Opinion
H037365
12-05-2012
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DENNIS LAMAR HARROUN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F19343)
Defendant Dennis Lamar Harroun was arrested in June 2010 after police executed a search warrant at his Santa Cruz hotel room and discovered various controlled substances, indicia of drug sales, and a loaded handgun. After a magistrate denied defendant's motion to suppress seized evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, and after the court denied his renewed motion to suppress, the court convicted him after a slow plea (see Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 (Bunnell))of four felonies, i.e., possession for sale of methamphetamine, possession of hydrocodone, possession of psilocybin, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The court also found the allegation true that, in connection with the possession-for-sale offense, defendant was personally armed with a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate five-year prison term.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
"A slow plea is defined as a submission of the guilt phase to the court on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts that is tantamount to a plea of guilty because guilt is apparent on the face of the transcripts and conviction is a foregone conclusion if no defense is offered. [Citation.]" (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 28, disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
Defendant challenges the conviction, contending that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He contends that (1) the search warrant was defective because it was based upon an affidavit that failed to present facts showing probable cause, and, (2) because the police did not act with objective reasonable reliance on the invalid search warrant, the United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 (Leon) good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. We conclude that, assuming the invalidity of the search warrant, the officers' reliance on its validity was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule applied and the motion to suppress was properly denied. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to the challenged search and seizure are taken from the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. "Since the trial court resolved this matter in favor of the prosecution, for purposes of this proceeding we view the record in the light most favorable to the People's position." (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 780.)
I. The Search Warrant
The factual background is taken from the 36-page affidavit of Santa Cruz Police Officer William Azua, dated June 9, 2010, submitted to the magistrate.
Officer Azua indicated in his affidavit that he was seeking judicial authority to search four rooms of the El View Hotel (El View) located on 3rd Street in Santa Cruz. He stated his qualifications, inter alia, as having been a Santa Cruz police officer since 1995; attended classes and formal training in the field of controlled substance recognition and enforcement; and "participated in no fewer than 1000 controlled substance cases, narcotics investigations and arrests while working in the Beach Flats and the lower Ocean Street area of Santa Cruz." Officer Azua declared that within two days of the execution of the affidavit, he had been "contacted by a Tested Confidential Informant" (TCI), who provided the officer with various information concerning illegal drug activity at four separate rooms of the El View.
"The TCI [said] that in room #110 a subject . . . named Curtis Allison was staying there with a female only known by the last name of Molena. The TCI described Molena as being a white female adult 5' 4["] and having blond hair. The TCI said that Curtis Allison was on active parole. The TCI said that he/she had seen methamphetamines packaged for sales inside the room." Officer Azua made contact with Parole Agent Russell, who confirmed that Allison was on parole, was subject to an active search clause, and was staying at the El View in room 109 (not in room 110).
The TCI also advised Officer Azua that he/she had observed $30 packages of heroin for sale in room 105 of the El View. The TCI said that the room's occupant, a white female adult named "Kat," possessed methamphetamine and heroin and had a live-in boyfriend, "Gasper," who might have had some affiliation with the Hell's Angels. Officer Azua confirmed through Santa Cruz Police Sergeant Michael Medina that Gasper—whose true name was Corey Chrysler and who had been contacted by the Hell's Angels but whose affiliation with the organization was unknown—was staying with Kat at the El View. Officer Azua also confirmed with the Department of Motor Vehicles that Chrysler had listed the El View as his address.
Officer Azua was told by the TCI that a white male, approximately 30 years old, six feet one inches tall with blond hair, and having the street name "Dirty Dave," lived in room 109 of the El View. Dirty Dave possessed crystal methamphetamine for sale. The TCI had observed Dirty Dave dividing crystal methamphetamine into $20-apiece baggies and wrapping them individually in tin foil.
