Opinion
December 5, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Tomei, J.).
Ordered that the amended judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's claim that he was denied due process of law by the Department of Probation's delay in filing violation charges against him is without merit. There is no requirement that the Department preserve its position by taking immediate steps upon becoming aware of a delinquency in a probationer's compliance with the conditions of his probation (see, People v Cherry, 143 A.D.2d 1028; People v Bacchi, 112 A.D.2d 940, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 648). In addition, we note that following the defendant's conviction of the offense upon which the revocation of probation was ultimately based, he was arrested three times within a two-month period. Under these circumstances, it was not inappropriate for the Department of Probation to await disposition of these charges in order to assess the cumulative effect of several potential parole violations (see, United States v Hamilton, 708 F.2d 1412).
It was established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was convicted of an additional crime while on probation and thus violated an essential condition thereof (see, CPL 410.10; 410.70 [3]).
In addition, the hearing court's decision not to recuse itself from the probation violation hearing because of its participation in the defendant's trial on a previous charge which ended in a hung jury and a dismissal was not an improvident exercise of discretion (People v Moreno, 70 N.Y.2d 403; People v Bartolomeo, 126 A.D.2d 375, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 702).
We have considered defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, Spatt and Balletta, JJ., concur.