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People v. Harris

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 21, 2003
B163512 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)

Opinion

B163512.

11-21-2003

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Marc J. Nolan, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


Appellant Edward Harris appeals from a judgment convicting him of first degree murder. He contends that the trial court erred by (1) refusing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 9.44 regarding a claim of right defense, (2) subsequently giving the jury a modified version of CALJIC No. 9.44, and (3) instructing the jury on flight (CALJIC No. 2.52) His arguments are not persuasive, and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Viewing the evidence in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66), on the evening of October 7, 2001, police found Nichole Wrights (Wright) body lying in the seventh floor hallway of the Cecil Hotel in downtown Los Angeles. Wright, whose larynx was broken, had died from manual strangulation, and had a towel around her neck and clenched in her teeth.

In a videotaped, postarrest interview, appellant said that he and Donald Sinclair (Sinclair) spent October 7, 2001, smoking crack cocaine in room 725 of the Cecil Hotel. Appellant then began searching for a woman, so he walked around the building and met Wright, who had cocaine with her. Appellant brought Wright back to his room.

After they ran out of cocaine, Sinclair gave Wright money to buy more. After 20 or 30 minutes, appellant found Wright elsewhere in the building. He brought her back to his room, and all three smoked more cocaine. Appellant believed that Wright had more drugs in her purse, but Wright said she needed to sell it to pay for a room.

As Wright washed her face in the bathroom, appellant suggested to Sinclair, "why dont we just tie her up and just take her stuff?" Appellant said that he also "got real pissed off" when Wright crumbled a bar of soap from the bathroom and tried to sell it to them as cocaine.

Appellant told police that he grabbed a towel and "wrapped it around her face," while Sinclair held Wrights legs. Appellant told Wright that he just wanted "the dope and the money," and Wright said the drugs were in her rectum. Appellant said he was "holding her so she dont scream," but that Wright bit his finger when he pulled the towel from her face. Appellant "kneed" her in the face and neck to prevent her from biting him again.

According to appellant, Wright screamed, so he put the towel around her throat and held her on the floor. After Sinclair stripped Wright and searched her for drugs (and found none), appellant removed the towel, which was bloody. Wright was breathing "a little bit," but was otherwise still. Appellant said that he was scared, and that he told Sinclair that he thought he killed her. After a while, Wright stopped breathing, and appellant panicked. He said that he and Sinclair put Wrights belongings back in her purse and dragged her naked body in the hallway "to make it look like someone raped her and killed her." Appellant said that he and Sinclair agreed to keep the killing a secret.

Thereafter, appellant left the hotel and went to the Union Mission. He did not leave the mission for three weeks, at which point he went to Bakersfield.

The Jury Instructions

During trial, appellant requested that the trial court instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 9.44, the claim of right defense/instruction. The trial court refused, reasoning, inter alia, that "this is clearly an illegal transaction. I dont know how to characterize it as anything other than an illegal transaction. It was [appellant and Sinclairs] attempt to buy narcotics from Ms. Wright. And under the [People v.] Hendricks [(1988) 44 Cal.3d 635], [People v.] Gates [(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168,] and [People v.] Johnson [(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 425] case[s], I think its clear that you cannot base a claim of right defense where the right to the possession of property is founded on an illegal transaction. Thats the holding of those cases, and all three[] of those cases are cited in the footnote of the [People v.] Tufunga [(1999) 21 Cal.4th 935] case."

Thereafter, during deliberations, the jury asked, "Are you guilty of the crime of robbery if you take back your own property from someone against the will of that person?" Appellant argued that the trial courts answer should simply be "no." However, the trial court concluded that a response of "no" would be "extremely misleading." Accordingly, it ruled that the jury should be instructed with the law concerning a claim of right, as set forth in CALJIC No. 9.44, but with additional guidance concerning "its applicability to an illegal activity or transaction" pursuant to the law as set out in People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d 635, People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, and People v. Johnson, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d 425. Thus, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: "An essential element of the crime of robbery is a specific intent permanently to deprive the alleged victim of his or her property. That specific intent does not exist if the alleged perpetrator had a good faith claim of right to title or ownership of the specific property taken from the alleged victim. In other words, if a perpetrator seeks to regain possession of property in which he honestly believes he has a good faith claim of ownership or title, then he does not have the required criminal intent.