Further, the TCI told Officer Azua that "in room #103 there was a [B]lack male adult who had green eyes [who] possibly went by the name of 'Damien'. . . . 'Damien' was in possession of crack cocaine for sales. The TCI said that he/she had seen 'Damien' in possession of thirty to forty dollar bags of crack cocaine for sales."
In his affidavit, Officer Azua stated that the TCI had "worked with [him] for approximately seven months and ha[d] provided [him] with reliable information that resulted in arrest[s] and convictions of individuals who[] possessed and sold controlled substances. The TCI is familiar with the packaging for sales and usage of controlled substances. . . [and had] also used controlled substances in the past. [¶] The TCI does have a criminal history in the Santa Cruz County Courts and is on active probation. The TCI does not have any cases pending in the Santa Cruz County Courts. . . . The TCI is providing [him] this information for the betterment of the community."
Officer Azua indicated in his affidavit that he had "arrested several people for possession of controlled substance[s] and sales of . . . controlled substance[s] in the past at the El View Hotel. The El View Hotel is considered high in gang and narcotic[s] activity." He also indicated that approximately a week before execution of the affidavit, he and several other officers had gone to the El View attempting to locate "a wanted female. . . . Upon knocking on the door[,] the wanted female jumped from the two-story window and fled barefooted down a hill. The female was arrested and booked. . . ."
Based upon the information obtained from the TCI and from Allison's parole agent, and based upon the officer's corroboration of certain facts, Officer Azua opined in his affidavit that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant for the four identified rooms of the El View. The affidavit in support of the search warrant, in addition to being signed by Officer Azua, bore the signature of an assistant district attorney. Above the latter's signature appeared the following: "Prepared with the assistance of or reviewed by[.]"
The search warrant, based upon Officer Azua's June 9, 2010 affidavit, was issued by the magistrate on the same date. The search pursuant to the warrant was executed at approximately 7:00 a.m. on June 11, 2010, by Santa Cruz police officers, including Officer Azua. As a result of the search of room 110 at the El View, the officers discovered approximately 111.8 grams of crystal methamphetamine (contained in three separate bags of more than one ounce apiece, as well as in 12 other bags containing smaller quantities); approximately 10.6 grams of psilocybin mushrooms; approximately 30 hydrocodone pills packaged in a heat-sealed plastic bag; 1.2 grams of marijuana; a notebook containing entries that appeared to reflect a pay/owe sheet used for drug sales; police scanners that were operational and tuned to police frequency; laptop computers; a digital scale containing crystal methamphetamine residue; three methamphetamine pipes; syringes; a large amount of cash; and a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Some of the items, including the packaged methamphetamine, the scale, the revolver, and a portion ($518) of the cash, were located in a safe in the room. Defendant was the only person found inside of room 110.
II. First Motion to Suppress
After being charged with four felonies in a complaint filed in June 2010, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. He argued that Officer Azua's affidavit on which the search warrant was based did not provide probable cause for the warrant's issuance. Defendant asserted that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable because it was not objectively reasonable for the police officers to have relied on the validity of the warrant which was so lacking in a foundation of probable cause. In support of his position, defendant argued that the affidavit was deficient in that (1) Officer Azua did not indicate when the TCI had observed Allison's packaging of methamphetamine in room 110 of the El View; (2) the TCI's information was contradicted by Allison's parole agent, who advised Officer Azua that Allison resided in room 109 (not room 110) of the hotel; (3) Officer Azua failed to establish the reliability of the TCI, who was a person with a criminal record and was on active probation, and whose credibility was undermined by contradictory information from Allison's parole agent; and (4) the information obtained from the TCI was not corroborated by Officer Azua.
The People opposed the suppression motion. They argued that there was probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant because the information supplied by the TCI—who was a tested and reliable informant—was detailed and based on firsthand knowledge. The People asserted that these facts, coupled with Officer Azua's confirmation of some of the TCI's statements and the officer's experience that the El View was known to be a frequent location for drug trafficking, provided sufficient information to establish probable cause for the warrant's issuance. The People argued further that even if the warrant were invalid, the Leon exception applied because the officers acted with objectively reasonable reliance upon the validity of the warrant.
