Opinion
559 KA 10-01503
05-01-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jamie C. HARRISON, Defendant–Appellant.
Cara A. Waldman, Fairport, for Defendant–Appellant. Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Steven G. Cox of Counsel), for Respondent.
Cara A. Waldman, Fairport, for Defendant–Appellant.
Scott D. McNamara, District Attorney, Utica (Steven G. Cox of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.
Opinion MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] ) for intentionally causing the death of Jamon Miller, whose body was found in defendant's home. In his statements to the police, defendant claimed that someone else, whom he would not identify, had killed Miller, and that he then killed the person who was responsible for killing Miller. That other person was referred to as “W” by the police during the interrogation of defendant. On appeal, defendant contends that reversal is required because he may have been convicted of an unindicted act of murder, i.e., the killing of “ W.” That contention is not preserved for our review (see People v. Allen, 24 N.Y.3d 441, 449–450, 999 N.Y.S.2d 350, 24 N.E.3d 586 ), and is without merit in any event. The prosecutor and defense counsel reminded the jury during their opening and closing statements that defendant was charged with killing only Miller, and County Court gave similar instructions to the jury. There is therefore no danger that the jury convicted defendant of an unindicted act (see People v. Cooke, 119 A.D.3d 1399, 1400, 989 N.Y.S.2d 753, affd. 24 N.Y.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 755, 27 N.E.3d 469 ; see also People v. Rodriguez, 32 A.D.3d 1203, 1205, 821 N.Y.S.2d 331, lv. denied 8 N.Y.3d 849, 830 N.Y.S.2d 708, 862 N.E.2d 800 ).
Defendant contends that his statements to the police were involuntarily made inasmuch as he was sleep-deprived and intoxicated during the 12–hour interrogation. Defendant failed to raise that specific contention as a ground for suppressing those statements in his motion papers or at the suppression hearing and thus failed to preserve that contention for our review (see People v. Brown, 120 A.D.3d 954, 955, 990 N.Y.S.2d 755, lv. denied 24 N.Y.3d 1118, 3 N.Y.S.3d 760, 27 N.E.3d 474 ). In any event, we conclude that the record does not support defendant's contention regarding the alleged involuntariness of his statements (see People v. Hunter, 46 A.D.3d 1374, 1375, 847 N.Y.S.2d 880, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 812, 857 N.Y.S.2d 45, 886 N.E.2d 810 ; People v. Swimley, 190 A.D.2d 1070, 1071, 593 N.Y.S.2d 687, lv. denied 81 N.Y.2d 977, 598 N.Y.S.2d 778, 615 N.E.2d 235 ).
Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.