Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 08WF0198 Lance Jensen, Judge.
Susan K. Keiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
We appointed counsel to represent Coleman Leon Hart on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court no issues were found to argue on his behalf. Hart was given 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf. That period has passed, and we have received no communication from him.
Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), to assist the court in conducting its independent review, counsel provided the court with information as to issues that might arguably support an appeal. Counsel provided information on three issues: (1) the adequacy of the factual basis for the plea; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the trial court’s denial of Hart’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
We have reviewed the information provided by counsel and have independently examined the record. We found no arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
An information charged Hart with two counts of robbery in violation of Penal Code sections 211 and 212.5, subdivision (c), two counts of false imprisonment by violence, in violation of sections 236 and 237, subdivision (a), and one count of street terrorism in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a). The information alleged that the robbery and false imprisonment offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), that in the commission of the two robbery offenses, Hart was a gang member who vicariously used a firearm in violation of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1), and that in the commission of the two false imprisonment offenses, Hart personally used a firearm in violation of section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Hart pled guilty to the two robbery counts and admitted the gang and the armed allegations as to one robbery only. As part of the negotiated plea, the trial court dismissed the remaining counts and the use allegation after Hart entered his guilty plea and his admissions. The court sentenced Hart to a term of 13 years in prison consistent with the plea negotiation.
Hart filed a notice of appeal and requested a certificate of probable cause. A couple months later, Hart filed a motion to withdraw his plea, and the prosecutor opposed the motion. The trial court denied Hart’s request for a certificate of probable cause, and his motion to withdraw his plea.
DISCUSSION
We address each of the claims identified by counsel pursuant to Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, anon.
Was the factual basis for the plea adequate?
To establish the requisite factual basis for a plea, nothing more than a prima facie factual basis is required. (People v. Calderon (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 930, 935.) The factual basis Hart initialed in his written guilty plea form, and confirmed verbally in open court, meets all the legal requirements for an adequate factual basis.
Did Hart receive ineffective assistance of counsel?
Appellate counsel suggests Hart may have received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to file a detailed request for a certificate of probable cause, and failed to assist Hart in moving to withdraw his plea, or alternatively seeking relief so that successor counsel could be appointed to assist Hart.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must establish his attorney’s representation fell below professional standards of reasonableness and must affirmatively establish prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 623-624.) If the defendant’s showing is insufficient as to one component of this claim, we need not address the other. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.)
To obtain a certificate of probable cause, a defendant must file with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings. (§ 1237.5, subd. (a).) No such filing appears in the record. We have reviewed the record to identify reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds that would justify the issuance of a certificate of probable cause and have found none. We suspect trial counsel was no more successful in identifying grounds for a certificate of probable cause, and this likely explains why a detailed request was not prepared on Hart’s behalf. But even if trial counsel negligently failed to file a detailed request, we conclude Hart was not prejudiced.
There is nothing in the record to suggest trial counsel failed to assist Hart in moving to withdraw his plea. The record reflects on May 8, 2009, retained counsel James M. Hodges filed on Hart’s behalf a motion to vacate Hart’s previously entered guilty plea. The record is silent as to how Hodges came to represent Hart, but clearly Hart was not without the assistance of counsel as he sought to withdraw his plea. There is no basis to suggest there was a need for appointed counsel. Accordingly, we find no basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Did the court err when it denied Hart’s request for a certificate of probable cause?
We review the trial court’s denial of a certificate of probable cause for an abuse of discretion. (Lara v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 436, 440.) As we have previously noted, we discern no reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds justifying the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. Hart’s request for a certificate of probable cause was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J.IKOLA, J.