After hearing argument on the motion to suppress on August 23, 2010, the court denied the motion. It found that because of the absence in the affidavit of the dates upon which the TCI made his or her observations of drug activity at the El View, there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. But the court held that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and therefore the suppression of the seized evidence was unwarranted.
III. The Information
Defendant was charged by information filed in August 2010 with four felonies: possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1); possession of hydrocodone for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count 2); possession of psilocybin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 3); and possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 4). It was alleged further as to counts 1 and 2 that defendant had suffered a prior controlled substance conviction within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c), and that he was personally armed with a firearm (former § 12022, subd. (c)).
IV. Second Motion to Suppress
Defendant filed a second motion to suppress, identical to his first motion, which was opposed by the People. On December 9, 2010, the court denied the motion.
The same judge heard both motions to suppress.
V. Conviction and Sentencing
After disposition of defendant's second motion to suppress, on September 9, 2011, the information was amended to charge defendant with possession of hydrocodone (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) in count 2, and allegations concerning the prior controlled substance conviction and being personally armed with a firearm were dismissed as to count 2, only. Defendant agreed to a "slow plea," pursuant to Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, under which the case was submitted for court trial based solely upon the evidence presented from the preliminary hearing. The court found defendant guilty on all four counts and found true the special allegations alleged as to count 1. The court sentenced defendant on the count 1 conviction to the middle term of two years in prison, plus three years for the arming enhancement, for a total prison term of five years. It also imposed separate, two-year prison terms for counts 2 through 4, each to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for count 1. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The court also imposed a three-year prison term for the prior drug conviction enhancement (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and struck the punishment.
DISCUSSION
I. Contentions
Defendant challenges the conviction, contending that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He contends that the search warrant was defective because it was based upon an affidavit that failed to present facts showing probable cause. He argues further that because the police did not act with objective reasonable reliance on the invalid search warrant, the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was inapplicable.
II. Standard of Review
"An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] 'The [trial] court's resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.' [Citations.] [¶] The court's resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, . . . is also subject to independent review." (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; see also People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.) All presumptions favor the trial court's exercise of its power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences, " 'and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.' " (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, quoting People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160.) And where there is no controversy concerning the underlying facts, our task is simplified: The only issue is whether that rule of law, as applied to the undisputed historical facts, was or was not violated. This is an issue for our independent review. (See People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 818.)
III. Denial of Motion to Suppress
A. Leon Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule derives from Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897. In Leon, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment should be applied in all instances to preclude the prosecution from introducing evidence seized by police pursuant to a search warrant ultimately invalidated because of an absence of probable cause to support it. (Id. at p. 900.) The high court observed that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to chill future police transgressions; the rule is not designed to punish the actions of errant judges or magistrates. (Id. at p. 916.) It held that "the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." (Id. at p. 900; see also Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 142.) Thus, suppression of evidence acquired pursuant to a search warrant "should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule." (Leon, at p. 918, fn. omitted.) And as later stated by the high court, "evidence should be suppressed 'only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.' [Citations.]" (Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 348-349, quoting United States v. Peltier (1975) 422 U.S. 531, 542.)
The Supreme Court identified the four kinds of "unusual cases" (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918) in which the exclusionary rule should be applied for evidence seized by officers executing a search pursuant to an invalid warrant, i.e., instances in which the officers have not acted with objective reasonable reliance on the warrant. They are (1) "if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;" (2) "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role;" (3) where the officer relies "on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable';" or (4) where the "warrant [is] so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." (Id. at p. 923; see also People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 596 (Camarella).)
