1991) ; People v. Alcazar , 173 Ill. App. 3d 344, 354, 122 Ill.Dec. 827, 527 N.E.2d 325 (1988). Appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on appeal is objectively unreasonable and therefore constitutes deficient performance.

  8. People v. Amirante

    2016 Ill. App. 150129 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    The Speedy Trial Act is to be construed liberally so as to give effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and each case is to be decided on its own facts. People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 980 (1991). ΒΆ 60 Here, the circuit court's analysis on remand involved the period from December 15, 2009, when defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, to June 23, 2011 when Judge Kyriakopoulos denied defendant's amended motion to reconsider its denial of the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The circuit court found the delays on three court dates during that period (December 28, 2010, February 3, 2011, and March 16, 2011) were not attributable to defendant.

  9. The Village of Mundelein v. Bogachev

    952 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 6 times

    If this is so-which we may presume to the extent that it supports the judgment on appeal-then we cannot agree that a continuance granted on the court's motion represents delay attributable to defendant. See also People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App. 3d 973, 983-84 (1991) (holding that delays caused by trial court's inability to bring the defendant to trial due to its crowded calendar were not attributable to the defendant). Here, the record reveals that the continuances of April 3, 2009, and April 24, 2009, were based on matters outside defendant's control or responsibility, such as the court's busy schedule.

  10. People v. Gooden

    296 Ill. App. 3d 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 10 times
    In Gooden, when we said "any delay occasioned by such a late filing would not be attributable to the defendant," we meant just that. If the initial and subsequent charges filed against the defendant are subject to compulsory joinder, delays attributable to the defendant on the initial charges are not attributable to the defendant on the subsequent charges.

    The speedy-trial statute was adopted to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration. People v. Hawkins, 212 Ill. App.3d 973, 980, 571 N.E.2d 1049, 1054 (1991). Defendant was tried within eight months of his arrest.