Opinion
C084822 C085221
06-19-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD THOMAS HARRIS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16CF05977)
Defendant Richard Thomas Harris appeals the judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b), statutory section references that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise set forth) and first degree burglary (§ 459). The trial court sentenced him to eight years on the arson conviction and one year four months for burglary, for a total of nine years four months, to be served consecutively. The remaining counts (§§ 69, 29800, subd.(a)(1); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd.(a)) and sentencing enhancements (§ 677.5, subd. (b)) were dismissed with a restitution waiver.
Defendant argues section 654 bars the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for arson and burglary because they were part of a single course of conduct. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
We derive the facts from the probation report, which was stipulated as the factual basis for defendant's plea. On December 12, 2016, the Butte County Sheriff's Department responded to a report of arson and residential burglary. The interior of the home was burned, mostly in the master bedroom. It was determined several items were missing from the residence, as well as a four-wheeler from an outbuilding.
A search of the area revealed several stolen items, including the four-wheeler, which was found lying on its side. The officer found defendant hiding in bushes near the four-wheeler and detained him. A search of the bushes produced a gun, which the victim later confirmed was from inside his home. "[T]he victim's vehicle keys, building keys, various pieces of jewelry, and credit cards" were all found on defendant.
Defendant told the probation officer, "I don't remember being in the house and I don't know how it caught on fire. Maybe I dropped a torch in there, but they never found the torch. All I remember is waking up in the bushes." He nonetheless indicated he did not believe he would have intended to cause the fire.
The trial court imposed consecutive terms for the arson and burglary offenses, stating: "Given the separate intents involved, the Court feels it is appropriate to impose consecutive sentencing for Count Two, the first-degree residential burglary."
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues section 654 bars the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for the arson and burglary because they were part of a single course of conduct and there is no evidence he "had an independent criminal objective to commit arson." Defendant clarifies on reply that "[t]he dispute in this appeal is whether the arson and burglary shared a single objective."
As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335: "It is well settled that section 654 protects against multiple punishment, not multiple conviction. [Citation.] The statute itself literally applies only where such punishment arises out of multiple statutory violations produced by the 'same act or omission.' [Citation.] However, because the statute is intended to ensure that defendant is punished 'commensurate with his culpability' [citation], its protection has been extended to cases in which there are several offenses committed during 'a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time.' [Citation.]
"It is defendant's intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. [Citations.] We have traditionally observed that if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.)
"If, on the other hand, defendant harbored 'multiple criminal objectives,' which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, 'even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.' [Citation.]" (People v. Harrison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 335.)
"Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] We review the trial court's determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)
Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences for the arson and burglary because it determined there were "separate intents involved[,]" implicitly finding the arson and burglary charges involved separate objectives. Several reasonable conclusions may be drawn from the probation report supporting this finding.
As the People concede, if defendant entered the home only with the intent to burn it, he could not be separately punished for both arson and burglary. (People v. Williams (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 339, 345.) However, the discovery of defendant with items from the victim's home supports the inference that he entered the home with the objective to deprive the owners of their property, which is burglary premised upon larceny. (§§ 459, 484; CALCRIM No. 1800.) This crime was complete upon entry into the home. (Magness v. Superior Court (2012) 54 Cal.4th 270, 279-280 [burglary is completed upon entry to premise].)
In contrast, the crime of arson occurred when defendant willfully and maliciously set fire to the victim's home. (§ 451, subd. (b); CALCRIM No. 1502.) The reasonable inference from his plea, which had the legal effect of admitting every element of arson (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1177-1178) and the burning of the home, is that defendant had a separate intent and objective beyond burglary which was, for whatever reason, also to set the home on fire.
While, defendant's statement to the probation officer disclaimed any memory of the crimes, he nonetheless argues there is no evidence he "had an independent criminal objective to commit arson." His logic continues that because there is no evidence he knew the homeowners, and his plea to arson rules out an accidental fire, "the remaining reasonable inference is that [he] set fire to the residence to cover his tracks and destroy evidence of the burglary." This misapprehends the scope of our review.
Defendant asks that we set aside reasonable inferences that could be made in support of the trial court's order implicitly finding the burglary and arson had separate objectives and instead infer that he burned the house to cover the tracks of the burglary.
Defendant argues that the arson only facilitated his escape. The trial court could have reasonably inferred, because defendant took numerous items from the home including jewelry, credit cards, different types of keys, and at least one gun, that defendant's entry into the home and the starting of the fire did not occur at the same time. Thus, the trial court was free to conclude the intent to commit the arson was formed sometime after the completion of the burglary premised upon larceny, or alternatively, that defendant had dual objectives to commit larceny and start the fire without finding a common plan to do so to facilitate the larceny. Both sets of inferences support the imposition of separate punishment. (See People v. McGahuey (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 524, 529 [§ 654 not implicated where defendant's burglary was complete when he formed the intent to assault the victim to prevent her from calling the police]; id. at pp. 529-530 ["defendant entertained two separate objectives: first to commit a burglary and second to prevent a report of his crime"].) As we have done before, we decline to accept that any act taken in furtherance of a getaway is necessarily taken pursuant to a common objective. (Id. at pp. 529-530.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HULL, Acting P. J. We concur: DUARTE, J. HOCH, J.