This third circumstance described in Leon is the one potentially applicable here. The California Supreme Court has described the standard as follows: "If a well-trained officer should reasonably have known that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause (and hence that the officer should not have sought a warrant), exclusion is required under the third situation described in Leon, . . ." (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596.) Thus, the fact that a reasonable officer might have concluded that additional investigation would be appropriate to augment the affidavit before submitting it to the magistrate would not preclude application of the Leon exception; it "is not whether further investigation would have been reasonable, but whether a reasonable officer . . . would have known that the affidavit, as it existed at the time it was presented to the magistrate, was legally insufficient without additional and more recent corroboration." (Camarella, at p. 606, fn. omitted.) If the "well-trained officer reasonably could have believed that the affidavit presented a close or debatable question on the issue of probable cause," the exclusionary rule need not be applied to suppress the seized evidence. (Ibid.; see also People v. Romero (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 440, 447 (Romero).)
The fact that a magistrate approved the defective warrant is not considered. (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 605.) Instead, the focus is on the officer's knowledge and conduct. (Id. at p. 606.) And in determining whether the Leon good faith exception should apply, " '[i]t is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the probable-cause determination.' [Citation.]" (People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 31.) "Thus, courts must determine 'on a case-by-case basis' whether the circumstances of an invalid search pursuant to a warrant require the exclusionary rule's application. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 32.)
It is the prosecution's burden to establish the facts essential to application of the Leon exception, namely, that the officers acted with objective reasonable reliance on the search warrant. (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 924; Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596.)
B. Applicability of Leon Exception
In ruling on the first motion to suppress, the court below held that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant because the affidavit failed to specify when the TCI observed the drug sales activity at the El View which he/she related to Officer Azua. It nonetheless denied the motion, finding the Leon good faith exception applicable. The court denied the second suppression motion on the same basis, again reasoning that although the warrant was defective, the Leon exception applied. Based upon the trial court's reasoning, and following the approach of our high court in Camarella, we will proceed on the assumption that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause and will address only whether the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule applied here. (See Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 602; see also Romero, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.)
The Attorney General does not argue on appeal that there was probable cause for issuance of the warrant, instead focusing on the applicability of the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
A number of factors support the conclusion that the officers' reliance on the validity of the warrant in effecting the search was objectively reasonable. First, in the affidavit, the TCI provided a significant amount of detailed information concerning drug sales activity in four separate rooms of the hotel. This information was, as it appeared from the affidavit, all based upon the TCI's personal knowledge and observations. He/she identified the occupants of room 110 by name (Curtis Allison and Molena), described Molena, indicated (correctly) that Allison was on parole, and noted that he/she had seen methamphetamine being packaged for sale inside the room. The TCI further identified the occupant of room 105, "Kat," and her live-in boyfriend, "Gasper," stated that Gasper might have some connection with the Hell's Angels, advised that Kat was in possession of heroin and methamphetamine, and said that he/she had seen packages of heroin for sale in the room. He/she also told Officer Azua that the occupant of room 109, "Dirty Dave," possessed crystal methamphetamine for sale and had seen him packaging the contraband for that purpose. Lastly, the TCI described a Black male adult with green eyes and possibly named "Damien" as the occupant of room 103, and that he/she had seen this individual "in possession of thirty to forty dollar bags of crack cocaine for sales."
Second, as it appeared in the affidavit, there was corroboration for some of the information provided by the TCI. Officer Azua contacted Sergeant Medina, who confirmed that Gasper was living at the El View with his girlfriend, Kat, and that Gasper, whose real name was Corey Chrysler, had been contacted by the Hell's Angels but it was unknown whether he was affiliated with the organization. Officer Azua confirmed further with the Department of Motor Vehicles that Chrysler had listed the hotel as his address. In addition, Officer Azua confirmed with Allison's parole agent that Allison was indeed on parole and that he lived at the El View, albeit in room 109, not room 110 as stated by the TCI.