"However, the required criminal intent exists if rather than seeking to recover specific property the perpetrator is attempting to satisfy, settle or otherwise collect on a debt, liquidated or unliquidated, and specifically intends permanently to deprive the alleged victim of his or her property in furtherance thereof.

"The required criminal intent also exists if the alleged perpetrators belief that he has a claim of right to the property taken is based on an illegal activity or transaction and he knows that the activity or transaction is illegal.

"The possession of cocaine is illegal when a person exercises control over or the right to control an amount of cocaine, knows of its presence, knows of its nature as a controlled substance and the substance is in an amount sufficient to be used as a controlled substance.

"The sale of cocaine is illegal when a person sells cocaine while knowing of its presence and nature as a controlled substance.

"If, after a consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the required specific intent, you must find him not guilty of the crime of robbery."

Shortly thereafter, the trial court gave copies of its answer to the jury, and corrected an error, stating: "Youre not being asked to return a specific verdict of the — on robbery. So the [last] paragraph should read `If after a consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the required specific intent, you must find that a robbery was not committed."

DISCUSSION

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Refusing to Instruct the Jury with CALJIC No. 9.44 and Subsequently Giving the Instruction in a Modified Form

At trial, the prosecution argued that the crime was first degree murder because appellant killed Wright during an attempt to rob her. Appellant does not dispute that he killed Wright, but claimed that he was trying to recover his cocaine from her. Thus, appellant argues that he was entitled to a "claim of right" instruction, as set forth in CALJIC No. 9.44. Furthermore, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it answered a question from the jury concerning the "robbery" of ones own property.

CALJIC No. 9.44 provides, in relevant part: "An essential element of the crime of [robbery] [theft by larceny] is a specific intent permanently to deprive the alleged victim of his or her property. That specific intent does not exist if the alleged perpetrator had a good faith claim of right to title or ownership of the specific property taken from the alleged victim. In other words, if a perpetrator seeks to regain possession of property in which [he] [she] honestly believes [he] [she] has a good faith claim of ownership or title, then [he] [she] does not have the required criminal intent." As explained by our Supreme Court: "It has long been the rule in this state and generally throughout the country that a bona fide belief, even though mistakenly held, that one has a right or claim to the property negates felonious intent." (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 943.) However, the claim of right defense "is not available where the claim of right to the property is founded in a `notoriously illegal transaction." (Id. at p. 953-954, fn. 5, citing People v. Hendricks, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 642, People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1182, and People v. Johnson, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 457-458.)

As appellant concedes, these cases resolve his argument on appeal. It is undisputed that appellant was involved in "notoriously illegal" activity, namely the buying, selling, and possessing of crack cocaine. Because of the illegal transaction exception, the trial court properly found that appellant was not entitled to assert a claim of right defense for forcibly taking cocaine from Wright, and killing her in the process.

Moreover, the trial court properly answered the jurys question regarding whether one is guilty of robbery if he takes back his own property from someone against the will of that person. As set forth above, the response provided the legal clarification the jury sought, by explaining the specific intent requirements for robbery, the claim of right defense, and illegal transaction exception to the claim of right defense.

II. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury with CALJIC No. 2.52

Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.52, the "flight after crime" instruction. Because appellant did not object to the instruction, he has waived this argument on appeal. (People v. Daya (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 697, 714.)

Regardless, the trial court properly instructed the jury. A flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of a defendants departure from the crime scene reasonably permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.) "`"[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.]"" (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60.) "`Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)

Here, appellants immediate movement away from room 725 of the Cecil Hotel and his subsequent movement away from Los Angeles were indicative of a consciousness of guilt. Appellant tried to cover up the crime and leave the scene undetected. He testified that he explained to Sinclair that they needed to "make it look like someone else did it." He then "needed to go," and returned to the Union Mission and did not leave for three weeks because he was "scared." He then headed for Bakersfield, where he was arrested. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that his movement away from room 725, his hiding out in the mission, and his eventual movement away from Los Angeles were "to avoid being observed or arrested." (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1226.) Under these circumstances, the inferences of flight and guilty knowledge were reasonable, and the instruction was appropriate.

Appellant also complains that CALJIC No. 2.52 is an unconstitutional pinpoint instruction. Pursuant to People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 179-181, this argument fails.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

We concur: NOTT, Acting P. J., DOI TODD, J.


Summaries of

People v. Harris

Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two.
Nov 21, 2003
B163512 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)
Case details for

People v. Harris

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD HARRIS, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two.

Date published: Nov 21, 2003

Citations

B163512 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003)