Third, the affidavit provided evidence of the TCI's credibility. Officer Azua stated that the TCI had "worked with [him] for approximately seven months and ha[d] provided [him] with reliable information that resulted in [the] arrest[s] and convictions of individuals who[] possessed and sold controlled substances." The officer also indicated in the affidavit that—although the TCI had a criminal history, familiarity with drug use and packaging of drugs for sale, and was on active probation—the TCI had no pending cases in Santa Cruz County, and was providing the information about drug sales at the El View "for the betterment of the community." These facts presented by Officer Azua offer a further basis for finding the officers' reliance on the warrant objectively reasonable.
Fourth, Officer Azua noted in his affidavit that he had made several arrests in the past at the El View for possession, and possession-for-sale, of controlled substances. And Azua noted that the hotel is a location notorious for "high in gang and narcotic[s] activity."
Fifth, the affidavit of Officer Azua submitted in support of the issuance of the search warrant was also signed by an assistant district attorney, providing an additional ground for reasonable reliance. In assessing good faith, it is "proper to consider . . . whether the affidavit was previously reviewed by a deputy district attorney [citation]." (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 5.)
Thus, viewing the affidavit as a whole, Officer Azua's "application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a 'bare bones' affidavit." (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 926.) Other courts have similarly found that the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule applied where the affidavit in support of the search warrant, although insufficient to establish probable cause, provided sufficient detail to warrant objective reasonable reliance. (See, e.g., United States v. Woolsey (7th Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 540, 548 [affidavit, which contained "considerable detail," included statement of reliable informant that he had personally observed quantity of drugs in drug dealer's residence and some of informant's information had been corroborated]; United States v. Cordero (5th Cir. 2006) 465 F.3d 626, 630 [affidavit included informant's statement to having personally observed cocaine in defendant's home, and officer had tested both informant's ability to identify cocaine and details of where it was observed].)
Defendant argues that the Leon good faith exception does not apply here because of "the facial staleness of the information provided by the TCI to Officer Azua. . ." We reject this argument.
The trial court properly found that the affidavit on which the warrant was based was flawed because, although Officer Azua identified the time frame when the TCI provided him with the information about drug sales activity at the El View (i.e., within two days of the execution of the affidavit on June 9, 2010), he did not specifically identify when the TCI actually observed the activity. While one might reasonably infer from a review of Officer Azua's affidavit in its entirety that the TCI's observations were close in time to his reporting of them, the omission of specific dates of those observations was significant and rendered the warrant vulnerable to attack. The omission, however, does not mean, as defendant contends, that the TCI's information was necessarily stale, thus making any reliance on the warrant and its supporting affidavit unreasonable.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the information concerning drug sales activity at the hotel provided by the TCI was in fact stale, or that Officer Azua knew that the TCI's observations of the activity had occurred a significant time before he or she reported them to the officer.
Defendant's reliance on People v. Hirata (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1499 (Hirata)and People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646 (Hulland)in support of his staleness argument is misplaced. In the former case, there was an 82-day delay between the defendant's involvement in a drug transaction and the date police sought the issuance of a warrant to search his home. (Hirata, at p. 1504.) Based upon this delay and the absence of additional information that the defendant had been involved in other drug transactions in the intervening period, the court held that the officers' reliance on the search warrant was not objectively reasonable. (Id. at p. 1508.) Similarly in Hulland, the police officer allowed 52 days to elapse between making an undercover drug purchase from the defendant and seeking a warrant to search two residences where he allegedly lived. (Hulland, supra, at p. 1648.) The court observed that although there is no bright-line test for staleness, four weeks or more between the date of the information and the date a warrant is sought is "generally considered insufficient to demonstrate present probable cause. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1652.) After concluding that the warrant was not supported by probable cause in light of the delay between the controlled buy and the warrant's issuance (id. at pp. 1652-1653), the court held that the Leon exception was inapplicable because any reliance on the warrant, based as it was on stale information, was not objectively reasonable. (Id. at p. 1655.) In contrast, here, there was no such substantial intervening period (of 82 days and 52 days as in Hirata and Hulland, respectively) between the TCI's observations of drug sales activity at the hotel and the warrant's issuance. As it appears on the face of the affidavit, one reading that could reasonably be made is that the TCI observed the drug activity shortly before he/she reported it to Officer Azua on or about June 7, 2010, which was two days before the warrant's issuance.
Defendant contends further that the Leon good faith exception does not apply because there was information that contradicted the TCI's statement that room 110 was occupied by Allison and a woman named Molena. That information included the statement to Officer Azua by Allison's parole officer that Allison lived in room 109, not room 110 as reported by the TCI. Additionally, defendant points to information Officer Azua received after the warrant was issued but before it was executed—a report from the hotel manager that defendant was the registered occupant of room 110. We reject defendant's claim that this contradictory information precludes the application of the Leon good faith exception.
These facts were presented during the cross-examination of Officer Azua at the preliminary examination. Although the record is somewhat unclear, it appears from the officer's testimony that other officers involved in executing the search warrant obtained the information from the hotel manager, which they then reported to Officer Azua. Officer Azua testified that he disagreed with this approach by the other officers: "They went in and got the information. I wouldn't have gone to the hotel room manager because of the fact that you can't really trust them. We've had so many problems there . . . , if you alert them, that information might be getting back to the people . . . and then we wouldn't find anything." The court indicated that it had reviewed the transcript of the preliminary hearing in conjunction with considering and deciding defendant's second motion to suppress.
"The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." (Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) 436 U.S. 547, 556, fn. omitted (Zurcher); see also People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, 728-729.) Here, there was credible information that there was present in room 110 of the hotel a quantity of methamphetamine packaged for sale. The fact that a parole agent told Officer Azua that Allison lived in room 109, not room 110, does not negate the officers' reasonable belief, based upon a reading of the affidavit, that there was contraband in room 110. The TCI reported substantial illegal drug sale activity in no less than four rooms of the El View, including both room 109 and room 110. It was reasonable to suspect that, even if Allison were living in room 109, methamphetamine was present in room 110, and that he was possibly assisting the actual occupant of room 110 with illegal drug sales activity. Similarly, the fact that Officer Azua learned after the warrant's issuance that Allison was not the registered occupant of room 110 did not negate his reasonable belief, or the reasonable belief of other officers executing the warrant, of the presence of methamphetamine in that room. (See Zurcher, at p. 556.)
The affidavit offers some suggestion that, according to the TCI, the quantity of methamphetamine was significant: "Your Affiant believes that disclosure of the exact amount of package[d] crystal methamphetamines will identify the TCI."
In short, this is not one of "those unusual cases in which exclusion [of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant] will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule." (Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 918, fn. omitted.) Based upon the matters presented in the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, including the specific facts related to Officer Azua by the TCI which he or she had personally observed, the reliance in the warrant's validity by Officer Azua and the other officers executing the warrant was objectively reasonable. Stated otherwise, this was not an instance in which "a well-trained officer should reasonably have known that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause (and hence that the officer should not have sought a warrant), [such that] exclusion is required under the third situation described in Leon, . . ." (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 596.) Accordingly, the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the circumstances here, and the trial court properly denied the motions to suppress.
Defendant also contends that his trial counsel failed to argue that the information the officers learned after the warrant was issued but before it was executed—namely, that defendant was the registered occupant of room 110—undermined probable cause, and that the failure to make this argument constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing (1) of performance that was deficient, and (2) prejudice resulting from such deficient performance. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 961.) A court may dispose of an ineffective assistance claim without addressing whether counsel's performance was deficient if no prejudice appears. (In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019-1020.) Here, since we have concluded that the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of any assumed deficient performance by counsel with respect to the failure to make the argument now advanced.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
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PREMO, ACTING P.J.
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Judge of the Monterey County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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